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ABSTRACT 
Fiscal deficits, which are the end result of fiscal indiscipline 
and lack of fiscal space, have been the focus of fiscal and 
macroeconomic adjustment in developed and developing countries. 
Developments in the euro zone between 2007 and 2011, have 
reminded policy makers about the macro-economic dangers posed 
by government debt. The nasty experiences of Portugal, Italy, 
Greece and Spain forced policy makers in Europe to introduce 
painful austerity measures. Up to this day, the eurozone debt crisis 
threatens the survival of the European Union. Although most African 
countries were not directly affected by the contagion of the euro 
zone debt crisis, they too had their own structural problems of 
unsustainable fiscal deficits and bad governance which caused 
macroeconomic imbalances. This study examines the macro-
economic effects of fiscal deficits and the contribution of bad 
governance to macroeconomic instability in Zimbabwe.  
In chapter one the problem and methodology of the study are 
introduced. The key questions are basically whether deficits are 
harmful or neutral? Linked to this is of course, the political economy 
of these deficits, especially the method of financing them and how 
this affects the macro-economic equilibrium. In order to investigate 
these issues, this study uses a qualitative and comparative 
methodology which juxtaposes Zimbabwe’s experiences with those 
of other developing countries, namely Ghana, Morocco, Zambia and 
Botswana. These countries are chosen as they collectively depict 
both cases of good fiscal management (Botswana and Morocco) on 
the one hand, and bad fiscal management (Ghana and Zambia), on 
the other. This methodology adequately captures political economy 
issues which are not capable of being estimated without running the 
risk of lack of validity and spurious inferences given the softness of 
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data under hyperinflationary conditions that occurred in Zimbabwe 
prior to 2009. 
In chapter two the study examines various theoretical 
propositions on the relationship between the fiscal deficit and 
selected macroeconomic variables. The traditional theory postulates 
that the fiscal deficit has a negative impact on macroeconomic 
performance whereas the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem posits 
that the impact of the deficit is neutral. Keynesians argue that 
deficits arising from public expenditure on investment as opposed to 
consumption actually crowd-in rather than crowd out private sector 
investment.  In theory, there is a close connection between a 
monetized deficit and inflation.  A positive theoretical relationship is 
also found between the twin deficits (that is, the trade and fiscal 
deficits). However, the relationship between the budget deficit, 
interest rates and exchange rate is ambiguous. 
In chapter three we find that the majority of empirical studies 
support the view that budget deficits are generally inflationary when 
they are financed by printing money. A causal link is also found 
between the budget deficit and trade deficit.  However, empirical 
evidence on the relationship between the deficit, exchange rate and 
interest rates is largely ambiguous. 
The comparative politico-economic and fiscal experiences of 
Ghana, Zambia, Morocco and Botswana in chapter four are used to 
provide the trajectory for the Zimbabwean case study in chapter 5. 
The review of the experiences of Ghana and Zambia showed that 
fiscal indiscipline resulted in high fiscal deficits which led to the 
deterioration of macroeconomic performance whereas in Morocco 
and Botswana, fiscal discipline resulted in low fiscal deficits and 
improved macro-economic performance. But central to the politico-
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economic performance of these countries, was the issue of bad 
governance and how this worsened the impact of fiscal deficits.  
In chapter five the experiences of Zimbabwe confirm the view 
that fiscal deficits are harmful to the economy. Many years of fiscal 
indiscipline and bad governance, led to macro-economic instability 
that resulted in record hyperinflation levels in 2008.  
Finally, the study concludes that, cumulative fiscal deficits in 
Zimbabwe since 1980, precipitated macroeconomic instability and 
fiscal unsustainability. Prolonged fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits, 
which were largely financed by printing money, triggered 
hyperinflation and macroeconomic disequilibria. The lack of fiscal 
probity and the profligacy of the state, corruption, macroeconomic 
mismanagement and dirigistic policies, all rolled into one, caused 
the unprecedented economic meltdown and eventual economic 
collapse in Zimbabwe. The study finds that fiscal indiscipline in 
Zimbabwe, other than causing macroeconomic instability, also 
contributed to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, never 
witnessed in a country not waging a war. Going forward, the study 
recommends a battery of policy measures in the area of 
institutional, fiscal and macro-economic adjustment in order to 
control and manage the deficit in Zimbabwe.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to examine the macroeconomic 
impact of fiscal deficits and the catalytic effect of bad governance in 
Zimbabwe since independence in 1980 up to the end of 2008 when 
an inclusive government was formed. To inform this discussion, a 
comparative study of the experiences of selected African countries 
is done and lessons drawn. The hypothesis of the study is that fiscal 
deficits, which are induced by recurrent expenditure, are generally 
harmful to the economy.  
The background to this study is that high fiscal deficits have 
been at the centre of macro-economic adjustment in Africa and 
other developing countries since the 1980s. During the 1990s, lack 
of fiscal adjustment was blamed for an assortment of economic ills, 
namely: poor economic growth, high inflation, low investment and 
unsustainable debt in most developing countries (Easterly, 1994). 
Moreover, the debt crisis that engulfed the Euro Zone since 2010, 
coming hard on the heels of the 2007 global financial crisis, 
rekindled the debate on the efficacy and centrality of fiscal policy in 
macroeconomic adjustment. However, this study adds a new 
dimension to the study of fiscal deficits by examining the role 
played by bad governance in abating macro-economic instability. 
The underlying objective is to find out whether or not fiscal deficits 
posed any macro-economic problems for Zimbabwe and the role 
played by bad governance. 
The study begins by reviewing the political-economy and fiscal 
developments in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. The Study 
employs a comparative and qualitative analysis methodology to 
examine the impact of fiscal deficits in Zimbabwe with special 
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reference to selected African countries, in casu, Zambia, Ghana, 
Morocco and Botswana.  The rest of the study proceeds as follows: 
chapter one gives the background of the study and its chosen 
methodology; chapter two reviews theoretical literature; chapter 
three reviews various empirical studies; chapter four focuses on the 
experiences of selected African countries; chapter five discusses the 
experiences of Zimbabwe and chapter six concludes the study. 
1.2 The Problem 
The root of the macroeconomic problems in Zimbabwe can be 
traced from the cumulative budget deficits incurred since 
independence in 1980. Admittedly, however, bad governance 
further worsened the economic situation, especially after the year 
2000.  Since 1980, issues of budget deficits have preoccupied policy 
makers in Zimbabwe. Fiscal deficits have been blamed by the IMF 
and World Bank for most of the macroeconomic problems affecting 
Zimbabwe since 1980. In the 1990s, Zimbabwe embarked on the 
IMF backed economic structural adjustment programs whose major 
thrust was the liberalization of the economy, the removal of controls 
and subsidies and the introduction of competition, among others. 
During structural adjustment, Investment increased but consumer 
prices continued to increase. Economic growth was sluggish and 
many companies retrenched employees. The deficit remained above 
the 5% of GDP threshold. After 2000, the country entered a phase 
of quasi-fiscal operations and monetization of deficits. This plunged 
Zimbabwe into a record hyperinflation which precipitated the 
unprecedented economic collapse from 2000 to 2008 ( A detailed 
discussion is found in Chapter 5). But more significantly, fiscal 
deficits have been roundly blamed for seeding Zimbabwe’s national 
debt stock estimated at around US$9billion as at December 2008 
(GoZ, 2009). 
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The early years of independence  
Zimbabwe’s fiscal problems can be traced back from its 
expansionist fiscal policies that began soon after independence in 
1980, when fiscal expenditures were incurred on social development 
programs in education and health. Defense expenditure and 
government consumption (civil service wages, subsidies to 
parastatals and local authorities, purchases of goods and services) 
also chewed up a large chunk of the budget. Expansionary fiscal 
policy precipitated budget overruns which were initially funded from 
domestic and later external borrowing. 
Yet at independence in 1980, Zimbabwe had started off with 
an economy that was relatively robust and characterized by a 
balanced current account, low inflation and stable growth rates 
(Morande and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991). However, growing public 
expenditures in the late 1980s put Zimbabwe's economic position in 
a fragile position - a stagnating economy showing low rates of 
growth and high budget deficits.  
Despite a surplus in the current account, Zimbabwe ran fiscal 
deficits exceeding 10% of GDP since 1981. In addition, due to 
borrowing, the stock of public debt has been on the increase since 
independence. This posed serious fiscal and macroeconomic 
adjustment challenges for the Zimbabwean government. 
The following table shows trends of the deficit, foreign debt 
and domestic debt in the 1980s. 
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Table 1:  Zimbabwe: Trend of fiscal deficit and public debt stock as 
% of GDP (1980 – 1988) 
 Deficit Foreign Debt Domestic Debt 
1980 9.1 12.0 43.4 
1981 13.5 17.6 37.2 
1982 13.1 23.3 33.7 
1983 14.4 27.0 31.3 
1984 12.7 33.3 35.7 
1985 14.3 42.2 35.5 
1986 14.4 40.6 36.6 
1987 10.9 41.1 41.7 
1988 10.4 38.0 42.9 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Monthly Review, June 2000 
As the above table shows, the deficit increased steadily 
between 1980 and 1983 before coming down in 1984. The deficit 
rose again in 1985 and 1986 as a result of public spending and 
borrowing. However, in 1987, a partial fiscal adjustment took place 
and this led to the improvement in the fiscal deficit in 1987 and 
1988. Foreign debt increased from 12% of GDP in 1980 to 38% of 
GDP in 1988 while domestic debt slightly declined from 43.4% in 
1980 to 42.9% in 1988. The high levels of fiscal deficits and public 
debt showed the lack of capacity by the new government to control 
spending and borrowing. There is a general consensus that fiscal 
deficits that are above 5% of GDP can become chronic and become 
difficult to tame. The European Union has set a budget deficit 
threshold of 5% of GDP –the Maastricht treaty. Member countries 
were obliged to contain their budget deficits within a given 
threshold. However, this was not followed resulting in the infamous 
Euro Zone crisis. In SADC, the goal of macro-economic convergence 
by 2015, is premised on budget deficit of 5%.  
The impact of the fiscal deficit during the first decade of 
independence in Zimbabwe was well captured by Morande and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (1991), when they observed that high public sector 
spending crowded out both private consumption and investment 
during the eighties. Restrictions imposed on consumer and capital 
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imports are also cited as typical examples of the crowding out of 
private spending in the eighties (Davis and Rattso, 1990).  This was 
caused by the scarcity of foreign exchange which meant that 
government consumed more foreign exchange leaving nothing for 
the private sector. 
Market based reforms  
Public spending and borrowing continued unabated in the late 
1980s. Despite the adoption of the economic structural adjustment 
program in 1990, government failed to exercise fiscal discipline. It 
is noted that government either failed or was politically unable to 
exercise fiscal discipline. Of particular note during the 1990s, was 
the failure by government to reform the loss making public 
enterprises which demanded huge resources from the treasury, the 
unbudgeted defense expenditures incurred in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) war of 1997/1998 , a  huge civil service 
bill and interest payments. The fiscal stance created by the above 
issues, reinforced internal fiscal imbalances which had a 
destabilizing effect on the economy. 
In the following table, we show the trends in the deficit, 
foreign debt and domestic debt during the economic structural 
adjustment period, 1991 and 1999. 
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Table 2: Zimbabwe: Trend of fiscal deficit and public debt stock as 
% of GDP (1991 – 1999) 
 Deficit Foreign Debt Domestic Debt 
1991 8.0 36 23.5 
1992 9.0 56 30.0 
1993 5.0 62 30.0 
1994 10.0 63 25.0 
1995 12.0 62 19.6 
1996 8.0 55 17.8 
1997 8.0 59 20.0 
1998 6.0 78 22.0 
1999 8.0 82 24.8 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Monthly Review, March 2001 
The above table shows that the government of Zimbabwe 
continued to fail to reduce the budget deficit to 5% of GDP by 1995 
as targeted by the IMF and World Bank. Foreign debt ballooned 
from 36% in 1991 to 82% of GDP in 1999 with debt service 
payments remaining high. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
government also relied heavily on foreign financing of public debt. 
Government also borrowed from the domestic market by 
resorting to short-term instruments such as Treasury Bills to finance 
budget deficits. Treasury bills react quickly to interest rate changes. 
The Reserve Bank often raised interest rates in order to curb 
inflation but the underlying force driving inflation was the excess 
demand in the economy caused by excessive public expenditure-in 
other words by the fiscal deficit itself. Continued fiscal deficits 
meant further borrowing and higher interest rates on a larger stock 
of debt, hence the debt problem became self-reinforcing (Davies, 
1994). 
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Failed Controls and Chaos  
During the third decade of independence (2000 -2008), the 
Zimbabwean economy was plunged into hyperinflation which was 
primarily triggered by the decline in production in the agricultural 
sector, followed by a fall in manufacturing and mining production, 
decline in foreign direct investment (FDI) as a result of the land 
reform, sanctions, poor export performance and the central bank’s 
quasi-fiscal operations which were characterized by deficit 
monetization and the total collapse of the local currency as a unit of 
exchange after several futile attempts to revalue the domestic 
currency through the removal of zeros. 
Due to poor revenue performance in the absence of external 
support, the public sector became insolvent and the state was no 
longer able to discharge its obligations. Social and economic 
infrastructure collapsed due to lack of investment and maintenance. 
Service delivery was hamstrung by lack of resources. Health, 
education and social services virtually collapsed. In the health 
sector, lack of sanitation led to the outbreak of cholera which cost 
more than a thousand lives in Harare and other urban centers in 
2008. Because of public sector insolvency, the central bank directed 
the financial affairs of the state and government by bankrolling its 
quasi-fiscal operations across all sectors of the Zimbabwean 
economy. This resulted in high money supply growth and 
hyperinflation. Quasi-fiscal losses compounded the deficit which 
stood at 98 % of GDP in December 2008 although the non-financial 
public sector deficit was way below that figure. 
Role of Governance 
Political developments since 1980 are also largely blamed for 
the macroeconomic woes of Zimbabwe. Since 1980, the state 
dabbled in politically expedient policies and programs based on a 
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knee-jerk reaction to problems. For example, the awarding of 
unbudgeted pensions to war veterans in 1997 sparked a serious 
currency crisis and budgetary problems. The fiscus was strained by 
the army’s involvement in the war in Mozambique in the 1980s as 
well as the civil war in Matebeleland. Widespread corruption in the 
1980s took its toll on the economy. In the 1990s, government failed 
or was politically unable to operate within the budgeted revenue 
due to expenditures that were politically expedient, like for example 
the maintenance of a state bureaucratic machinery- large cabinet 
and bloated civil service. The Democratic Republic of Congo war of 
1998 triggered an unprecedented hemorrhage of state resources 
and wiped out Zimbabwe’s external reserves. After the year 2000, 
the state became pre-occupied with maintaining power at all costs. 
Zimbabwe became a rogue state and resources were used up in 
defending a state whose popularity was waning. As is often said, 
dictatorship is not cheap. At the same time accountability broke 
down and corruption increased. The so-called land reform program 
was the last straw to break the backbone of the economy. 
Productive and commercial Agriculture was decimated. Agricultural 
production declined by 75% and Zimbabwe morphed from being the 
bread basket of Africa to a basket case. Concurrently, bad 
governance led to political instability that took its toll on the 
economy, which was isolated. The European Union imposed 
economic sanctions in 2002 and the USA crafted the Zimbabwe 
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) which prevented 
Zimbabwe from accessing loans from multilateral institutions like 
the IMF and World Bank where the USA has a majority 
shareholding. 
Therefore, between 1980 and 2008, governance issues 
invariably negatively impacted on the economic stability of the 
country. First it was political expediency followed by bad 
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governance. The result was that government ran down the 
economy. The hall mark of all this were the quasi-fiscal activities of 
the Reserve Bank between 2003 and 2008. These activities were 
basically meant to reproduce the state which was under siege, 
economically and politically. It is important, therefore to note the 
political developments in Zimbabwe and how they contributed to the 
economic ruin of the country. This background is important as it 
informs us about the importance and relevance of political economy 
issues in Zimbabwe during the period under study.  More 
importantly it helps us understand a political economy question – 
why do politicians seem to be reluctant to pursue fiscal adjustment?  
The most common answer is that fiscal adjustments are politically 
costly: namely they lead to a loss of popularity and eventually to a 
loss of office. Risk averse politicians will avoid fiscal adjustments 
(Alesina, 1998). 
Alesina and Perotti (1998) suggest that large and persistent 
deficits may point to the existence of a deficit bias explained by 
several political economy factors: voters and policymakers may be 
subject to fiscal illusion (i.e. not be fully aware of government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint), and therefore favour deficits over 
surpluses; current voters (and policy makers) may want to shift the 
burden of fiscal adjustment onto future generations; debt 
accumulation may be used as a strategic instrument to limit the 
fiscal room for manouvre of future governments; fiscal consolidation 
may be delayed by political conflicts regarding the sharing of 
adjustment costs between various groups, resulting in persistent 
deficits and finally, existing budget institutions may function in a 
way that leads to persistently high spending. 
Given this brief background, the central question to be 
answered in this study is: To what extent did cumulative fiscal 
deficits cause macroeconomic instability in Zimbabwe during the 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 10
first, second and third post independence decades? This study 
examines in detail, the political economy of fiscal deficits and the 
macro-economic implications thereof. 
1.3 Hypothesis 
The study hypothesizes that growing public expenditures, 
especially of a recurrent nature, cause fiscal deficits which are 
generally harmful to macroeconomic performance and eventually 
trigger macro-economic instability. Thus, it is hypothesized that 
poorly financed budget deficits cause macroeconomic instability as 
they affect key variables such as inflation, exchange rate, interest 
rate, trade deficit and growth. Besides the negative impact of the 
budget deficit, we also underline the hypothesis that the political 
economy of a country roundly affects its macro-economic 
performance. In this regard, the budget deficit and bad governance 
are posited to co-impact macroeconomic stability.  
1.4 Objectives 
The objective of this study is to primarily investigate the 
impact of cumulative budget deficits on macroeconomic 
performance and develops policy recommendations in order to 
influence the formulation of better fiscal policies in Zimbabwe. The 
adverse impact of the deficit is however, juxtaposed against bad 
governance and how the combination of the two, negatively 
affected the economy. 
It is further hoped that the findings of this study and its 
recommendations will result in the enactment of appropriate legal 
instruments that may regulate fiscal policy in order to bring about a 
sound public finance management framework. This study therefore 
hopes to influence policy reforms in public finance and fiscal policy 
in Zimbabwe. 
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1.5 Methodology 
Several studies have employed econometric tests to 
determine the relationship between the deficit and macroeconomic 
variables. The estimation techniques employed to examine the 
relationship include but are not limited to: the Error Correction 
Model (ECM)( Monadjeni and Huh,1998), OLS (Darrat, 1985), 
Univariate Cointegration tests such as the autoregressive distributed 
lag models and Phillips-Hanse methods ( Abbas and Sanhita, 2005), 
Cointegration Analysis (Solomon,  De Wet and Walter 2004), 
Granger Technique (Darrat, 1998)  Linear Model (Easterly et al, 
1994), Vector Autoregression Model (Dwyer, 1982), Non-Linear 
Model, Catao and Torrones (2005), Granger-Sims Causality 
Techniques (Piersanti, 2000), Overlapping Generations Model ( 
Blanchard,1996), Engle Granger Two Step Procedure (Cheng,1988) 
and SURE Technique (Vamvoukas, 2002). These Estimation models 
were applied on consistent data which abstracted from structural 
and political influences 
This study is however, not a quantitative study. It is a political 
economy study based on a qualitative and comparative analysis 
methodology. The aim is to explore political, structural and 
economic reasons for persistent fiscal deficits in developing 
countries. In this regard, case studies of selected African countries’ 
experiences with overspending will be reviewed with a specific focus 
on public expenditures and the extent to which they affected 
macroeconomic performance in general, and in particular, the 
impact of fiscal deficits on inflation, interest rates, exchange rate 
and trade deficit in those countries. For this qualitative and 
comparative analysis methodology, the countries picked are 
Morocco and Botswana (representing the best case scenario), 
Ghana and Zambia (representing the worst case scenario).  The 
qualitative and comparative methodological approach marks a 
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departure from the conventional quantitative models which fail to 
capture political economy and structural factors which nevertheless 
have an important bearing on the budget deficit. Moreover, in a 
hyperinflationary economy like Zimbabwe, econometric modeling 
using soft data may be spurious and misleading. Hyperinflation 
occurs when month-on-month inflation exceeds 50% (Hanke, 
2010). In this regard, the qualitative and comparative 
methodological approach provides a unique and alternative platform 
to investigate what has always been a subject of econometric 
application – the macroeconomic impact of the fiscal deficit. 
Therefore chapter four of this study embodies and embraces 
the qualitative and comparative Methodology of the Study. This 
approach naturally removes the need for a dedicated chapter on 
Research Methodology, Data Analysis and Interpretation which 
would have been necessary in the case of an econometric study.  In 
short, this is a political economy study based on exploratory, 
qualitative and comparative analysis methodology. 
1.6 Justification for the study 
Zimbabwe is in search of long-term policies not only for 
macro-economic stabilization but also for sustainable economic 
growth and development. The private sector has always mourned 
that the fiscal deficit and its inflationary financing has led to a slow- 
down in economic activity. There is need for a comprehensive study 
which exposes the dynamics of the public sector expenditure, fiscal 
deficit and its boomerang effects on the economy. The justification 
of the study is that it will add value to policy making especially in 
regard to fiscal adjustment and macroeconomic management. The 
findings of the study will also assist policy makers to understand the 
centrality of the public sector deficit in policy formulation. It is 
further hoped that the findings of the study will assist policy makers 
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to place the right emphasis on the role of fiscal adjustment in 
economic policy. 
1.7 Delimitation of Scope 
This study suffered limitations with regard to the availability 
of continuous and consistent data. Due to the economic challenges 
experienced in Zimbabwe, the various statistical agencies were not 
able to periodically update information.  Data bases of other 
selected African countries were in some cases very difficult to 
access and also not quite user-friendly. Because of the differences 
in the data structure and format for Zimbabwe and other selected 
African countries, it was not possible, in the chapters dealing with 
these countries, to strictly maintain the template and style of 
presentation which was provided in the chapters dealing with the 
review of theoretical literature and empirical evidence. The use of 
soft nominal data in hyperinflationary economies like Zimbabwe 
could also present data comparability problems. However, these 
limitations are in my view not material enough to alter the findings 
and conclusions of this study because of the use of the qualitative 
and comparative methodological framework. 
The rest of the study proceeds as follows: chapter two reviews 
the theoretical literature; chapter three reviews various empirical 
studies; chapter four looks at the comparative experiences of 
selected African countries. Chapter five looks at the Zimbabwean 
economic history, which for the purpose of this study may be 
periodized as follows : 1980-1988 (dirigisme), 1989-1996 (market 
based reforms), 1997-2003 (failed controls) and 2004-2008 
(chaos). Finally, Chapter six concludes the study. 
1.8 Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to set the background and 
problem of the study. The chapter summarized fiscal developments 
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in Zimbabwe and traced the origins of fiscal deficits to expansionary 
fiscal policies pursued by the government of Zimbabwe since 
independence in 1980. The chapter discussed the methodology of 
this study and reasons for choosing the qualitative and comparative 
analysis methodology as opposed to doing conventional econometric 
estimation. With this background, the Study progresses to the next 
stage – the review of theoretical literature on fiscal deficits and their 
macro-economic implications. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF FISCAL DEFICITS: 
Review of Theoretical Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
This section reviews the theoretical literature on fiscal deficits 
with a view to helping us understand the macro-economic 
consequences of fiscal deficits. However, in doing so, we also 
critique the various theoretical postulations.   
Fiscal deficits have been at the forefront of macroeconomic 
adjustment since the 1980s, both in developed and developing 
countries. Deficits are often blamed for the assortment of ills that 
beset developing countries in the 1980s: over-indebtedness leading 
to the debt crisis beginning 1982, high inflation, poor investment 
and growth performance (Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991).  On 
the other hand, fiscal deficits form a central part of macroeconomic 
policies aimed at stabilizing business cycle fluctuations.  Over the 
past two decades, this role of fiscal policy has been under- 
emphasized but during the current global financial and economic 
crises, fiscal policy (and fiscal deficits in particular) has come to play 
a central role. Recently, the debt crisis faced by the PIGS (Portugal, 
Ireland, Greece and Spain) shows the importance of fiscal policy in 
maintaining macroeconomic stability. The US is weighed by 
unsustainable public debt and so is Britain. 
The assessment of the macroeconomic effects of fiscal deficits 
has been the subject of an extensive literature, both in developed 
and developing countries. In particular, the connection between 
fiscal deficits, money growth and inflation has long been a dominant 
theme in the traditional view of the inflationary process.  Focus has 
also been placed on the alternative deficit financing options and 
their impact on the behavior of interest rates and the sustainability 
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of fiscal deficits as well as the impact of public sector imbalances on 
the current account and the real exchange rate. 
The macroeconomic effects of fiscal deficits depend on how 
they are financed as well as on the composition of spending 
(Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991). Each major type of financing 
corresponds to a macroeconomic imbalance, if used excessively 
(Easterly, 1995). Money creation to finance the deficit leads to 
inflation; domestic borrowing leads to a credit squeeze and 
crowding out of private investment and consumption; external 
borrowing leads to a current account deficit and real exchange rate 
appreciation.  
In this chapter the theoretical aspects of the various 
relationships between fiscal deficits and the other major 
macroeconomic variables are considered.  The first section is 
devoted to the definition of the budget deficit and a brief outline of 
the various relevant alternative concepts used in the literature on 
fiscal deficits. We also define the public sector and discuss some 
measurement issues within the context of defining the scope of the 
public sector.  This is followed by a discussion of the three major 
schools of thought on fiscal deficits, viz. the Keynesian, Neo-
classical and Ricardian schools.  Finally the relationships between 
fiscal deficits and the various relevant macroeconomic aggregates 
such as inflation, interest rates, the balance of payments, exchange 
rates and economic growth are discussed. 
2.2 Fiscal Deficits: Definitions and Conceptual Issues 
Introduction 
The concept of a fiscal (budget) deficit is, in principle, simple 
enough:  It basically represents the difference between the 
government’s normal income from taxes and other sources, and its 
expenditure. Under this section we however go beyond the simple 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 17
definition of the budget deficit and provide a more sophisticated 
economic definition. We will also look at the alternative deficit 
concepts that are used in the calibration of various deficit measures.   
Simplified Definition 
A budget deficit occurs when fiscal revenues fall short of 
current and capital expenditures (including interest payments on 
public debt). Government budget constraints implies that any 
excess of government expenditure and net interest payments on 
debts over current revenue (taxes) has to be financed by public 
borrowing, sale of assets or money creation. Starting from the 
national income identity, the government budget deficit (G-T) is 
equal to net private Saving (S-I) plus current account deficit (IMP-
EXP). Therefore (G-T)= (S-I) + (IMP-EXP). This suggests that an 
increased fiscal deficit will have to be balanced by increased net 
private saving (either by “crowding out” I, or by raising S, i.e the 
so-called Ricardian Equivalence) or by increasing the current 
account deficit (i.e increasing reliance on foreign savings) 
From the financing side: 
G-T = foreign borrowing + domestic borrowing + printing 
money + depleting assets.  
(external grants may be counted “above the line” and would 
therefore be included in G-T.) 
Printing money is one way to finance a deficit. So long as the 
demand for base money (M3) is growing, as in a growing economy, 
governments can print money without raising inflation. If elasticity 
of money demand is unity, base money could be increased at the 
same rate as GDP growth. 
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Increasing base money at a higher rate can spur inflation. 
Inflation reduces the value of government debt and yields 
seignorage revenue (hence somewhat provides an incentive for 
governments to expand money supply). 
Another way of financing the deficit is to draw down on 
foreign exchange reserves or other assets. However, reducing 
reserves may cause the domestic currency to depreciate. Finally, 
deficits can be financed through domestic or external borrowing.  
The government budget constraint provides the linkage 
between taxes, expenditure, and alternative sources of financing of 
public imbalances. It is an essential tool for understanding the 
relationship between monetary and fiscal policies, and more 
generally the macroeconomic effects of fiscal deficits. 
More Sophisticated Definition 
A more sophisticated definition of a consolidated budget 
deficit is demonstrated by Agenor and Montiel (1996). Following 
Agenor and Montiel (1996), we consider a small open economy 
operating under a predetermined exchange rate regime. The central 
bank provides loans only to the general government, which includes 
central and local government. In general, the government can 
finance its budget deficit by either issuing domestic bonds, 
borrowing abroad or borrowing from the central bank. The 
consolidated budget identity of the general government can thus be 
written as: 
L .t + +.tB E t  F gt  = P t  (g t  - tτ   )+ i t  B t  + i *t E t  F gt  + i cL t  (1) 
Where L t  is the nominal stock of credit allocated by the 
central bank, B t  the stock of domestic currency denominated 
interest bearing public debt, F gt  the stock of foreign currency 
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denominated interest bearing public debt, g t  real public spending 
on goods and services (including current and capital expenditure), 
tτ  the real tax revenue(net of transfer payments), i t  the domestic 
interest rate, i *t  the foreign interest rate,  0 ≤ i c ≤ i t  the interest 
rate paid by the government on central bank loans, E t  the nominal 
exchange rate, and P t  the domestic price level. It is important to 
note that equation (1) abstracts from the existence of non-tax 
revenue and foreign grants, although these components may be 
sizable in developing countries. Normally in developing countries the 
proportion of non-tax revenue in total fiscus resources is much 
larger than in developed countries (Burgess and Stein, 1993). The 
exclusion of non-tax revenues and foreign grants is purely for 
reasons of simplicity.  
The right hand side of equation (1) shows the components of 
the general government deficit (expenditure, taxes, and interest on 
domestic and foreign debt), and the left hand side identifies the 
sources of financing of fiscal imbalance. The government budget 
constraint thus indicates that the fiscal deficit i c  is financed by an 
increase in interest bearing domestic and external debt, or credit 
from the  central bank. 
The central bank balance sheet in this economy is given by 
M t  = L t  + E t  R t  - tΩ ,        (2) 
Where M t  is the nominal stock of base money (currency held 
by the public and reserves held by commercial banks), R t  the stock 
of foreign exchange reserves and tΩ  the central bank’s accumulated 
profits or, equivalently, its net worth. Profits of the central bank 
consist of the interest received on its loans to the government, its 
interest earnings on foreign reserves, and capital gains resulting 
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from the revaluation of reserves E t  R t . In the absence of operating 
costs, the counterpart of these profits is an increase in the central 
bank’s net worth, the nominal value of which is also affected by 
capital gains arising from exchange rate depreciation: 
     Ω t   = I *t  E t  R t +i c+  L t +E t  R t ,     (3) 
Where for simplicity, the interest rate earned on reserves is 
assumed to be the same as that paid on the government’s foreign 
debt. 
Obtaining the overall public sector deficit requires 
consolidating the general government budget constraint with that of 
the central bank. To do so, central bank profits need to be 
subtracted from the general government deficit, and the increase in 
its net worth must be deducted from the general government’s 
increase in liabilities. Thus from equation (1) and (3), 
L t + B t +E t  F
g
t  - tΩ   = P t  (g t  - tτ  )+ i t + B t + I t *  E t  (B gt  -R t  ) – 
E t  R t ,    (4)  
From equation (2), L t  = M t  – E t  R t  – E t  R t  + tΩ . Substituting this 
result in equation (4) yields 
M t  + B t  + E t  (F
g
t  – R t  ) = P t  (g t  -  tτ  ) + i t  B t  +  i *t  E t  (F gt  – R t ). 
Defining net public foreign debt as F t
*  = F gt  - R t  yields 
M t   + B t  + E t  F
*
t  = P t  (g t  - tτ  ) +i t B t  + i *t E t  F *t .        (5) 
On the basis of equation (5), several commonly used budget 
concepts can thus be derived. 
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Conventional Deficit 
The conventional deficit is, as the name suggests, the most 
common term used to designate the government’s budget deficit. 
From the onset, it is instructive to note that the conventional deficit 
is a composite measure that includes capital expenditure, like for 
example expenditure on infrastructure. The conventional deficit may 
generally be described as the resource use of the public sector 
which remains to be financed after the government has offset its 
receipts against its outlays (Abedian and Biggs (1998)).  More 
formally Tanzi, Blejer and Tejeiro(1993: 178) define the 
conventional budget deficit as measured on a cash basis as “the 
difference between total government cash outlays, including interest 
outlays but excluding amortization payments on the outstanding 
stock of public debt, and total cash receipts, including tax and non-
tax revenues, and grants, but excluding borrowing proceeds.” 
The conventional deficit may also be defined with reference to 
the government’s budget constraint (see Agenor (2004)). 
G-(TT+TN)+iB-1+i*EB*t-1 = L+B+EB* ……………………………………(1) 
Where 
G = public spending on goods and services (both current and 
capital expenditure) 
TT = tax revenue 
TN = non-tax revenue 
B(B*) = domestic (foreign currency denominated) public debt 
(end of period) 
i(i*) = domestic (foreign currency denominated) public debt 
interest rate 
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E = nominal exchange rate 
L = change in nominal stock of credit allocated by the 
central bank. 
From equation (1), the conventional deficit can then be defined 
algebraically as: 
D = G-(TT+TN)+iB-1+i*EB*-1  ....................................... (2) 
The conventional deficit can be very sensitive to inflation. The 
key reason is the effect of inflation on nominal interest payments on 
the public debt (Tanzi, Blejer and Teijero, 1993). The Olivera-Tanzi 
effect means that inflation can reduce real revenue in the presence 
of collection lags (Agenor (2004)). The reason being that there 
typically is a time lag between the time tax payments are assessed 
and the time they are collected by the fiscal authorities. The 
Patinkin effect (Agenor (2004)) refers to a situation where inflation 
can reduce nominal government spending in real value if it is fixed.   
Blejer and Cheasty (1991) stress the point that the choice of 
accounting method has a bearing on the size or magnitude of the 
conventional deficit. A cash-basis deficit would differ in magnitude 
from an accrual basis-deficit. For example, in a cash-basis deficit, 
only expenses and revenues based on cash transactions are used to 
calculate the deficit whereas in accrual basis-deficit, transactions 
are recorded on a payment order basis or accruals which do not 
necessarily imply present cash flows, e.g payment arrears or 
interest payment arrears (Abedian and Biggs, 1998). Therefore, 
accrual-basis deficits are normally larger than cash-basis deficits. 
Because of the reliance on the cash-basis deficit by the 
conventional deficit measure, it is argued that the conventional 
deficit fails to adequately explain or present the fiscal stance which 
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is defined as the “aggregate demand pressure exerted by the public 
sector on the currently available resources” (Abedian and Biggs, 
1998, p. 186).  
But given the computational difficulties associated with the 
derivation of more accurate budget deficit constructs, the 
conventional deficit will probably continue to be the most widely 
used deficit measure.  
Primary Deficit 
The primary deficit is derived by subtracting interest 
payments on the stock of debt from the conventional deficit. By 
removing the effects of previous deficits on the budget, the primary 
deficit paints a more accurate picture of the fiscal stance than the 
conventional deficit measure (Abedian and Biggs, 1998). 
In algebraic terms the primary deficit can thus be defined as: 
D = G-(TT+TN)  ……………………………………………………………………………….(3) 
The primary deficit is important for evaluating the 
sustainability of government deficits and the consistency among 
macroeconomic targets (Agenor and Montiel, 1996) 
Operational Deficit 
The sensitivity of the conventional deficit to inflation has 
resulted in the development of an alternative concept, the so-called 
operational deficit, which is calculated by adjusting the conventional 
deficit for the inflation component of nominal interest rates.  More 
specifically, Abedian and Biggs (1998: 191) define the operational 
deficit as the “conventional deficit minus that part of debt service 
which compensates debt holders for actual inflation, or equivalently 
as the primary deficit plus the real component of interest 
payments”.  It should be noted however, that the operational deficit 
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is rendered less useful when inflation is highly variable.  This follows 
from the difficulties in measuring and interpreting real interest rates 
under these circumstances (see Agenor (2004)). 
The operational deficit can be thought of as providing an 
approximate measure of the size of the deficit the government 
would face at a zero inflation rate (Agenor and Montiel, 1996) 
Current Deficit 
In order to relate the budget deficit to total savings in the 
economy, the fact that the conventional deficit is measured on a 
basis that includes capital spending by government needs to be 
recognized.  The concept of a current deficit provides for this by 
measuring only non-capital revenues and expenditures.  Abedian 
and Biggs (1998: 194) define the current deficit as the conventional 
deficit exclusive of investment outlays and capital revenues by the 
government.  It should be noted, however, that a number of 
difficulties may arise in calculating current deficits.  See Abedian 
and Biggs (1998: 195-196) for a detailed discussion of these 
difficulties. 
Structural Deficit 
The structural budget balance is a useful tool for assessing 
the medium term stance of fiscal policy. A structural deficit is a 
deficit which is not pro-cyclical. In other words it does not depend 
on the business cycle. For example, a structural deficit could remain 
across a business cycle because the general level of government 
spending is too high for prevailing tax levels. The structural deficit 
shows the extent to which changes in the actual budget deficit 
reflect structural factors, in particular discretionary fiscal policy 
options rather than cyclical movements associated with movements 
in the business cycle or short term fluctuations in aggregate 
demand. Movements of the deficit attributable to the business cycle 
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can be viewed as essentially self-correcting whereas changes in 
deficits owing to structural factors can be offset only through 
discretionary policy measures. Removing the self correcting cyclical 
component from the observed budget deficit, therefore provides a 
more accurate indication of medium term fiscal positions.  See 
Abedian and Biggs (1989: 197-198) for a discussion of the 
methodology for constructing such a structural deficit. 
Quasi-Fiscal Deficits 
Quasi-fiscal deficits arise from off budget activities conducted 
by the central bank. According to Mackenzie and Stella (1996), 
quasi-fiscal activities can be defined as operations whose effects can 
in principle be duplicated by budgetary measures in the form of an 
explicit tax subsidy or direct expenditure. Quasi-fiscal activities can 
take the form of implicit (unfunded) contingent liabilities or explicit 
contingent liabilities.  Quasi-fiscal operations are often carried out 
by the country’s central bank but sometimes also by the state 
owned commercial banks and other public financial institutions, 
such as development banks. They are at times motivated by the 
desire to hide what are essentially budgetary activities for political 
or other reasons. In defining the budget deficit, it is important to 
consider off budget activities of the central bank in order to arrive 
at the correct level or magnitude of the deficit.  
By shifting what are essentially taxes and subsidies from 
government accounts to accounts of the central bank, quasi fiscal 
activities can severely distort the size of the deficit. Studies of Chile 
and Argentina by Easterly (1995) demonstrates this point. In Chile 
quasi fiscal deficits exceeded the conventional deficit by 10% of 
GDP. In Argentina, the conventional deficit was falling during 1984 
but the fiscal stance of the public sector, including the central bank, 
deteriorated greatly. 
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The use of the conventional deficit under circumstances of 
quasi-fiscal operations can be highly deceptive since it 
underestimates the degree of fiscal adjustment that would be 
required. (Abedian and Biggs, 1998). Because of their potentially 
severe distortionary effects on the allocation of resources, 
eliminating or at least reducing these quasi-fiscal activities has 
become a key objective of macroeconomic management and fiscal 
policy.  It then becomes important to bring all quasi-fiscal 
operations into the budget, by first identifying and quantifying them 
and subsequently by transforming them into explicit taxes and 
expenditures.  Therefore appropriate accounting of all explicit and 
implicit contingent liabilities is essential for assessing the stance of 
fiscal policy. Contingent implicit liabilities can be broadly defined as 
obligations that the government is legally compelled to honour if the 
entity that incurred them in the first place cannot (or chooses not 
to) do so (Polackova, 1998). Examples are state guarantees of 
borrowing by parastatals or local government entities. However, this 
may be a very difficult task as noted by Bleijer and Cheasty (1991) 
because of moral hazard issues and the fears that increasing fiscal 
transparency may encounter strong political resistance.  
The discussion of the above alternative deficit concept is very 
important and relevant to this study. According to Agenor and 
Montiel (1996), in practice, the difference between alternative 
measures of fiscal balance can be substantial. For example in 
certain instances, it is possible that the primary fiscal balance can 
indicate a surplus while by contrast, the operational balance may 
indicate a deficit or vice versa. In Ghana, in 1981, the conventional 
deficit amounted to 6.4% of GDP, the primary deficit to 4.3%, and 
the operational balance to a surplus of 5.5% (Blejer and Cheasty, 
1991). Furthermore, the discussion of various alternative measures 
helps us understand the conceptual deficiencies of the simplistic 
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definition of the budget deficit (excess of government expenditure 
over revenue). Understanding the different deficit concepts 
sharpens policy focus and leads to better targeted measures. 
Fiscal Sustainability 
The concept of fiscal sustainability has received substantial 
attention in the literature in recent years, including at the 
International Monetary Fund and the European Commission (see 
Krejdl, 2006).  In general terms, a sustainable fiscal policy (budget 
deficit) is a policy that can be maintained without any major 
interventions in tax and/or spending patterns.  According to 
Blanchard (1990) fiscal sustainability is about whether, based on 
current fiscal policy, a government is headed towards excessive 
debt accumulation.  Buiter (1985) uses a similar definition viz. that 
a fiscal policy is sustainable if it maintains the ratio of government 
net worth to GDP at its current level. 
A more formal definition is provided by Kredjl (2006: 2), 
“fiscal policy is called sustainable if the present value of future 
primary surpluses equal the current level of debt (the so-called 
intertemporal budget constraint)”.  This relates the sustainability 
concept to that of solvency, i.e. that a government can continue to 
service its debt obligations in perpetuity without explicit default. 
Sustainable public sector deficit measures are derived by 
looking at the below-the-line financing constraints of the deficits 
(Easterly, 1995). The government budget constraint model 
developed by Perotti (2007) and Agenor and Montiel (1996) shows 
the relationship between taxes, expenditure and other sources of 
the financing of deficits. Fiscal deficits have the following 
components: interest rates on domestic and foreign debt; 
expenditure on goods and services and taxes. 
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The central question is how government expenditure is 
financed? Practically, there are four sources, namely government 
revenue, domestic and external borrowing and money creation. The 
problems faced by developing countries in raising revenue include 
an inadequate tax base, a limited ability to collect taxes, reliance on 
money financing and, in some cases, high levels of public debt 
(Agenor, 2004).  Administrative and sometimes political constraints 
on the ability of tax authorities to collect revenue have often led to 
the imposition of high tax rates on a narrow tax base. The 
consequences have been endemic tax evasions and unbridled 
expansion of the informal sector.  At times the high degree of 
reliance on monetary financing of fiscal deficits in some countries 
has also resulted in macroeconomic instability, capital flight and 
currency crisis. Although taxation is the main source of central 
government revenue, the share of non-tax revenue is higher in 
developing than industrialized countries (Burgess and Stein, 1993). 
Because of all these bottlenecks encountered on raising revenues, 
developing countries tend to rely more on seigniorage than do 
developed countries. Seignorage consists of the amount of real 
resources extracted by the government by means of base money 
creation.  
Linked to fiscal sustainability are the notions of fiscal strength 
and fiscal space. Fiscal strength refers to the perceived probability 
of default on public debt (Abedian and Gibbs, 1998) whereas fiscal 
space refers to the room in a government’s budget that allows it to 
provide resources for a desired purpose without jeopardizing 
sustainability. 
Scope of the Public Sector 
The definition of the scope of the public sector has an 
influence on the magnitude of the deficit and will resultantly have 
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important implications for accurately analyzing the macroeconomic 
consequences of budget deficits. A narrow definition of the public 
sector can lead to erroneous conclusions of fiscal stance. Central 
government manages the main or national budgets. But there is 
also provincial and local governments which are the other levels of 
general government. Therefore general government comprises 
central, provincial and local government. The consolidated non-
financial public sector refers to general government consolidated 
with non-financial public enterprises (Abedian, 1998). Public 
enterprises are included because any change in their net worth will 
influence public finances. Moreover, as government enterprises, 
parastatals receive government transfers. In developing countries, 
public enterprises have been criticized for widening the deficit. 
The IMF’s Manual on Government Financial Statistics 
distinguishes between general government and non-financial public 
enterprises on the basis of the nature of goods and services they 
supply and the different character of their revenues: taxes are 
compulsory levies while income from the market sales is voluntary. 
The function of government is defined as the implementation of 
public policy through the provision of primarily non-market services 
and the transfer of income, supported mainly by compulsory levies 
on other sectors (IMF, 1986) 
The concept of a fiscal deficit is associated with balances of 
the consolidated non-financial sector. This is different from the 
budget deficit which is associated with the balances of central 
government. 
However, in most developing countries, and some developed 
countries, central banks also dabble in quasi-fiscal activities as 
discussed above. These quasi-fiscal activities, together with 
balances of financial public enterprises, fundamentally influence the 
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size of the deficit. When a central bank operates profitably, it 
generally transfers a substantial portion of its profits to the 
government. However, when it operates at a loss, the central bank 
generally runs down its reserves (or prints money) rather than 
receiving a transfer from the government to cover all or part of the 
loss. Such an asymmetric accounting treatment may seriously bias 
the accuracy of a country’s measured fiscal deficit when central 
bank losses are large. Symmetry needs to be restored and the full 
amount of the central bank loss must be included in the government 
accounts in order for the size of the fiscal deficit to be accurately 
assessed. Quasi-fiscal activities should therefore be consolidated 
into a comprehensive measure of the public sector deficit. 
Although it is ideal to use deficit measures which are based on 
the widest possible public sector coverage in order to get as precise 
a picture as possible of government’s fiscal stance, in practice, 
consolidated total government finances are not presented when 
national budgets are tabled in parliaments. The reason is that 
information on all levels of general or total government expenditure 
and the financing thereof through revenue, balances brought 
forward and transfer payments, is not readily and timeously 
available, especially from local government accounts.  
Because of the complex nature of constructing a public sector 
deficit which covers as wide a spectrum as possible, Abedian (1998: 
231) reached the conclusion that “ the deficit is a myth” . Indeed 
which of the alternative deficit constructs is appropriate depends on 
the definition of the scope of the public sector. 
Measurement 
The choice of accounting method also affects the magnitude 
of the reported deficit. Cash based deficit measures only include 
expenditures for which cash has been disbursed and only cash 
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revenues received during the fiscal year. To the contrary, accrual-
only deficits record transactions on a payment order basis and 
reflect income and spending transactions measured at the time they 
take place, even if they do not immediately generate cash flows. 
Accrual-based deficits tend to be larger than cash-based deficits as 
they incorporate arrears accumulated on interest, wages or goods 
expenditure. 
Another important measurement problem arises in countries 
where controls on interest rates or key public and private prices are 
pervasive. To the extent that expenditure is measured at official 
prices, the deficit may be largely underestimated. The appropriate 
solution in this case is to determine, for valuation purposes, an 
adequate “shadow” price for the goods or services whose prices are 
subject to government regulations – a daunting task often fraught 
with empirical and conceptual difficulties (Agenor and Montiel, 
1996)  
The above discussion is far from being exhaustive, but it 
clearly demonstrates that a holistic deficit record has to be 
augmented by other measures which view periods outside the 
current one.  And more importantly, how the deficit is measured has 
an important bearing on the accuracy of the macroeconomic 
implications of the deficit. 
In view of the controversies surrounding the alternative deficit 
concepts (see above) the following section proceeds to look at the 
theoretical literature on fiscal deficits.  
2.3 Schools of thought on fiscal deficits 
Although there now appears to be widespread support for the 
use of fiscal policy, and in particular running large fiscal deficits, in 
response to the current world financial and economic crisis, 
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economists disagree about the impact of such deficits on economic 
activity.  This is especially the case in more normal cyclical 
economic circumstances.  Generally speaking, three broad schools 
of thought regarding the economic effects of fiscal deficits can be 
identified. These are the Neoclassical, Keynesian and Ricardian 
schools.  The Neoclassical school is generally associated with the 
view that increased budget deficits cause interest rate increases, 
thus crowding out private investment (Bernheim, 1989).  The 
Keynesian school is generally associated with a more positive view, 
viz. an increase in the budget deficit increases aggregate demand 
which, under conditions of less than full employment, may stimulate 
investment and growth.  In the so-called Ricardian view, budget 
deficits do not have important effects since rational consumers 
know that deficit increases merely imply increased future taxes and 
thus imply increase in their savings.  The three alternative 
paradigms are discussed in more detail below. 
The Neoclassical paradigm 
A natural place to start a review of the theoretical literature is 
with the neoclassical approach, which places considerable emphasis 
on the supply side effects of fiscal deficits. 
The Neoclassical view regarding the economic effects of 
budget deficits has three central assumptions (Bernheim (1989)).  
Firstly, individual consumption is determined as the solution to an 
intertemporal optimization problem under perfect capital markets.  
Secondly, individuals have limited life spans so they plan their 
consumption over their life cycles.  Thirdly, market clearing is 
assumed in all periods, i.e. the economy is always at, or moving 
rapidly towards, full employment of resources. Therefore, deficits 
thus affect growth only through their effect on the rate of capital 
accumulation.  Under these conditions a permanent increase in 
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government consumption following from a permanent increase in 
the budget deficit raises interest rates, reducing private investment 
(Diamond (1965)).  Thus permanent increases in government 
budget deficits crowds out private investment and thus reduce long 
term growth. Neoclassicals argue alternatively that if government 
chooses to finance the deficit by issuing out government paper in 
the form of treasury bills or bonds, instead of increasing taxes, 
aggregate demand increases and national savings fall, thereby 
crowding out private sector investment. Thus, neoclassicals 
emphasize the adverse impact of budget deficit financing on interest 
rates and savings as a central feature in their crowding out debate. 
The effect of an increase in the budget deficit on interest rates 
depends on whether the economy is “closed” or “open”.  In a closed 
economy (where government does not resort to money financing of 
the deficit), interest rates would increase because the demand for 
loanable funds (to finance the deficit) increases relative to the 
supply. Investment falls and saving in, increases until savings and 
investment are once equal again. The increased interest rates are 
said to have crowded out private investment (Abedian, 1998).  In 
an open economy (particularly one with a floating exchange rate 
and mobile international capital flows), the increase in the interest 
rates would result in increased foreign capital inflows which cause 
the real exchange rate to appreciate and decrease the 
competitiveness of local goods on international markets (implying 
the deterioration of the country’s trade balance, which in effect 
means, the higher government budget deficit is financed by an 
increased trade deficit). The deficit thus crowd out exports rather 
than investment. 
For comparative purposes (especially with respect to the 
Keynesian paradigm) the neoclassical perspective differentiates 
between the effects of the permanent deficit, which is the average 
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deficit over time, and the temporary deficit, which is the deviation 
away from the permanent deficit. In other words, the neoclassical 
paradigm generally focuses on the long run effects of permanent 
changes in the budget deficits under conditions of full employment 
of resources. The neoclassical paradigm asserts that the expected 
permanent portion of the deficit is built into the aggregate demand 
curve and is taken into account when equilibrium prices and 
quantities are determined (Bernheim, 1989). Permanent deficits, 
therefore, do not have expansionary demand effects. They affect 
capital accumulation, but not resource utilization. The Keynesian, by 
contrast focuses on the short run with underemployment of 
resources.  
In the literature, a further distinction is made between 
financial crowding out and resource crowding out. The former 
relates to competition to access borrowed funds between 
government and the private sector at a given rate of interest. The 
later occurs when the government competes with the private sector 
on purchasing certain resources like human resources, raw 
materials and other inputs.  
The Neoclassical thinking has been challenged for, amongst 
other things, the validity of the neoclassical crowding-out 
proposition. 
Barro (1990, 1991) is one of the leading critics of the 
neoclassical crowding out hypothesis. He argued that government 
consumption has no direct effect on private productivity, but lowers 
savings and growth through the distorting effects from taxation 
only. We therefore conclude that there cannot be any doubt that 
once savings are lowered and growth reduced, the crowding out 
effect becomes unavoidable.  
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Another challenge to the neoclassical theory comes from Heng 
(1997) who opines that public capital “crowd in” private capital 
through two channels, namely, through its impact on the marginal 
productivity of labour and savings, depending on whether there is a 
relationship of complementarity or substitutability between public 
and private capital.  Heng argues that government expenditure on 
social programs can promote socio-economic development by 
reducing poverty and hence, creating a climate conductive for 
investment in human and physical capital through what he called 
the peace dividend. 
Moreover, Kelly (1997) argues that in developing countries 
where there is dualism between agriculture and industry, public 
investment is likely to be a catalyst of successful private sector 
activity and economic growth.  
The complementary hypothesis is crucial because it clarifies 
the fact that the public sector can either crowd in or crowd out the 
private sector depending on the form that public investment takes. 
It all depends on whether the budget deficit is incurred for recurrent 
or productive purposes.  As Aschauer (1989) rightly points out, 
higher public investment may raise the marginal productivity of 
private capital and, thereby, “crowd-in” private investment.   
This brings us to the conclusion that in order to correctly 
understand the effects of budget deficits on the private sector, we 
need to distinguish between capital and recurrent expenditure and 
above all how the budget deficit is structured.  In our view, the 
major breakdown in the neoclassical proposition as espoused by 
Bernheim is its bold assumption on the long run effects of 
permanent changes in the budget deficits. We argue that a long run 
time horizon cannot exclusively explain the behavior effects of 
deficit changes. Moreover, the assumption of full employment of 
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resources is spurious in the context of both developed and 
developing countries. We also challenge Bernheim’s trajectory of 
perfect markets that clear. In theory (even in practice) the concept 
of perfect markets is an ideal and not a possibility. We also argue 
that individuals are not as rational as Bernheim asserts, especially 
to suggest they have all the information to enable them to plan 
ahead in a given life cycle. Even in theory we all know about the 
dangers of information asymmetry. In our view the emphasis on 
“permanent” deficit changes is misplaced. Whether the change is 
permanent or not, we argue what matters is the degree and not the 
kind of impact. Finally we also argue that Bernheim was uncritical 
and unassuming about the elasticity of interest rates in relation to 
deficit changes. In this regard the neoclassical crowding-out 
hypothesis is based on a rather weak and assumed sensitivity of 
interest rates to deficits.     
The Keynesian School 
The Keynesian paradigm points to the existence of 
unemployment as evidence that deficits can increase growth 
through their effect on resource utilization.  
The simplest Keynesian model assumes price rigidity and 
excess capacity, so that output is determined by aggregate 
demand. In this model, a fiscal expansion has a multiplier effect on 
aggregate demand and output. When the Keynesian multiplier 
exceeds one, it increases with the responsiveness of consumption to 
current income. It is larger for a spending increase than for a tax 
cut. If a spending increase is matched by a tax increase, the 
resulting ‘balanced budget multiplier’ is exactly one.  
The Keynesian model firstly assumes that the economy is not 
at the full employment level of production, i.e. there exist 
unemployed resources.  Secondly, it assumes that there exists a 
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substantial number of liquidity constrained economic participants. 
Thirdly, it assumes that consumption is related to current income. 
The combination of these three assumptions renders a 
positive impact of an increase in the budget deficit on consumption 
and investment and thus output. Deficit spending increases 
demand, which brings previously unutilized resources into the 
production process and increases output. Liquidity constrained 
consumers have a high propensity to consume from the increases in 
disposable income which follow tax cuts or government expenditure 
increases.  The underutilization of resources then implies that 
increases in aggregate demand increases production and the 
profitability of investments (Eisner (1989)). Keynesians argue that 
public investment is complementary to private investment and that 
the high level of demand resulting from large deficits increases 
investors’ expectations of profitability. Through these two 
mechanisms, deficit-financed public investment can crowd in private 
investment, and thereby increase the rate of capital accumulation. 
In the more modern Neo Keynesian models, increased 
government spending shifts out the demand for goods because of 
nominal rigidities or countercyclical markups or increasing returns 
to scale (Perotti (2007)).  Under these conditions the demand for 
labour and thus real wages increase resulting in increases in private 
consumption expenditure (Gadi, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007)). 
Keynesian theory postulates that discretionary fiscal policy 
can be used to stabilize the economy. Keynes wrote that once an 
economy had moved into a situation of high unemployment, the 
price mechanism would not work to adjust the economy back to a 
high level of employment. Instead, the government needed to 
intervene to raise the demand for output by increasing public 
expenditure such that once demand had increased, firms would 
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produce more output and employ more labour, which in turn would 
increase demand still further (Levacic and Rebmann, 1986). 
According to Keynes, fiscal policy is a pivotal instrument of 
demand management. Keynes doubted the efficacy of monetary 
policy. Keynes’s argument was that, money did not influence macro 
variables. Keynesian policies were followed in post-war Europe. In 
1948, Britain practiced Keynesian demand management policies to 
replace the planned economy. However, in the 1960s, 
unemployment rose and growth became sluggish leading also to the 
questioning of the efficacy of Keynesian policies by many scholars. 
In the literature, critics of Keynesian economic thought argue 
that money supply has a more pervasive influence on economic 
behavior than Keynesians had allowed for. Hence emphasis was 
now equally put on inflation as a policy problem in contrast to 
Keynesian traditional focus on unemployment. This marked the 
resurgence of neo-classical thinking in the field of monetary 
economics which came to be known as monetarism (the Chicago 
School of Milton Friedman) or new macroeconomics. 
The other criticism directed against Keynesian theory was that 
Keynesian short run models analyzed the economy as coming to 
rest in equilibrium while there were still imbalances in the economy 
yet these imbalances were not dealt with. A further critique of 
Keynesian policies was that they failed to capture private sector 
expectations, in particular, expectations on what government policy 
will be.  
As a result of these criticisms, macro-economic models even 
of a Keynesian nature now incorporate fuller monetary sectors and 
make greater allowances for the role of expectations and long run 
adjustment than did the Keynesian models of the 1950s, leading to 
what is called the Keynesian-Neo-classical Synthesis in the 
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exposition of macro-economic theory and policy.  Our view is that 
Keynes overestimated the supply response generated by the 
increase in aggregate demand. It does not necessarily mean that 
the economy can fully respond to all government stimulus 
measures. Keynesians do not anticipate policy gaps or the mere fact 
that time leads and poor implementation can blunt the effectiveness 
of policy stimuli. In any case, it is unrealistic to assume a positive 
supply response in the so-called short run. Moreover Keynes does 
not question the reason for the existence of underemployed 
resources. Instead, he takes it for granted and thereby commits a 
fallacy of composition. As a result we believe that Keynes’s 
preoccupation with the efficacy of fiscal policy at the expense of 
monetary policy and the complimentarity between the two, renders 
his analysis heavily biased in favour of state interventionist policies 
to stimulate aggregate demand at all costs. Nevertheless, we think 
that the dimension of crowding –in which Keynesians introduced is 
quite groundbreaking in that it allows for the differentiation or 
categorization of expenditure between capital and recurrent. The 
challenge posed by the Keynesian model is that it fails to draw the 
line regarding the extent or limits of public spending and hence 
leaves room for excessive spending which invariably can become 
harmful to the economy. This is quite evident in the Keynesian 
belief that public expenditure is still good even if it means digging 
holes and refilling them. 
Regarding the ‘resource utilization’ effect of deficits, problems 
may be encountered when this theory is translated into actual 
policy. Firstly, for given technologies it may be necessary to have 
spare capital capacity as well as unemployment if sustained 
increases in demand are to lead to sustained increases in output. 
Secondly, spare capacity may occur in specific sectors only. 
Increasing aggregate demand in these sectors will have spillover 
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effects into other sectors which may have not had spare capacity. 
Bottlenecks can arise, which will either push prices up or increase 
imports. To the extent that imports increase, the trade balance will 
worsen, and the aggregate demand effects will be weakened 
(Abedian, 1998). It is unclear then whether running deficits 
increases capacity utilization.  
The most serious and well-known shortcoming of the 
Keynesian approach is its lack of microeconomic foundations and 
overly focus on the demand side of the economy. 
Ricardian Equivalence 
The Ricardian equivalence proposition states that deficits and 
taxes are equivalent in their effect on consumption (Barro, 1974). 
The focus in the Ricardian equivalence literature is on the effects of 
cuts in lump-sum taxes for a given path of government spending. 
An increase in the budget deficit as a result of a cut in taxes, 
has no impact on consumer spending.  Alternatively formulated, a 
decrease in the governments saving as a result of a cut in taxes, 
leads to an offsetting increase in desired private saving, and thus no 
change in desired national saving. 
This is explained by the view that if consumers are Ricardian 
in the sense that are forward-looking, and are fully aware of the 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint, they will anticipate 
that a tax cut today, financed by issuing government debt, will 
result in higher taxes being imposed on their infinitely lived families 
in the future. Permanent income is therefore unaffected, and in the 
absence of liquidity constraints and with perfect capital markets, 
consumption will not change (Barro, 1974). Thus there is a 
Ricardian equivalence between taxes and debt. Perfect Ricardian 
equivalence implies that a reduction in government saving resulting 
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from a tax cut is fully offset by higher private saving, and aggregate 
demand is not affected. The fiscal multiplier effect is zero in this 
case (Hemming, Kell and Mahfouz, 2002). 
The Ricardian Equivalence theorem further asserts that 
whether the deficit is financed by borrowing (debt finance) or 
increasing revenue (tax finance) it makes no difference to 
aggregate demand. The assumption is that individuals are rational 
and have all the information about their present and future tax 
liabilities hence they don’t need to alter their present consumption. 
Thus, under conditions of short run full employment equilibrium, 
debt finance has no effect on the price level or the cost of 
borrowing. 
It is important to note that the Ricardian equivalence is based 
on strong assumptions: Thus short time horizons, less than perfect 
foresight, partial liquidity constraints, imperfect capital markets, 
and a non-altruistic desire to pass some of the current fiscal burden 
to future generations can reestablish a stronger link between fiscal 
policy and consumption. (Mankiw and Summers, 1984)  and of 
course that consumers are fully rational and farsighted.  
Consequently, the practical significance of Ricardian equivalence is 
problematic, at least in its perfect form (Hemming, Kell and 
Mahfouz, 2002). 
Barro (1989) argued that the reduction of taxes in the current 
period would somehow still have to be offset by some future tax 
hikes induced by the government debt. The effect of this is to leave 
interest rates constant. The corollary is that private investment will 
also remain the same. Therefore the wealth effect of the deficit 
would be neutralized. 
Barro is supported by Huang (1986), another proponent of 
the Ricardian Equivalence, who argues, whether a given level of 
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government spending is tax financed or bond financed, that is 
irrelevant. The neutrality argument will still hold. 
Huang’s argument is premised upon the presence of 
“intergenerational transfers” so that the public equates the current 
value of the bonds with the present value of future tax liabilities 
generated by the bonds. Consequently, no net wealth is involved 
when government bonds are issued, and the public is indifferent to 
the use of either tax or debt financing instruments. 
The conditions required for Ricardian Equivalence to hold are 
the existence of infinite planning horizons, certainty about future 
tax burdens, perfect capital markets (or the absence of borrowing 
constraints), rational expectations and non-distortionary taxes. 
According to Agenor and Montiel (1996), the restrictive nature of 
these assumptions poses practical problems. In particular, the debt 
neutrality has been shown to break down if agents have finite 
horizons, capital markets are imperfect, or uncertainty and 
distributional effects play a pervasive role in individuals’ 
consumption and savings decisions. 
And as Hemming et al (2002) pontificate, it is nevertheless, 
worth asking whether there are circumstances where a Ricardian 
response is more likely. For example, if a government is bound by a 
fiscal rule which requires that a fiscal expansion has to be reversed, 
then even individuals who do not have very long time horizons may 
adjust their saving behavior to at least partially for higher future 
taxes. Similarly, where it is widely perceived that the current path 
of government debt is unsustainable, and that future tax increases 
will soon be required to lower the debt, there could be a seemingly 
Ricardian offset to a fiscal expansion even in a Keynesian 
framework. 
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We also challenge the so-called neutrality of the deficit. Our 
view is that the effect of the deficit can either be positive or 
negative but not neutral. As we pointed out elsewhere in this 
section, the assumption of rational agents who have all the 
information at their disposal is fallacious.  
Given the Keynesian, Neoclassical and Ricardian Equivalence 
paradigms on the general theoretical effects of the deficit on the 
overall economy, we proceed to look at the specific theoretical 
relationships between the deficit and particular macroeconomic 
aggregates. We therefore abstract from the general to more specific 
theoretical relationships in order to fully understand the centrality of 
the deficit to macroeconomic stability.     
2.4 Fiscal deficits and macroeconomic implications 
Introduction 
No issue in fiscal policy has generated more debate over the 
past decades than the effects of fiscal deficits. Many economists 
share the view that deficits are harmful, and perhaps even 
disastrous (Ball and Mankiw, 1995). 
When economists and policy makers decry deficits, they cite 
diverse reasons. Thus, despite almost unanimous concern over 
deficits, there is considerable controversy about the effects of 
deficits on the economy. 
Ball and Mankiw (1995), argue that fiscal deficits have many 
effects but they all follow from a single initial effect: deficits reduce 
national saving. National saving is the sum of private saving (the 
after tax income that households save rather than consume) and 
public saving (the tax revenue that the government saves rather 
than spends). When the government runs a budget deficit, public 
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saving is negative, which reduces national saving below private 
saving. 
The effect of a budget deficit on national saving is most likely 
less than one –for-one, for a decrease in public saving produces a 
partially offsetting increase in private saving. For example consider 
a $1 tax cut. This tax cut reduces public saving by $1, but it also 
raises households’ after tax income by $1. It is likely that 
households spend part of this windfall but save part as well. This 
implies that national saving falls, but by less than the fall in public 
saving. 
We then need to apply our minds on the question: How does 
lower national saving affect the economy? To answer this question, 
we consider some simple accounting identities. Following Ball and 
Mankiw(1995)- 
Let Y denote gross domestic product; T, taxes; C, 
consumption; and G, government purchases, then private saving is 
Y-T-C, and public saving is T-G. Adding these yields national saving, 
S. 
S = Y – C –G 
National saving is current income not used immediately to 
finance consumption by households or purchases by the 
government. 
The second crucial accounting identity is the one that divides 
DGP into four types of spending: 
Y = C + I + G + NX 
Output Y, is the sum of consumption C, Investment I, 
government purchases G, and net exports NX. Substituting this 
expression for Y into the previous equation for national saving yields 
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S = I + NX 
This simple equation sheds considerable light on the effects of 
budget deficits. It says that national saving equals the sum of 
investment and net exports. When budget deficits reduce national 
saving, they must reduce investment, reduce net exports, or both. 
The total fall in investment and net exports must exactly match the 
fall in national saving. 
To the extent that budget deficits increase the trade deficit 
(that is reducing net exports) another effect follows immediately: 
budget deficits create a flow of assets abroad. This fact follows from 
the equality of the current account and the capital account. When a 
country imports more than it exports, it does not receive these 
extra goods and services for free; instead it gives up assets in 
return. Initially, these assets may be the local currency, but 
foreigners quickly use this money to buy corporate or government 
bonds, equity or real estate. In any case, when a budget deficit 
turns a country into a net importer of goods and services, the 
country also becomes a net exporter of assets. 
A decline in national saving reduces the supply of loans 
available to private borrowers which pushes up interest rates. Faced 
with a higher interest rate, households and firms choose to reduce 
investment. 
Higher interest rates also affect the flow of capital across 
national boundaries. When domestic assets pay higher returns, they 
are more attractive to investors both at home and abroad. The 
increased demand for domestic assets affects the market for foreign 
currency: if a foreigner wants to buy a domestic bond, he must first 
acquire the domestic currency. Thus, a rise in interest rates 
increases the demand for the domestic currency in the market for 
foreign exchange, causing the currency to appreciate. 
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The appreciation of the currency in turn affects trade in goods 
and services. With a stronger currency, domestic goods are more 
expensive for foreigners, and foreign goods are cheaper for 
domestic residents. Exports fall, imports rise, and the trade balance 
moves towards deficit. 
To sum up: government budget deficits reduce national 
saving, reduce investment, reduce net exports, and create a 
corresponding flow of assets overseas. These effects occur because 
deficits also raise interest rates and the value of the currency in the 
market for foreign exchange. 
We now proceed to look at the specific theoretical 
relationships between deficits and some of the macroeconomic 
variables in a little more detail below.  
Deficits and Inflation  
The debt crisis of 1982 and recent events in Europe (the 
PIGS) and the United States of America have renewed the debate 
regarding the macroeconomic impact of deficits. But what does 
theory say about the relationship between the deficit and inflation? 
In the literature, there are a number of theories which 
support the view that fiscal deficits are negatively related to money 
creation (seigniorage), (Rodriguez, 1998). In other words, these 
theories do not associate the deficit with inflation. In this regard, 
the argument advanced is that the relationship between deficits and 
inflation is blurred because governments finance deficits by 
borrowing as well as by printing money, therefore the impact of the 
latter cannot be easily fingered. These arguments are fortified by 
the view that the relationship is further muddied by other factors 
such as unstable money demand, inflationary exchange rate 
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depreciations, widespread indexation practices and sticky 
expectations (Easterly, Rodriguez and Schimdt-Hebbel, 1996). 
Milton Friedman (1968), however propounded a different view 
altogether. Friedman argues that inflation is always and everywhere 
a monetary phenomenon. Friedman interpreted inflation as a result 
of too much money chasing too few goods. Hence the reason why 
the monetization of fiscal deficits is singled out as the root cause of 
inflation by Monetarists. 
In order to solve the problem of inflation, Friedman (1968) 
argued that monetary authorities had the leverage to rein in 
inflation in the long run by dealing with money supply growth in 
view of the fact that the monetization of deficits caused inflation.  
The monetarist view, found a lot of traction from other 
scholars.  Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991) supported the 
monetarist view and argued the extent to which deficits are 
financed by money creation, indisputably determines the 
relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation. The question 
whether large deficits are always associated with higher inflation 
was also affirmatively answered by Sargent and Wallace (1985) - in 
their “monetarist arithmetic”.  Sargent and Wallace argue that the 
monetization of debt is often unavoidable and is something which 
happens anyhow. Similarly, Dwyer (1982) opines that deficits 
increase the real value of outstanding bonds as well as perceived 
wealth and its consumption and raises the price level. Such 
monetization results in an increase in money supply growth and the 
rate of inflation, at least in the long-run period.  Miller (1983), holds 
the uncompromising view that fiscal deficits are always inflationary 
irrespective of whether the deficits are monetized or not.  
According to Miller, a deficit policy leads to inflation through 
different channels The Central Bank might be politically forced into 
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monetary accommodation of the deficits as argued by Sargent and 
Wallace (1985). But, he further goes on to say that even if the 
Central Bank does not monetize the deficit, deficits are still 
inflationary through crowding out.  
Barro (1978; 1979) poses a post hoc propter hoc claim. He 
argues that deficits are a result of inflation, rather than inflation 
being a result of deficits. The government deficit is symptomatic of 
the variation in the nominal value of outstanding government 
bonds.  The nominal value of outstanding bonds is indexed to 
inflationary increases. 
As Agenor and Montiel (1996) pointed out, one common 
explanation for the inflationary consequences of fiscal deficits in 
developing nations is the lack of sufficiently developed domestic 
capital markets that can absorb newly issued government debt 
(Shahin, 1992). Moreover, in some countries, the central bank is 
under the direct control of the government and often passively 
finances fiscal deficits through money creation (Agenor and Montiel, 
1996) 
In developing countries, because of limited financing options, 
printing of money, together with the associated seigiorage revenue, 
is the most popular method to finance deficits. This is the reason 
why in the context of developing countries the percentage of money 
supply to GDP is fairly larger than in developed countries . To this 
extent, in our view, there is merit in the theories that link inflation 
to monetized fiscal deficits. No wonder why in successful fiscal 
adjustments, money supply growth is almost always targeted. The 
incidence of hyperinflation in developing economies bears testimony 
to the centrality of the dangers of money financing of deficits. 
Notwithstanding the compelling arguments by monetarists, it 
is however, not entirely correct to attribute inflation solely to deficit 
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financing. We now know that inflation is more than just a monetary 
phenomenon. There are various policy and structural issues that 
may trigger inflationary pressures other than deficit financing. For 
example, utility prices are known to stoke inflationary pressures in 
developing countries. Moreover, supply side economics does affect 
prices. Other inflation drivers include the exchange rate, 
international prices of imports, operational costs and food prices. 
Most Consumer Price Indices are actually based on weighted 
averages of a basket of non-monetary items. Therefore, 
monetarists do an over-kill in their emphasis of inflation as a 
monetary phenomenon. Such a bias cannot be justified as it clearly 
precludes other important causes.  
Deficits, Interest Rates and Crowding out 
Another vexing question is the link between deficits and 
interest rates.  Do deficits raise domestic real interest rates when 
governments rely heavily on domestic debt financing?.  Easterly and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (1995) argue that it all depends on the money and 
interest elasticity of investment, although of course this relationship 
is heavily blurred by financial repression (Easterly, 1989) and the 
high substitutability between public debt and other assets held by 
the private sector (Giovannini and de Melo, 1993).  
Yet another contentious issue is the relationship between 
budget deficits, private consumption and investment.  The central 
question to be asked is: How does private consumption and 
investment react to deficits?  Barro (1974) argues that consumers 
will only offset changes in government consumption – without 
reacting to changes in government tax or debt financing.  In a 
related discussion, Barro’s (1974) Ricardian Equivalence proposition 
talks of a one-to-one crowding out of private consumption by public 
consumption. This proposition has gone under refutation from 
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various scholars (Haque and Montiel, 1989, Corbo and Schmidt-
Hebbel, 1991).  Giovannini (1983), Corbo and Schmidt Hebbel, 
(1991) support the theory that private consumption is insensitive to 
real interest rates. 
In regard to government investment, the recurring question is 
whether government spending crowds-in or crowds-out private 
investment? In other words, does a higher level of public capital 
spending crowd in or crowd out private investment? Theory predicts 
this will depend on the degree of substitutability or complimentarity 
of private and public capital (Easterly, Rogriguez and Schmidt-
Hebbel, 1989, Blejer and Khan, 1984, Khan and Reinhart, 1990). 
Easterly (1995) argues that public deficits could have indirect 
effects on private consumption and investment if real interest rates 
rise in response to higher domestic debt financing. Easterly (1995) 
argues that although theory predicts  that real interest rates will 
have an unambiguous effect on private consumption, nevertheless, 
private investment should decline unambiguously with higher 
interest rates.  
The demand side effects of fiscal policy are articulated by 
Hemming, Kell and Selma (2002). In their analysis they start by 
looking at the Keynesian model which assumes that prices are rigid, 
and that there is excess capacity so that output is determined by 
aggregate demand. Under such a scenario, a fiscal expansion would 
have a multiplier effect on aggregate demand and output. When the 
Keynesian multiplier exceeds one, it increases with the 
responsiveness of consumption to current income, and it is larger 
for a spending increase than for a tax cut. If the spending increase 
is matched by a tax increase, the resulting balanced budget 
multiplier is exactly equal to one (Hemming, Kell and Selma, 2002). 
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The negative relationship between investment and interest 
rates postulated in the IS-LM curve implies that a borrowing 
induced fiscal expansion would increase interest rates and reduce 
investment. Crowding out can also manifest itself via the exchange 
rate as argued in a typical open market IS-LM (Mundell-Fleming) 
model. In addition higher interest rates, attract capital inflows which 
in turn can appreciate the exchange rate and cause a deterioration 
in the external current account. This can actually offset the 
domestic demand arising out of the initial fiscal expansion 
(Blanchard and Summers, 1984). 
It is important to take note of conditions under which 
crowding out can happen. First, crowding out will be more if 
investment is fairly sensitive to interest rates but if investment is 
sensitive to income, larger fiscal multipliers can be created even 
with the existence of crowding out (Evans 1987). The other factor 
that determines the extent of crowding out is money demand. 
Crowding out via interest rates assumes money demand is a 
function of interest rates and income. If the money demand is less 
sensitive to interest rates but more sensitive to income, there will 
be more crowding out (Goldfeld and Sichel, 1990).  
The exchange rate and the degree of openness will also affect 
the extent of crowding out. In an open economy, fiscal multipliers 
depend on whether the exchange rate is flexible or fixed. We have 
also already mentioned the appreciation of the exchange rate due to 
capital inflows attracted by high interest rates. This implies that 
crowding-out is more pronounced under situations of high capital 
mobility. In such cases, fiscal policy is rendered ineffective. In an 
open economy, however, a fiscal stimulus will produce a small 
increase in interest rates than in a closed economy and given full 
capital mobility, fiscal policy is effective since money supply will rise 
and dampen interest rate hikes. 
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Price flexibility also determines the extent of crowding out. 
When prices are rigid in a closed economy, interest induced 
crowding out will be reinforced by higher prices arising from the 
fiscal expansion. This partly chokes off the increase in aggregate 
demand.   
Interest rates can also influence crowding out via wealth or 
real balance effects (Pigou effects). Alesina and Perotti (1995) also 
say that institutional factors can determine the extent of crowding 
out. For example, large and persistent deficits may mean that there 
is a deficit bias – there is political pressure from voters to maintain 
high levels of aggregate demand. This is also called fiscal illusion, 
which means that voters are ignorant of the government’s inter 
temporal budget constraint or resistance from politicians to reduce 
the deficit. Moreover, in developing countries, deficit bias arises 
from the low tax base, inefficient tax administration and other 
factors. 
In theory, where interest rates are relatively flexible, large 
public deficits financed by borrowing from domestic credit markets 
will exert upward pressure on real interest rates and thus reduce 
private investment and output.  
Furthermore, in financially repressed economies where the 
structure of interest rates is determined by government fiat, 
excessive domestic borrowing may also lead to crowding out of 
private sector expenditure, by entailing a direct reduction of the 
amount of credit allocated by the banking system. Whether fiscal 
deficits have a negative effect on private investment, output and 
growth depends to a large extent on the sources of the deficit and 
the composition of government expenditure (Agenor and Montiel, 
1996). 
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However, theoretical postulations of bond financed deficits 
depend on the elasticities of interest to bond financing and the 
prevalence of the Ricardian equivalent. Financial repression also 
complicates this relationship. Moreover, where capital markets are 
not sufficiently deep, it is impossible to reach a conclusive 
pronouncement. In addition, the degree of substitutability between 
public debt and other assets held by the private sector further 
complicates the theoretical predictions on deficits and interest rates. 
Therefore, theory does not convincingly explain the link between 
deficits, interest rates, private consumption and investment.  All it 
does is open the debate to more questions than answers.    
Budget Deficits, Trade Deficits (the Twin Deficits) and Real 
Exchange Rates 
Several theoretical models attempt to link fiscal deficits, trade 
deficits and the real exchange rate. 
First we examine the question how do fiscal imbalances feed 
into external deficits? Theory predicts a strong link between fiscal 
and current account deficits in financially open economies when 
either consumers are not Ricardian or the national versus imported 
composition of public and private sector spending differs.  
In the literature, fiscal balances have a spillover effect on 
external account balances (Rogriguez and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1995). 
This lends support to the fiscal approach to the balance of payments 
which says that fiscal imbalances are the main sources of external 
imbalances. Theory postulates that the fiscal deficit is a prime 
determinant of the trade deficit (Bernheim, 1998) and Miller and 
Russel (1989), 
Theory says that consumers will anticipate that the 
government will raise taxes in the future to close the fiscal gap and 
pay back the accumulated debt. 
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To pay for the future tax increases, consumers have to save 
and accumulate wealth which they can do in two ways – by 
spending less and by boosting their income by increasing working 
hours. The later makes the capital stock more productive which 
fosters more private investment. The increase in investment 
partially offsets the increase in private saving, so that, overall, the 
current account balance deteriorates in response to the 
deterioration of the fiscal balance. 
A look at a simple Keynesian open economy model will 
illustrate this relationship. According to Saleh (2006), in an open 
economy, gross domestic product, Y, is the sum of private 
consumption expenditures, C, gross private domestic investment 
expenditures, I, government expenditures, G, and exports, X, over 
imports, M: Y = C + I + G + X – M                                           (1) 
Alternatively, Y equals private consumption expenditures, C, 
savings, S, and taxes, T: Y = C + S +T                                     (2) 
Substituting (2) in (1) and rearranging terms yields: 
(X-M) = (S-I) + (T-G)                                                     (3) 
Equation (3) suggests net exports equal private and public 
savings. Assuming there is a balanced fiscal budget (T-G = 0) and 
balanced trade (X-M = 0, that, is, net exports are 0), then (3) 
suggests that private domestic saving equals private domestic 
investment. This is necessarily the case in a closed economy where 
domestic investment is constrained by domestic saving.  
In practice however, in an open economy, such a relationship 
may not always exist. An economy with a foreign sector has access 
to international financial markets.  
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The hypothesis that increases in the government’s budget 
deficit leads to an increase in the trade deficit follows directly from 
the Mundell-Fleming model (Fleming, 1962; Mundell, 1963).  
In the Mundell-Fleming framework, an increase in the 
government’s budget deficit can generate an accompanying 
increase in the trade deficit through increased consumer spending. 
By increasing the disposable incomes and the financial wealth of 
consumers, the budget deficit encourages an increase in imports. To 
the extent that increased demand for foreign goods leads to a 
depreciation in the exchange rate, the effect on net exports is 
mitigated.  
However, the larger budget deficit also pushes up the interest 
rate (in large open economies) because this appreciates the 
exchange rate, which encourages a net capital inflow and a larger 
decline in net exports. The size of the effect is an empirical matter 
(Shojai, 1999).  Volcker (1987) argues that budget deficits lead to 
trade deficits and both hinder economic growth in the long run. 
Fieleke (1987) provided the theoretical basis for the relationship 
between the budget deficit and the trade deficit. He argued that the 
dominant theory is that an increase in government borrowing in a 
country will, other things being equal, put upward pressure on 
interest rates thereby attracting foreign investment. As foreign 
investors acquire the country’s currency in order to invest there, 
they bid up the price of that currency in the foreign exchange 
market. 
The higher price of the country’s currency will discourage 
foreigners from purchasing its goods but will conversely encourage 
residents of the country to use their now more valuable currency to 
purchase foreign goods, so that the country’s current account will 
move toward a deficit. 
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In addition, any increase in the country’s total spending 
resulting from the enlarged government deficit will go partly for 
imports and for domestic goods that would otherwise be exported, 
also worsening the current account balance. 
Moreover, the Keynesian absorption theory suggests that an 
increase in the budget deficit would induce domestic absorption and 
hence import expansion, causing a current account deficit. 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) argue that savings and 
investment are highly linked, hence budget deficits and current 
account deficits are thought to move together. An alternative view 
is that the “twin deficits” are not related in the simple manner 
depicted by conventional economists. The link from the budget 
deficit to the current account deficit can be weak or non-existent. 
Therefore, there may not exist any predictable or systematic 
relationship between the two deficits given that there could be 
many other factors that might serve to make the “twin” relationship 
doubtful (Saleh, 2006). 
For example, the stability of savings and investment over time 
can complicate the twin deficit relationship (Khalid et al., 1999). 
And as the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (REH) states, a shift 
between taxes and budget deficits does not matter for the real 
interest rate, the quantity of investment, or the current account 
balance. In other words, the REH negates any link between the two 
deficits. 
An alternative way to view the link between fiscal deficits and 
the current account is through expectations about future policy. 
Suppose the government runs a bond-financed fiscal deficit for a 
limited period of time. The dynamics of the economy during the 
transition period depend on whether the public anticipates the 
government to switch in the future to a tax finance regime or to a 
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money finance regime (Kawai and Maccini, 1991). If tax finance is 
expected to be used to close the deficits in the future, then current 
fiscal deficits will be associated with a current account deficit. On 
the contrary, if money finance – or seignorage-is primarily 
anticipated to be used, then fiscal deficits may be associated with 
current account surpluses. ‘Twin deficits’ therefore arise only when 
private agents anticipate that the government will raise taxes in the 
future to eliminate current fiscal deficits (Agenor and Montiel, 1996) 
The trinity of fiscal deficit, trade deficit and real exchange rate 
can be seen as a chain reaction. Theory predicts that fiscal deficits 
lead to external borrowing. In turn, external borrowing leads to a 
current account deficit and real exchange rate appreciation and 
sometimes to a balance of payments crisis (if foreign reserves are 
run down) or an external debt crisis (if debt is too high)(Easterly 
and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1996). 
Carlos Rodriguez (1991) develops an analytical framework 
that captures several mechanisms through which fiscal policies 
affect private spending and the accumulation of foreign assets. The 
external deficit determines the real exchange rate that is consistent 
with the clearing of the market for non-traded goods. An important 
implication of such models is that the effects of deficits, or more 
generally, fiscal policy – on the current account and the real 
exchange rate depends not only on the level but also on the 
composition of public expenditure (Montiel, 1986, Khan and 
Lizondo, 1987) 
Hakkio (1996) argues that the domestic currency depreciates 
as a result of high demand for foreign currency that is triggered by 
the lowering of interest which arises from government lowering its 
deficit financing by reducing the demand for loanable funds. Thus 
deficit reduction makes domestic assets more attractive and causes 
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the currency to appreciate. Stoker (1999) argues that in the short 
term, an increase in deficit spending increases the value of the 
currency. Other theories say that a deficit can lead to a weaker 
exchange rate. According to Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991) 
real exchange rates also seem to be affected considerably by 
whether government spending is oriented more towards tradables 
or non tradables. But according to Dornbusch, (1985) and Easterly 
(1995), the relationship between the deficit and exchange rate is, 
however, generally ambiguous.  
To sum up, economic theory suggests that there is a close link 
between the trade deficit and budget deficit (the so-called twin 
deficits) in open economies. Increased budget deficits lead to an 
increase in the interest rate. On the other hand an increase in the 
interest rate tends to appreciate the exchange rate. In turn, exports 
become relatively expensive and imports cheaper, thus generating a 
trade deficit. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter discussed the theoretical postulations on the 
deficit and its impact on macroeconomic variables. The deficit 
occupies a central position in fiscal and macro-economic 
adjustment. However, the efficacy of fiscal policy depends on a 
correct understanding of the alternative deficit measures and how 
they impact on fiscal policy. Despite the various conceptual 
definitions of the deficit, it has emerged that the conventional 
deficit, despite all its weaknesses, will probably continue to be the 
most widely used deficit measure. This is so because of the 
computational difficulties associated with the derivation of more 
accurate deficit measures and the unavailability of timely data 
(Abedian and Biggs, 1998:186). 
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Three competing schools of thought explain the impact of the 
deficit on the economy. The three main schools of thought are the 
Neo-Classical, Keynesian and Ricardian Equivalence (Bernheim, 
1998). The Neoclassical school argues that deficits are harmful to 
the economy via the mechanism of raising interest rates which 
causes crowding out. This view is countered by Keynesians who 
argue that as long as the economy has excess capacity and is 
operating below full employment, deficits will stimulate economic 
activity via aggregate demand. The Ricardian Equivalence, however, 
opines that deficits are at best neutral (Barro, 1991). This is due to 
the fact that rational agents interpret a deficit rise as merely 
implying an equivalent future tax hence they will increase their 
present savings to offset the impact of the deficit increase and 
therefore neutralizing it. 
Finally the chapter discussed the theoretical relationships 
between the deficit and key macroeconomic variables, which are 
namely inflation, trade deficit, exchange rate and interest rate. 
In general, the impact of the deficit depends on how it is 
financed (Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991). Each major type of 
financing, if used excessively, brings about a macroeconomic-
imbalance. The impact of the deficit on interest rates, private 
consumption and investment is generally ambiguous. However, 
theory establishes a strong link between deficits and trade deficits 
(the twin deficits) via the exchange rate transmission mechanism.  
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CHAPTER 3 
MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF FISCAL DEFICITS: 
Empirical Evidence 
3.1 Introduction 
Having analyzed the theoretical literature on the deficit and its 
macroeconomic implications in chapter two, this chapter reviews the 
associated empirical literature. In the course of reviewing the 
various empirical studies below, we also give our own independent 
opinion and critique of the empirical findings.  
The relationship between fiscal deficits and the major 
macroeconomic variables has been considered in a large number of 
empirical studies over time.  In this chapter this empirical evidence 
is considered.   
3.2 Budget deficits and crowding out 
In the discussion of the various schools of thought on the 
impact of government budget deficits on macroeconomic 
performance, crowding out of private investment as a result of an 
increase in the budget deficit was identified as a central imperator 
by the Neoclassical school.  The argument was that a permanent 
increase in the budget deficit would, at least in a closed economy, 
raise interest rates and thus curtail investment and with that, 
economic growth. 
According to Spectar (2005) there is a significant and positive 
association between deficits and interest rates, thereby giving a ring 
of truth regarding the crowding out effect. 
However, empirical studies carried out by Kormendi and 
Meguire (1985) found no significant cross-sectional relationship 
between the growth rate of the economy and government spending. 
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Using annual data for the US over the period (1953-1986), 
Aschauer (1989) empirically examined the effect of public 
expenditure on private investment and the rate of return to private 
capital. He concluded that the net effect of a rise in public 
investment had a positive effect on private investment. This applied 
to the crowding in effect as opposed to crowding out.   
In other empirical studies it was revealed that debt incurred 
on financing such expenditures like defense, health, and social 
welfare negatively affected the growth of real per capita GDP 
especially in developing countries, while debt-financed increases in 
education had a positive effect on growth in developed countries.  
Kelly (1999) found that public investment in infrastructure, 
and particularly housing expenditure, and social security 
programmes are positively connected to economic growth thereby 
suggesting that countries can actually increase budgetary spending 
on social security.  
Using Saudi Arabian annual data over the period (1960-
1996), Ghali (1997) found no relationship existed between public 
spending and private investment and economic growth. 
Monadjemi and Huh (1998) employed the error correction 
model (ECM) to examine the relationship between private 
investment and public spending in Australia, UK, and the US over 
the period 1970:1-1991:4 and found limited support for “crowding 
out” effects of government investment on private investment. 
Empirical results established that in the long run, public 
spending had a positive impact on growth and private spending. 
However, in the short-run, it was observed that public investment 
had a negative impact on private investment and no effect on 
growth. 
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However, Saleh (2003) notes that outcomes from cross-
section analysis cannot capture the country specific nature of the 
government spending and growth relationship. Time series analysis 
reveals the causal relationship between variables, while cross-
section analysis can identify correlation but not causation between 
variables. Saleh concludes that, in general, both the method of 
financing and the components of government expenditure could 
have different impacts. 
The above empirical findings on the relationship between the 
deficit and crowding out make one challengeable assumption – the 
assumption of a closed economy. In practice, most economies are 
open, whether small or big. Crowding out operates via the 
mechanism of interest rates. To therefore make a bold assumption 
that interest rates are always responsive to deficits is open to 
contestation. I would tend to agree with Kelly’s findings that public 
investment in infrastructure crowds-in rather than crowd-out 
investment subject to a long-term gestation period. 
Moreover it is crucial to distinguish between current and 
capital expenditure when measuring the impact of fiscal deficits on 
private investment and output growth.  Some empirical studies find 
a significantly negative effect of public consumption expenditure on 
growth while the effects of public investment expenditure are found 
to be somewhat positive. We therefore want to pursue the debate 
regarding the empirical relationship between growth and the deficit. 
3.3 Budget Deficits and Growth 
A great deal of attention has been devoted in empirical 
literature to the possible impact of various fiscal magnitudes on 
growth (Adam and Bevan, 2004). Linked to this, there is debate 
whether the relationship between growth and deficit is linear. The 
Linear model has been widely used as it tends to fit the data 
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reasonably well for developing countries (Easterly et al, 1994). 
However, this approach overlooks important non-linearities which 
are nevertheless policy relevant especially when the deficit is at low 
levels. Empirical studies by Adam and Bevan (2004) for a panel of 
45 middle and low income countries over the period 1970-1999 
revealed that the relationship is not linear, that is, the positive 
effect of fiscal contraction to growth are most noted as the deficit 
falls from a high level, but these taper out well before the economy 
reaches a balanced budget position (Adam and Bevan, 2004:594). A 
statistically significant non-linearity in the impact of the budget 
deficit on growth at around 1.5% of GDP was found. This non-
linearity underlined the significance of the composition of deficit 
financing and the effect of seigniorage financing on growth. Deficit 
financing can reinforce growth since its distortionary effects are 
less, compared to the distortionary impact of taxation and the 
accompanying increase in the tax rate.  
Moreover, empirical studies argue that the government 
budget need not be balanced. It is argued that there are two types 
of government spending and five ways of financing it – taxes, 
grants and three forms of deficit finance (printing money and by 
issuing domestic or external debt). This analysis implies that while 
the impact on growth of taxes and grants are straightforward, the 
impact of the deficit is more complex depending on the financing 
mix and the debt stock. As Adam and Bevan (2004:594) argue, 
deficits may be growth enhancing if financed by limited seigniorage; 
they are likely to be growth inhibiting if financed by domestic debt 
and to have opposite flow and stock effects if financed by external 
loans at market rates.  In this connection, two types of non-
linearities may emerge, one involving the size of the deficit and the 
other involving the interactions between the deficit and the public 
debt stock. Hence the study by Adam and Bevan shows that at a 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
 64
deficit threshold of 1.5% of GDP, growth is enhanced but any 
further contraction in the deficit becomes detrimental to growth. 
The magnitude of this payoff will depend on the manner in which 
the deficit is financed and how the change in the deficit is 
accommodated elsewhere in the budget. It is further argued that 
high debt stocks exacerbate the adverse impact of high deficits on 
growth. 
All we can conclude from the above discussion is that budgets 
do not necessarily need to balance and that the relationship 
between the budget deficit and growth is non-linear and subject to 
the budget constraint. Finally a deficit threshold of 1.5% of GDP is 
growth enhancing but a further deficit contraction becomes growth-
inhibiting.  
3.4 Budget Deficits and Inflation 
As we saw in the review of theoretical literature [e.g. Metzler 
(1951); Patinkin (1965); Friedman (1968); Sargent and Wallace 
(1981) Dywer (1982); Miller (1983); among others] it was argued 
that government deficit spending is a primary cause of inflation.  
We also noted that the inflationary effect of government deficits 
depends upon the means by which the deficit is financed and the 
impact of that on aggregate demand.   
Dwyer (1982) sought to test the relationship between the 
federal deficit and inflation. He employed a vector auto regression 
model to test the linkage between government deficits and a 
number of macroeconomic variables in the U.S. over the period 
1952-1978. Dwyer found that deficits played no role in the 
inflationary spiral. Dwyer’s conclusions ran directly counter to the 
views of Buchanan and Wagner (1977) who argued that deficits lead 
central banks to engage in debt monetization which is highly 
inflationary. 
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Following on Dwyer’s study, a number of critical scholarly 
articles were written challenging Dwyer’s findings. The most 
outstanding criticism came from Garrison (1984).  Garrison raised 
theoretical, conceptual and methodological questions regarding 
Dwyer’s study. Garrison criticized Dwyer for using comparative 
dynamics as opposed to market dynamics. Furthermore he criticized 
Dwyer’s redefinition of the deficit as the change in the real value of 
the debt and called this an analytical error. He says, “to focus on 
the real value of outstanding bonds for each of a sequence of years, 
as Dwyer does, limits the analysis to the comparative-statics mode 
and overlooks the debt monetization process and the subsequent 
market process by which the economy becomes adjusted to each 
increment of monetized debt. These processes constitute the 
market dynamics that cause the real value of outstanding bonds to 
fall largely offsetting the newest increment of debt. That is, the 
monetization of debt is an important part of the market dynamics 
that cause the amount of debt in real terms to be no higher than 
before” (Garrison (1984: 593-596)). 
In summary, Garrison argued that Dwyer committed the 
historical fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc by failing to capture 
the consequences of debt monetization on monetary growth. 
However, there is a strong argument regarding the inflationary 
impact of deficit financing. It is almost a truism that, among other 
factors, the printing of money to finance deficit almost always 
stokes inflation.  
Catao and Torrones (2005) found, in a study of 107 countries 
over the period (1960 – 2001), a strong and positive relationship 
between deficits and inflation among high-inflation and developing 
country groups but not among low-inflation advanced countries.  
They used panel econometric techniques on non-linear equation 
specifications to distinguish explicitly between short- and long-run 
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effects of fiscal deficits. We find the argument that deficit financing 
has little impact in low inflation countries as self-serving. In the first 
place, low inflation rates cannot be achieved without fiscal dexterity. 
Hamburger and Zwick (1981) examined the influence of 
deficits on monetary growth in the U.S. The evidence was that the 
effect of deficits on the growth of money was present between 
(1961 and 1974) and again in (1977 and 1978). Hence the 
conclusion that a combination of an expansionary fiscal policy and 
the Federal Reserve’s attempts at moderating interest rate 
movements, begun in the mid-1960s, had caused higher inflation. 
This view was counteracted by McMillan and Bread (1982) 
who did not see any connection between fiscal policy and monetary 
expansion. 
Darrat (1985)’s empirical studies on the deficits and inflation 
in the U.S. during the post-1960 period found a connection between 
the two variables. He employed the OLS technique. He further 
observed the linkage between monetary growth and inflation 
although he explained that this link was weaker than the one 
between deficits and inflation. 
McCallum (1984) argued that only primary deficits could be 
said to be neutral. Once interest payments are considered, it is 
difficult to maintain the argument that per capita budget deficits 
could be maintained if financed by bonds rather than by money 
without causing inflation. The logic of this argument is perplexing. 
Interest in calculated on the primary deficit. To me it makes little 
sense therefore to try and make a distinction between the two. I 
argue that, the two are jointly and severally responsible for inflation 
increases. The difference is the same. 
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Other empirical studies by Shojai (1999) and Ahking and 
Miller (1985) all cast doubt on the link between inflation and 
deficits.  However, empirical studies by Dornbusch and Fischer 
(1981), Metin (1995; 1998) and Darrat (2000), found that budget 
deficits, as well as the growth rate of money supply, have 
significant impacts on inflation.  
Abbas and Sanhita (2005) examined the impact of the budget 
deficit on inflation in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The study was 
based on an analysis of time series annual data (1963-1999). Using 
univariate cointegration tests such as the autoregressive distributed 
lag models (ARDL) and Phillips-Hanse methods to explore the 
relationship of budget deficits and inflation in the long-term, and 
the error correction model to study the behavior of the model in the 
short-term, the study showed budget deficits as well as liquidity had 
an impact on inflation rates in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Burdekin and Wohar (1990) sought to establish the relative 
impacts of monetized and non-monetized deficits on output and 
inflation in the US using annual data for the period 1923-1982. As a 
measure of the degree of monetization, Federal Reserve purchases 
of government debt were used. Using Granger causality tests for 
the period 1923-1960, they concluded that in this instance neither 
deficit growth nor monetization affected real GNP growth or 
inflation. However for the period 1961-1982, the study found that 
monetization had fuelled inflation but had no effect on real GNP. 
Non-monetized deficit were found to have a negative impact on the 
rate of inflation in the short-run over the same period. 
Solomon, De Wet and Walter (2004) tested the effect of the 
budget deficit and inflation in Tanzania. The Tanzanian economy 
had experienced the dual problems of high deficit and high inflation 
simultaneously for a prolonged period despite the absence of 
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hyperinflation. The tests involved cointegration analysis over the 
period 1967-2001.  The study concluded that the monetization of 
the deficit, led to significant increases in inflationary trends in 
Tanzania. 
Metin (1995) used multivariate cointegration analysis of the 
Turkish economy and arrived at the conclusion that excess demand 
in the government sector was the main cause of Turkish inflation 
rate and that inflation could be reduced by eliminating the fiscal 
deficit. These findings are consistent with the empirical evidence 
from Dornbusch (1977), Fischer and Easterly ( 1990). 
Catao and Torrones (2005) found, in a study of 107 countries 
over the period (1960 – 2001), a strong positive relationship 
between deficits and inflation among high-inflation and developing 
country groups but not among low-inflation advanced countries.  
They used panel econometric techniques on non-linear equation 
specifications to distinguish explicitly between short- and long-run 
effects of fiscal deficits. 
Meltzer (1989) buttressed the Chicago School by supporting 
the view that budget deficits were inflationary. He referred to 
countries like Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil as good examples of 
inflation that was financed by printing money to meet government 
spending needs during the 1980s. But on the other hand, he argued 
that the experience in most developed countries does not support 
the view that deficits induce money supply growth and inflation. He 
gave an example of Italy, which experienced a budget deficit of 
about 10 percent of GDP throughout the 1980s.  
However, inflation was reduced from about 20 percent to 
about 5 percent a year during this very same period. Other 
examples of persistent deficits and declining inflation were noticed 
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in Japan and the United States. In Japan the inflation rate was 
almost zero while the budget deficit climbed during the 1980s.  
During the same period the inflation rate in the U.S. declined 
from 10 percent to about 4 percent, despite the increasing budget 
deficit of the 1980s (Meltzer, 1989). Abizadeh et al. (1986) in their 
studies focus on the link between deficits and inflation. They argue 
that one way of resolving the controversy over deficits and inflation 
was to test the possibility of a causal link between the growth of 
government expenditures and inflation. The authors’ study led them 
to conclude that there was a link between the size of the budget 
deficit and the size of government. 
According to Easterly (1996) any notion that fiscal deficits and 
inflation have a simple relationship fails to capture the fact that 
countries make different choices about seigniorage to finance their 
deficits partly because they differ in the extent to which other 
means of finance are available. Second, money creation and 
inflation are non-linearly related – the relationship between the 
inflation rate and revenue from seigniorage is of a laffer curve 
nature. Seigniorage is calculated as the ratio to real GDP of the 
yearly sum of deflated monthly changes is the money base 
(Easterly, Rodriguez and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1995 
In summary, extensive empirical studies on the connection 
between budget deficits and inflation, point towards a strong 
positive relationship in high-inflation and developing countries but 
not among low-inflation advanced countries. We would generally 
agree with the findings of the empirical studies positively linking 
budget deficits to inflation. Of course, this is not to say that 
“inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”. 
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3.5 The Twin Deficits 
Several empirical studies have been conducted to establish 
the link between the budget deficit and the trade deficit. The two 
are commonly referred to as the twin deficits in the literature. In 
the US, studies were conducted by various scholars. The US 
economy had experienced negative current account balance for a 
prolonged period since the mid –seventies. By the end of 2004 the 
trade deficit was in the neighborhood of 6% of GDP. Exports 
increased by 11.2% while imports grew by 16.8%. So clearly, trade 
deficit was a burning issue hence the desire to seek to find out the 
extent to which the federal deficit had contributed to the escalation 
of the trade deficit. 
Theory postures that there is a link between the twin deficits 
via interest rates and the effect on the value of the currency. This 
link has been the subject of many empirical studies.  Darrat (1998) 
used the Granger technique to test the relationship and concluded 
that indeed, the budget deficit caused trade deficits. Hutchison and 
Piggot (1984) looked at the relationship that exists between three 
variables, namely, budget deficits, exchange rates and the current 
account balance. The conclusion was that the increase in the budget 
deficit tended to push up real domestic interest rates, which in turn 
appreciates the currency and thereby increases the trade balance. 
Kim and Roubini (2004) did an empirical study of the effects 
of budget deficits on the current account by capturing effects of 
output fluctuations. Overall they found that at horizons of one to 
two years, output fluctuations explained most of the divergence 
between the budget balance and the current account. But after 
controlling for the effects of business cycles on the budget deficit 
and current account balance, they actually found that the trade 
deficit increased in the short run regardless of whether the deficit is 
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as a result of increases in government spending or a reduction in 
taxes. 
The empirical results by Kim and Roubini (2004) were 
supported by Erceg, Guerrierri and Gust (2005) and Cavallo (2005). 
They found that budget deficits regardless of their source, had a far 
more modest effect than Baxter (1995) had allowed for. In 
particular they found that a deficit financed increase in government 
expenditure corresponding to 1% of GDP induces the trade balance 
to decline by about 0.15% of GDP, and a persistent cut in labour tax 
rates that produces a decline in tax receipts equivalent to 1% of 
GDP induces a trade balance deterioration of about 0.12% of GDP. 
This was because when the budget deficit increases, the resulting 
higher interest rates induce an appreciation of the exchange rate, 
which makes domestic goods relatively more expensive than 
imported goods. In theory these relative price changes would 
depress sales of domestic goods and stimulate imports thereby 
leading to deterioration in the trade balance. 
Cavallo (2005) aptly described the problematic relationship of 
the twin deficits when he said that sibling relationships were always 
complicated. He noted that despite theoretical postulates that a 
deterioration in the budget balance results in a deterioration of 
current account balance, the two siblings did not always move 
together. For policy makers this raises questions as to whether a 
reduction in the deficit would necessarily lead to an improvement in 
the current account balance. 
Other researchers such as Dewald (1983), Dwyer (1982), 
Holelscher(1983) and Evans (1985) however, challenge the 
relationship between the twin deficits arguing that interest rates 
were not responsive to deficit changes. 
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Feldstein (1992) argued that the trade deficit was a product of 
the spendthrift tendencies of American consumers and not a result 
of the budget deficit. He argued that Americans were spending 
more than they produced. To do this, they were forced to borrow 
from foreigners at very high levels of interest rates. 
Bahmani-Oskoee, et al study (1993) examined the statistical 
relationship between the twin deficits over the period 1970-1990 
and found that the two variables were cointegrated. No conclusive 
evidence of a relationship between large budget deficits and high 
interest rates was found by Beck (1993) study. On the other hand, 
Thorbecke (1993) affirms the positive link between the twin deficits. 
He argued that a reduction in the budget deficit would reduce 
excess spending and lower the trade deficit. 
Eravi et al (1992) found that deficits did not directly Granger 
cause exchange rate changes although there was an indirect effect 
through the money supply and the price level. According to 
Humpage (1992) there was no evidence of a long term relationship 
between fiscal policy, long term interest rates, the real dollar 
exchange rates and real net exports in a study he conducted 
applying cointegration tests. 
Similar findings were reached by Mohammadi and Skaggs 
(1996), Johnson and Marquez (1998), Houthakker and Magee 
(1996), Cline (1989), Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998).  
Kearney and Monadjemi (1990), in a study of eight countries 
(Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the 
United States) found the existence of a temporary twin deficit 
relationship between the stance of fiscal policy and performance on 
the current account of the balance of payments, which however was 
temporary. They further argued that fiscal expansions would lead to 
prolonged periods of improved current account performance as the 
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economy adjusts towards its long run equilibrium. They concluded 
that the twin deficit relationship varies internationally in magnitude 
and duration, and it is not independent of the government’s 
financing decision. 
Islam (1998) examined empirically the causal relationship 
between budget deficits and the trade deficits for Brazil from 
1973:1 through 1991:4.  Results confirmed the presence of bilateral 
causality between trade deficits and budget deficits.  
According to Khalid and Guan (1999) the relationship between 
the budget and trade was more likely to occur in developing 
countries than developed ones. 
Egwaikhide (1999) verified the above assertion when he used 
a macroeconomic model to examine the effects of budget deficits on 
the trade balance in Nigeria over the period 1973-93 and found that 
budget deficits arising from increased government spending 
adversely affected the balance of trade irrespective of whether it is 
money-financed or financed by external borrowing. 
Piersanti (2000) utilized the Granger-Sims causality technique 
to investigate the relationship between the current account deficits 
and budget deficits for seventeen OECD countries over the period 
1970-1997. Results strongly supported the view that current 
account deficits have been associated with large budget deficits 
during the 1970-1997 periods in most industrial countries. 
Saleh (2006) empirically examined the long run linkage 
between the budget deficit and trade deficit in Lebanon for the 
period 1975-2003. The aim of the research was to test the 
Keynesian proposition and Ricardian Equivalence. The estimation 
technique used was the unrestricted error correction model using a 
cointegration test called the bounds test to examine whether the 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
 74
twin deficits were cointegrated. Granger causality tests showed that 
causality ran from the trade deficit to the budget deficit and the 
relationship was positive and statistically significant. Saleh 
concluded that any policy measures to reduce the trade deficit in 
Lebanon could well assist in reducing the Lebanon budget deficit. 
The above findings are also supported by Mankiw (2006). 
Enders and Bong-Soo (1990)’s empirical studies concluded 
that increases in government spending, regardless of the means of 
finance, can be expected to induce a current account deficit. 
In his empirical studies, Normandin (1996) gauged the causal 
relationship between external and budget deficits by using 
Blanchard’s overlapping generations model to test whether there is 
a positive relationship on one hand and the Ricardian equivalence 
(i.e there is no causal link between the twin deficits), on the other. 
The study found the relationship between the twin deficits to be 
significantly positive. 
Abell (1990:81-96) used multivariate time series analysis to 
examine the linkages between the federal budget deficits and 
merchandise trade deficits. Using a vector autoregressive model it 
was found that budget deficits influenced trade deficits indirectly 
rather than directly. The twin deficits were found to be connected 
through the transmission mechanism of interest rates and exchange 
rates. The model indicated that reducing the size of the budget 
deficit could prove to be at least as effective as exchange rate 
intervention for the purpose of reducing the size of the merchandise 
trade deficit. 
However, Feldstein (1992) argued that although the link 
between the US federal deficit and trade deficit in the 1980s was so 
clear that the two were popularly labeled the twin deficits, it is 
wrong to generalize from the American experience of the 1980s to 
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conclude that budget deficits and trade deficits are two sides of the 
same coin. 
Mann (2002) similarly argues that focusing too much 
attention on current account balance is misleading because the 
current account is not a fundamental economic force in itself, but 
only one out of many factors of the general equilibrium, such as the 
domestic rate of savings and investment, economic growth and 
trade, international investment and capital flows, prices and rates of 
return and the exchange rate, and fiscal and monetary policy. 
In summary, we conclude that most empirical evidence based 
on different estimation techniques have, in their majority, validated 
the view that a causality runs from the budget deficit to the trade 
deficit and the relationship is positive and significant. The phrase, 
(twin deficits) is thus derived from the bilateral causality between 
budget deficits and trade deficits. However, conclusions may be 
altered in the event that the effect of the budget deficit on trade 
deficit is blunted or neutralized by rising deficits of trading partners.   
3.6 Budget Deficits and Exchange Rates 
In a study of the deficit in Germany and the US for the period 
1979-1995, Hakio (1996) plotted a regression line relating the 
budget deficit to the exchange rate.  The results yielded an upward 
slopping regression line, suggesting that both the dollar and the 
mark generally rose with the increase in the budget deficit. The 
slopes of the regression lines were 3.6 for the US and 0.5 for 
Germany. The study concluded that a positive relationship indeed 
existed between budget deficits and exchange rates in the two 
countries. 
In another study of the relationship between the budget 
deficit and exchange rate for Finland and Sweden, Hakio (1996) 
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found a downward slopping regression line showing that the Finnish 
Markka and Swedish Krona generally fell with increases in the 
budget deficit. The slopes were –2.4 for Finland and –0.8 for 
Sweden. Results indicated a negative relationship between the 
budget deficit and the exchange rate in the two countries. 
Apergis (1998) examined the relationship between budget 
deficits and exchange rate in 8 OECD countries (Italy, Germany, 
Canada, UK, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands and France) for the 
period 1980-1995. Using quarterly data and the methodologies of 
cointegration, long run causality and Granger (short run) causality 
tests, he found strong empirical evidence in favour of the 
association between exchange rates and budget deficits although 
the results were again mixed with some showing a positive and 
others a negative association. 
At the 1995 Jackson Hole Symposium whose theme was 
“Budget Deficits and Debt: Issues and Options”, participants argued 
that the exchange rate could be strengthened by deficit reduction 
while others argued that it would be weakened (Craig and Hakio, 
1996). As already pointed out, it is by no means not surprising to 
see that the empirical evidence on the relationship between budget 
deficits and exchange rate is inconclusive because in the first place 
the theoretical relationship is ambiguous. 
Many researchers have thus concluded that there is no 
significant relationship between the budget deficit and exchange 
rate (Melzer, 1993). Other researchers have delved into random 
walk models in pursuit of answers to the empirical question on the 
relationship between budget deficits and exchange rates. For 
instance in 1983, Meese and Rogoff in a major study, concluded 
that a random walk model of exchange rates performs as well as 
any structural model.  
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Other studies have concentrated on the stationarity of real 
and nominal exchange rates and whether exchange rates and 
fundamental economic variables are cointegrated (Chinn, 1991). 
These studies have attempted to establish the existence of a long-
run relationship between exchange rates and economic aggregates.  
Humpage (1992) utilized the Engle-Granger Cointegration 
technique to test for the existence of a long-run relationship 
between the level of the U.S. federal budget deficit and the 
exchange rate during the period 1973-1991. Unlike many other 
studies, Humpage used the level of the deficit instead of deficit as a 
percentage of GDP. He argues that when the level of the deficit is 
very large, it could have substantially different effects on the 
exchange rate.  This study found no evidence of a long-term 
relationship between common aggregate measures of U.S. fiscal 
policy and real long term interest rates, real dollar exchange rates, 
and real net exports.  
Burney and Akhtar (1992) empirically examined the effects of 
budget deficits on the exchange rate for Pakistan over the period 
(1971-72) to (1989-90). The estimated results using the OLS 
method indicate that in the case of Pakistan, government budget 
deficits had a significant direct impact on the real exchange rate 
through the price level.  
Hakkio (1996) used pooled annual data during the period 
(1979-1994) for eighteen OECD countries and regressed the real 
exchange rate on the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP. To 
estimate the indirect impact of a deficit reduction on the exchange 
rate, a country’s inflation rate relative to the average OECD inflation 
rate, the stock of government debt (as a percentage of GDP) 
relative to the OECD average, and the change in government 
spending as a share of GDP are included in the regression line to 
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proxy the impact of expected inflation, risk premium, and the 
expected rate of return effect on the exchange rate. Hence, the way 
the government chooses to use these tools (cutting government 
spending or increasing tax rates) have important effects on the 
expected rate of return of domestic assets, thereby leading to 
changes in the demand for domestic assets and in turn to changes 
in the exchange rate. 
The estimated results indicate that the direct impact of a 
deficit reduction in thirteen countries leads to a stronger currency, 
but in five countries the currency weakens as the deficit is reduced. 
Also, in all cases the indirect impacts of deficit reduction have the 
correct sign and are statistically significant. 
However, Al-Eyd, Barrell and Pomerantz (2005) argued that 
the emergence of a sustained deficit did not automatically 
necessitate a fall in the exchange rate and fall in the exchange rate 
may not correct such a deficit. The authors further argued that 
deficits can exist if a currency moves above its sustainable real 
exchange rate and a real depreciation can remove such a deficit. 
Accordingly, the authors argued that deficits caused by exchange 
rate movements are likely to be more temporary than those that 
either emerge for long term structural reasons or result from 
structural imbalances in the economy. 
Khan and Saul (1987) empirically examined the use of fiscal 
policies to sustain the effects of a nominal devaluation on the real 
exchange rate. They concluded that the extent of the change in the 
real exchange rate depends not only on the size of the devaluation 
and the degree of fiscal adjustment but also on the means by which 
the fiscal deficit is reduced. Furthermore, the change in the nominal 
exchange rate necessary to maintain the depreciation of the real 
exchange rate was deemed to depend on whether the fiscal deficit 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
 79
is eliminated through tax revenue increases or by reducing state 
expenditure on traded and non-traded goods. In this instance, the 
required depreciation of the currency is bigger if the deficit is 
eliminated through taxation than the case if the deficit were lowered 
by reducing government spending. 
The overall conclusions indicate that a deficit reduction leads 
to a stronger currency in the United States, Germany, France, Italy, 
and Canada. However, deficit reductions through tax increases and 
spending reductions have different effects on the currency of 
different countries. In general, in all countries under investigation, 
except for Japan, the UK, and Australia, cutting the deficits by 
spending cuts causes the currency to appreciate more than when 
taxes are increased. In Italy, revenue increases have a small impact 
on the exchange rate, but spending cuts are more effective. In 
Portugal and Norway, deficit reduction through tax increases 
weakens the currency, but spending cuts strengthen the currency 
(Shojai, 1999, pp. 61-62). 
Real exchange rates showed little association with fiscal 
deficits in the empirical studies done by Easterly (1995). Dornbusch 
(1985) also supports the view that evidence on the relationship 
between the real exchange rate and deficits is ambiguous. However, 
empirical studies by Feldstein (1986), Throop (1989), Melvin, 
Schlangenhauf and Talu (1989) and Beck (1993) found a positive 
and significant relationship between fiscal expansion and the 
exchange rate. Mcmillin, and Douglas (1990), Koray and Chan 
(1991) and Cramer (1995) did not find a statistically significant 
relationship. 
Bisignano and Hoover (1982) used a small country setting 
with static exchange rate expectations and concluded that budget 
deficits may appreciate or depreciate the exchange rate depending 
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on the relative importance of wealth effects and relative asset 
substitution effects. They argued that deficits are followed by tight 
monetary policy which causes the currency to appreciate. 
All we can conclude from the analysis is that empirical models 
provide a mixed picture of how deficit reduction affects a currency. 
The direct impact of budget deficits can lead to currency 
depreciation; however, the indirect impact can overwhelm such 
exchange rate changes in the opposite direction. It would appear 
that the empirical studies do not shed any better light on this 
particular issue (the exchange rate) than theoretical postulations. 
3.7 Budget Deficits and Interest Rates 
In this section, we review empirical studies on the connection 
and causality between budget deficits and interest rates.  
Feldstein and Eckstein (1970), Hoelscher (1986), and Cebula 
(1988; 1991) showed that federal deficits have a positive effect on 
nominal long-term interest rates, cause the slope of the yield curve 
to increase, and crowd out private investment.  More recently, Knot 
and de Haan (1999) utilized the deficit announcement effect 
methodology to examine the relationship between budget deficits 
and interest rates in Germany over the period 1987-93. Their 
results suggested that the positive relationship between budget 
deficits and interest rates is due to fear that government debt may 
crowd out private investment (Knot and de Haan, 1999, p. 570). 
Ewing and Yanochik (1999) examined the impact of federal 
budget deficits on the term structure of interest rates in Italy over 
the period 1977:1-1991:3. Using cointegration techniques, this 
study suggested that budget deficits increase the yield spread 
between long-term government bonds and the three-month 
Treasury bill rate.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
 81
Vamvoukas (2000) examined the linkage between budget 
deficits and interest rates in Greece over the time periods 1949-
1994, 1953-1994 and 1957-1994. Within the methodological 
framework of cointegration, ECM strategy, and several diagnostic 
and specification tests, the empirical findings support the Keynesian 
model of a significant and positive relationship between budget 
deficits and interest rates. 
Modeste (2000) utilized the loanable funds model of interest 
rate determination to investigate the relationship between budget 
deficits and interest rate movements. A basic tenet of that model is 
that interest rates would rise (or fall) as economic forces either 
increase (or decrease) the demand for loanable funds or reduce 
/increase the supply of such funds. 
The methodology (loanable funds framework and error 
correction) was applied on Jamaican data over the period 1964-
1996. This study found that the government’s budget deficits 
exerted a significant positive effect on the long-term interest rate. 
Adding to this result, a major implication of this study is that budget 
deficits, to the extent that they force up interest rates, can cause 
“crowding out” of private investment. As a result, as the previous 
event occurs, one can expect capital formation to be retarded and 
long term growth to be inhibited (Modeste, 2000, pp. 676-677). 
Cheng (1998:419-422) empirically investigated the causal link 
between deficit and interest rate in Japan. The Study employed the 
Engle-Granger two step procedure and found that neither budget 
deficits, short term interest rates, and prices in one model nor 
budget deficits and long term interest rates in the other, are 
cointegrated in Japan. The study found no causality between budget 
deficits and long term interest rates but detected feedback causality 
between the deficit and short term interest rates in Japan using 
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Hsiao’s version of the Granger causality method with the aid of 
cointegration.  
Vamvoukas (2002:31-36) investigated the empirical 
framework of both the Keynesian and Ricardian paradigms by 
applying SURE technique and impulse response functions. SURE 
results concluded that a bidirectional pattern of causality might exist 
between deficit and interest rates. Impulse response functions 
revealed that deficits and interest rates follow a joint feedback 
causality which was consistent with the Keynesian proposition that 
changes in interest rates are a response to positive movements in 
the budget deficits. This position was earlier on opposed by Garcia 
and Ramajo (1990:715-718) who found that budget deficits did not 
appear, in the case of Spain, to raise long run nominal interest rates 
during the sample period. 
As a summation, empirical studies show that the 
government’s budget deficit exerted a significant positive effect on 
the long term interest rate. A major implication is that, to the 
extent that they force up interest rates, deficits can crowd-out 
private investment. However, for this causal link to hold, the deficit 
must be incurred on recurrent rather than capital expenditure. The 
empirical findings on deficit and interest rates fail to make a clear 
distinction between nominal and real interest rates. In the absence 
of this clear distinction, any conclusion arrived at may not stand the 
test of empirical rigour.  
3.8 Summary 
This chapter examined the empirical relationships between the 
budget deficit and macroeconomic variables, namely, inflation, 
current account deficit, interest rate, exchange rate and growth. In 
short, empirical findings were as follows: A positive and significant 
relationship exists between monetized deficits and inflation; there is 
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a causal link between the budget deficit and trade deficit (the twin 
deficit); Bond financed deficits increase interest rates and crowds 
out private investment but we have to be careful to make a 
distinction between recurrent and capital expenditure. The 
relationship between the deficit and the exchange rate is ambiguous 
and finally we conclude that the relationship between the deficit and 
growth is non-linear and depends on the budget constraint- a 
corollary of this is that budgets do not need to balance (Adam and 
Bevan, 2004). However, some of the empirical conclusions are 
contestable. For example, the conclusion that budget deficits cause 
trade deficit without anticipating the counteracting impact of high 
deficits in trading partners and the conclusion that budget deficits 
have a positive impact on interest rates without making a distinction 
between real and nominal interest rates. We find the evidence on 
deficit and growth to be weak and inconclusive. However, it seems 
that evidence on deficits and inflation is convincing, depending on 
how they are financed.  
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CHAPTER 4 
FISCAL DEFICITS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: The 
Experiences of Selected African Countries 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter one clearly set out the methodology of this study, 
namely the exploratory, qualitative and comparative analysis 
methodological framework as opposed to quantitative methods. The 
justification is that this is a political economy and analytical study 
which goes beyond metrics to look at broader political, policy and 
institutional dynamics that have a bearing on the performance of 
developing countries. These factors cannot, however, be measured. 
Moreover, the reliability and validity of econometric results under 
hyperinflationary conditions such as those prevailing in Zimbabwe 
during the period of the study, is doubtful.   
Chapters two and three reviewed the theoretical and empirical 
literature on deficits and macro-economic performance. The 
theoretical postulations and empirical findings provide the necessary 
conceptual background for Chapter four. 
Chapter four employs an exploratory, qualitative and 
comparative analysis methodology to review the experiences of 
selected African countries in the execution of fiscal policy in order to 
understand the impact of fiscal policy on the performance of their 
economies.  
The chapter begins by first reviewing the general economic 
performance of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries in order to get 
a broader perspective of the economic history of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Economic policies of Sub-Saharan African countries are 
examined over the various historical epochs of these countries.  
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After 1980, African economies went through two major 
phases that are generally classified as follows: 
• 1980-1999 - a period sometimes referred to as  the two 
lost decades (Easterly, 2001) and; 
• 1999-2008 – a period of the so-called economic 
renaissance (Delechat, Kovanen, and Wakemann(2008) 
and IMF(2000).  
The above classification is however subject to contestation. 
But for purposes of this study, I shall stick to it, without 
prejudice. 
This bird’s eye view is informed by the literature on Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) and in particular the World Bank (1994) report 
as well as Collier and Gunning (1999; 2006) and other literature on 
public finance.  After this broad overview, a detailed focus will then 
be placed on the selected African countries, by looking at their 
experiences in matters of public finance management, fiscal 
performance and macroeconomic implications. 
4.2 Sub-Saharan Africa 
4.2.1 General overview of macro-economic performance in Sub-
Saharan Africa before structural adjustment programmes  
Economic performance in Sub-Saharan Africa started 
deteriorating in the mid 1970s (World Bank, 1994). By the early 
1980s, the economic situation had worsened with further 
deteriorations in the terms of trade and sharply reduced access to 
international finance capital.   The economic stagnation and decline 
in the 1970s and 1980s were also attributed to poor policies – both 
macro-economic, fiscal and sectoral (Collier and Gunning, 1999; 
2006). 
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During the 1980s, per capita GDP in SSA declined by 1.3% 
per annum which was about 5% below the average of less 
developed countries in general. Between 1990 and 1994, the 
decline accelerated to 1.8% per annum, and the difference 
compared to other less developed countries jumped to 6.2% per 
annum (Collier and Gunning, 1999). In terms of domestic policies, 
overvalued exchange rates and large and prolonged budget deficits 
were considered detrimental and undermined the macroeconomic 
stability needed for long-term growth.  It was argued that these 
wrong policies were associated with the development paradigm of 
the 1970s, which gave the state a prominent role in regulating 
economic activity under protectionist barriers (also see Killick, 
1992). 
Because of lack of domestic capital and entrepreneurship, the 
unwillingness to rely on foreign capital, and the underlying distrust 
of the market, almost all African countries chose to rely on the 
state-led development model.   At the time, development 
economists encouraged this (Sen, 1982). 
Import substitution industrialization was believed to be the 
key to rapid growth because of declining prices of primary 
commodities and the resultant decline in foreign exchange earnings.  
Agriculture, rather than being stoked as the engine of growth, was 
heavily taxed to provide the resources to build a modern industrial 
sector.  Governments drew up 5-year economic development plans, 
created public enterprises and enacted regulations to control prices, 
restrict trade and allocate foreign exchange in pursuit of socio-
economic goals. 
Government intervention was supported by development 
economists who recognized the role of government in providing 
“social head capital” or “infrastructure” to facilitate economic 
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development (Krueger, 1990). Other economists justified 
government intervention in economic activity on the basis of market 
failures or structural rigidities that resulted in the lack of 
responsiveness to price signals. It was therefore concluded that 
governments should take a leading role in socio-economic 
development and take control of the commanding heights of the 
economy in order to compensate for market failures (Hirschman, 
1981, Rosenstein-Rodan, 1984). 
The public sector became over-extended as governments tried 
to build nation states and deliver on the promises of independence.  
The volatility of export receipts and thus of foreign exchange 
earnings and fiscal revenues complicated macro-economic 
management policies in post colonial Sub-Saharan Africa.  Policies 
were poorly conceived and wrongly implemented (World Bank, 
1998).  This created a fertile ground for fiscal stress. 
A look at some of the poorly conceived policies will drive the 
point home: 
Overvalued exchange rates 
In the 1970s and 1980s, overvalued exchange rates bred 
unofficial parallel markets for foreign exchange to an extent that 
Africa’s parallel market premiums became by far the largest in the 
developing world (Nashashibi and Bazzoni, 1994).  In the 1980s the 
average premium was almost 300%.  Rough estimates indicate that 
a 10% premium is likely to reduce GDP growth by 0.4% a year and 
a 100% premium, GDP by 2% a year.  For example, in the case of 
Ghana between 1974 and 1980, the parallel market premium of 
more than 200% explained a slow-down in GDP growth of about 3 
percentage points a year (Killick, 1992). 
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Government Expenditure 
Among the indicators of good fiscal policy are a small budget 
deficit and a low ratio of government consumption (that is current 
spending on goods and services) to GDP.  In pre-structural 
adjustment Sub-Saharan Africa, consumption began to increase in 
the early 1960s and reached its peak of nearly 17% of GDP in the 
early 1980s, exceeding the ratio of other regions by 5% to 6%.  
That excess was instrumental in deterring growth (World Bank 
(1994).  
Studies showed that over the typical range of government 
expenditure, each 10 percentage point increase in the ratio of 
government consumption to GDP typically reduced GDP per capita 
growth by 1.2 percentage points (World Bank, 1994). 
Inward-looking trade policy 
This took the form of import substitution strategy, 
supplemented by widespread use of tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
reduce external competition, mainly in the manufacturing sector. A 
study by Dollar (1992) used the index of outward orientation to 
measure trade openness. The index showed Sub-Sahara’s African 
countries as the least outward-oriented. Other studies revealed that 
out of a sample of 20 countries (high performing economies) with 
high non-tariff barriers, 11 were in the Sub-Saharan African region 
(Pritchett, 1991). This protection was another pervasive policy 
choice, because competition increases productivity, while 
restrictions increase input prices and the cost of capital, thereby 
choking growth. 
Political Stability 
Political and social stability are usually associated with higher 
rates of growth (Darro 1991, Fosu 1992). More than half the 
region’s countries were rocked by internal strife, uprisings against 
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the government, and devastation from drought and famine. Average 
GDP growth for these countries was –0.5% a year from 1965 to 
1985. By contrast, the region’s 11 stable countries had an average 
growth rate of 1.4% (Hodd 1991). 
Human capital 
Countries with skilled personnel grew faster. Sub-Saharan 
Africa trailed behind other regions in social indicators, hence the low 
growth (World Bank, 1994). 
Financial Sector 
Financial strength is another determinant of growth. Countries 
with more developed financial sectors grew faster. Financial 
strength improved in Africa, for example, M2 as a share of GDP, 
increased from about 15% in the early 1970s to 20% in the mid 
1980s. Financial and human development actually helped to stem 
the economic decline, not cause it. 
Terms of trade 
A hostile external environment (external shocks) worsened 
macro-economic adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa. This was 
exacerbated by the failure to diversify commodity production, 
especially the tradable goods sector.  
Implications 
The evidence on Sub-Saharan Africa shows that poor policies 
clearly hurt Africa’s long-term growth far more than a hostile 
external environment did. But according to the World Bank (1994) 
neither policy choices nor external factors explain all of the low 
growth. Cross country econometric analysis shows that Sub-
Saharan Africa has grown more slowly than other regions even after 
differences in macro-economic policies, endowments, political 
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instability and external shocks are taken into account (Easterly and 
Levine 1993).  
It is argued that other factors such as the bias against 
agriculture, extensive government intervention in the economy, 
weak infrastructure, and the difficulties of the political and social 
transition following independence, account for the residual 
difference in growth performance. The World Bank takes for 
instance, the bias against agriculture as perhaps the most important 
omitted variable in econometric analysis. 
As Schiff and Valdes (1992) point out, most Africans live in 
rural areas and the region relies heavily on agriculture for foreign 
exchange. Yet agriculture has been heavily taxed, much more than 
in other regions. According to Akiyama and Larson (1989, ) 
producers of agricultural exports were often forced to sell their 
crops to marketing boards that monopolized exports while they 
received real prices half those received by producers of similar crops 
in other countries. This stifled the region’s agricultural growth. 
Econometric analyses alone, does not fully explain Africa’s low 
growth. Econometric policy indicators fail to capture the intricacies 
of policy intervention in the region such as the setting of prices, the 
nationalization of banks, price controls, rationing of foreign 
exchange, imposition of licenses, corruption and the creation state 
enterprises. None of these interventions nor their impact is easy to 
quantify because the required data are generally either unavailable 
or unreliable. 
Yet another possible factor that econometrics neglects is 
ideology, which had been important in setting the policy agenda in 
African countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Classifying countries as 
African capitalists, African socialist populists and Afro-Marxists 
shows that the capitalists experienced the fastest growth between 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
 91
1985 and 1980 (Yang 1988),with the exception of Congo, an Afro-
Marxist country which did well due to the oil windfall, while some 
capitalist countries such as Zaire did not do well because of political 
and social instability. 
All these factors played some role in Africa’s poor revenue and 
growth performance. But we can only speculate about their 
relevance, because they are difficult to quantify and test rigorously 
(World Bank, 1994). 
4.2.2 General-Economic Performance of Sub-Saharan Africa under 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (1980-1999) 
As already discussed in the previous section, the macro-
economic crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa started to manifest itself in 
the 1970s and early 1980s with the decline in export earnings while 
import demand remained almost unchanged. Official currencies 
were overvalued, existing alongside the parallel market whose 
premiums exceeded 100% (World Bank, 1994). In addition to these 
economic problems, fiscal deficits also increased by more than 7% 
of GDP, which was compounded by the debt crisis. Access to 
international credit became problematic. 
The challenge was how to strike a balance between revenue 
and expenditure in order to avoid the pitfalls of budget deficits. 
Naturally, fiscal discipline called for fiscal probity and the tightening 
of credit policies and dealing with the overvalued   real exchange 
rate. The idea of tight fiscal and credit policies was meant to cut 
overall spending in the economy. But to mitigate the recessionary 
impact of such contractionary policies, currencies had to be 
depreciated so as to increase production in the tradable sector. This 
was the beginning of structural adjustment.  
In Africa, Ghana and Mauritius were among the first to take 
bold steps along these lines. However, structural adjustment failed, 
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as countries did not do enough to reduce their budget deficits and 
were reluctant to depreciate their currencies to restore 
competitiveness (Killick, 1992). This negatively affected economic 
growth in the first half of the 1980s. In this regard, examples of 
Ghana in the 1970s and Tanzania between 1980 and 1985, are 
instructive. 
The dawn of the second half of the 1980s, however, saw 
adjusting Sub-Saharan African countries beginning to improve their 
macro-economic policies. Tighter fiscal and credit policies, 
accompanied by increased foreign financing started to bear fruits 
and helped improve the balance of payments and moved economies 
out of the import-compression phase of adjustment. The policy 
packages were more effective when they controlled inflation and 
realigned the exchange rate like for instance in Malawi (1982-84) 
and Tanzania (1983-1985).  
Fiscal Reform  
In the 1980s, African governments were already saddled with 
fiscal deficits arising from the high spending that had been triggered 
by the windfalls of commodity booms in the 1970s. Furthermore, 
the deficits were compounded by declining trade revenues arising 
from the decline in international commodity prices. Budget deficits 
(including grants) in excess of 7% of GDP were the norm because 
high budget deficits meant rapid money supply growth, high 
inflation and large current account deficits; this was hardly the basis 
for a sound macro-economic climate (Easterly and Schmidt – 
Hebbel 1991; Kignel and O’Connell 1993). 
Between 1981 and 1986, half of the African countries 
implemented structural adjustment measures whose main focus 
was the reduction of budget deficits. Deficits were reduced from 7% 
of GDP to below 6.5% of GDP. These were called early adjusters. 
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Other African countries pursued fiscal probity much later, between 
1990 and 1991, reducing their deficits from over 7% to 5.2% of 
GDP. These were called later adjusters (World Bank, 1994) 
However, the median improvement in the deficits disguises 
differences among country groups. Five of the six countries with the 
largest reductions (more than 5%) – Burundi, Gambia, Malawi, 
Tanzania and Zambia – are low-income, flexible exchange rate 
countries.  In contrast, middle-income countries with fixed 
exchange rates, and the oil exporters had their overall fiscal 
balances deteriorate, with Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire having the 
largest increases in the deficits (World Bank, 1994). 
Another measure of the fiscal balance is the so-called primary 
deficit (see chapter 2), calculated by deducting interest payments 
from the total deficit. Changes in the primary deficit are considered 
a better indicator of fiscal performance than changes in the overall 
deficit because fluctuations in external interest payments are largely 
beyond government control in the short-term. The primary deficit as 
a share of GDP improved in the adjusting countries, with a median 
decrease of almost 2%. This was more than the decrease in the 
overall fiscal deficit, because interest expenditure rose in most 
countries and partly offset efforts to reduce the overall fiscal 
balance. Improvements in the primary fiscal balance were larger for 
the low-income countries and those with flexible exchange rates 
than for the middle income countries and those with fixed exchange 
rates (Wetzel and Islam, 1991) 
Despite the deficit reductions, the fiscal situation in Sub-
Saharan Africa remained fragile. Most countries still relied heavily 
on foreign grants to avoid fiscal imbalances, and the median deficit 
excluding grants remained large – about 8% of GDP since the 1980s 
until in the late 1990s. Indeed the 1.3 percentage point increase in 
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external grants between the early 1980s and 1990 – 1991, 
contributed heavily to reducing the overall budget deficit during this 
period. 
The reduction in budget deficits was helped by lower 
spending, with a median decline of 1 percentage point of GDP, 
despite an increase in interest payments of about 0.9% of GDP. 
Most of the cuts were in capital spending.  The cuts were deeper for 
middle income and fixed exchange rate countries, and deepest for 
the oil exporters – not surprising because they started with bloated 
public investment programs.   In the 1990s, the overall wage bill fell 
in Cameroon, Congo, Cote D’Ivoire, Gabon and Zimbabwe – 
countries with the largest wages bills as a percentage of GDP.  All 
these were efforts to reduce government spending (World Bank, 
1994).   
Fiscal Stance 
The overall budget deficit (including grants) was the criterion 
used by the World Bank (1994) to assess the countries’ fiscal 
stance.  Countries with high deficits generally needed to improve 
their fiscal accounts to avoid inflation or crowding out domestic 
investment.   
Fiscal Policy Stance (1990 – 1991) 
The following table shows the rating of selected countries 
regarding their fiscal performance. The results are based on a 
survey by the World Bank (1994). 
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Table 3:  Rating of fiscal performance for selected African 
countries 
1 
Good 
2 
Fair 
3 
Poor 
4 
Very Poor 
Gambia Burundi Benin Zimbabwe 
Ghana Burkina Faso Kenya Mozambique 
Mauritania Gabon Madagascar Zambia 
Senegal Malawi Mali Cameroon 
Tanzania Togo Nigeria Niger 
  Rwanda Nigeria 
  Uganda Sierra Leone 
Notes: 
(1) A good rating indicates a budget surplus or an overall deficit including 
grants of less than 1.5% GDP. 
(2) Fair – deficit of 1.5 – 3.5% of GDP. 
(3) Poor – a deficit of 3.6 – 7.0%. 
(4) Very poor – a deficit of 7.1% or more. 
 
Source:  World Bank, 1994:48 
The countries with a good rating depended on external grants.  
This shows how fragile public finances are in Africa and how quickly 
a fall in external assistance could destabilize them. 
The World Bank Report (1994) stressed that:- 
 In order to achieve fiscal balance and macro-economic 
stability, countries needed to focus on establishing or 
maintaining realistic exchange rates, keeping budget deficits 
low and inflation low, and increasing public sector savings. 
Keeping budget deficits small helps control inflation and 
avoids balance of payments problems.  Public enterprises 
reforms are important if countries are to sustain their macro-
economic gains. 
 Building effective financial systems in Africa is bound to take 
time, given the lack of institutional and regulatory capacity 
and the difficulty of reforming the public sector. 
 All aspects of public sector management require 
improvement, particularly budgeting, payroll management, 
investment planning and monitoring and tax collection. 
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 Re-allocating public spending towards basic services 
benefiting the poor is essential and in order to balance 
reforms that could weaken public finances such as higher 
spending on health, education and infrastructure – other 
expenditures must be reduced and the tax base broadened.  
The growing popular demands for more accountable and more 
transparent government must be heeded in order to improve 
fiscal discipline. 
 In general, African countries under spent in the sectors that 
are a priority for development such as health and education, 
and overspent on wages, defense, and subsidies to public 
enterprises. The problem was compounded by the decline in 
tax revenues. 
Table 4  Tax revenue in selected African countries (% of GDP) 
 Total Tax Revenue 
 1986 1992 
Burundi 14.4% 15.8% 
The Gambia 17.6% 19.5% 
Ghana 12.2% 10.0% 
Kenya 19.6% 19.1% 
Madagascar 8.6% 8.6% 
Malawi 14.8% 16.9% 
Mauritania 19.9% 16.5% 
Mozambique 9.4% 21.7% 
Niger 9.1% 9.0% 
Senegal 14.6% 14.5% 
Tanzania 15.3% 17.6% 
Uganda 6.0% 6.1% 
Source:  World Bank (1994). 
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The overview of Africa’s macroeconomic and fiscal policies 
clearly shows a readable pattern of a combination of external and 
domestic factors that slowed growth, increased public spending and 
precipitated the debt crisis. While it is true that external factors 
played a big role, it is also true that poor macroeconomic policies 
and other institutional factors equally contributed to Africa’s overall 
dismal economic performance. Easterly (2008) pointed out that, 
fast and sustained growth does not happen simultaneously. It 
requires a long-term commitment by a country’s political leaders 
and each country has specific characteristics and historical 
experiences that must be reflected in the leaders’ growth strategy. 
Krueger (1990) argues that by the 1970s and early 1980s, 
governments in most developing countries were mired down in 
economic policies that were manifestly unworkable.  Kruger (1990) 
opines that government failures were more colossal than market 
failures (market failure is defined as being present when conditions 
for Pareto-optimality are not satisfied in ways in which an 
omniscient, selfless, social guardian government could costlessly 
correct). 
Krueger (1990) argues that there were many failures, both of 
commission and omission. Failures of commission included 
exceptionally high cost public sector enterprises, like for example, 
state marketing boards which often served as a monopoly 
distribution network and also provided inputs (erratically and often 
heavily subsidized if not free) to farmers; state ownership of retail 
shops for the distribution of foods and other deemed essential 
products and state operations of mines and manufacturing 
activities. Moreover, government public sector deficits were fuelled 
by public sector enterprises, excessive investment programs and 
other government expenditures that led to high rates of inflation, 
with their attendant consequences for resource allocation, savings 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
 98
behavior and the allocation of private investment. This view is 
supported by Tinbergen (1984), Cowen (1988), and Krueger and 
Tuncer (1982) 
Failures of omission included deterioration of transport and 
communication facilities, maintenance of fixed nominal exchange 
rates in the face of rapid domestic inflation, buttressed by exchange 
controls and import licensing, nominal rates of interest which were 
well below inflation and credit rationing and failure to maintain 
existing infrastructural facilities (Krueger, 1990).  
According to Krueger, as by-products of these failures, 
rampant corruption arose. And as such, all of these vices emerged 
in the context of pervasive government involvement in, and control 
over, economic activities. But other scholars argue that 
governments could still play a significant, targeted and purposive 
role in the development of the economy (see Stiglitz, 1988; Short, 
1983; Streeten, 1984). 
While the 1970s can be described as commodity boom years 
for most countries in SSA, regardless of the 1973/74 oil shocks, the 
period 1980 to 1999, however, is often referred to as the two lost 
decades (Easterly, 2001). As the foregoing paragraphs highlighted, 
poor macroeconomic performance manifested in many forms – poor 
economic growth, low private investment, low levels of foreign 
direct investment, price instability and nominal exchange rate 
instability, real exchange rate misalignment and poor distribution of 
the public budget ( Naming  and Schoeman,  2007). 
In summary, in respect of the ‘lost decades’ we also  found 
that several literature link poor macroeconomic performance to 
specific factors such a lack of openness to international trade (Sachs 
and Warner, 1997), overvalued exchange rates (Ghura and 
Grennes, 1993), a lack of financial deepening (Collier and Gunning, 
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1999), political instability (Collier and Gunning, 1999, Ghura and 
Hadjimichael 1995, Fosu 2001 and Ghura and Grennes, 1993), 
geographical problems (Easterly and Levine, 1997) and inadequate 
institutions and corruption (Sachs and Warner, 1997, Easterly, 
2001).  
The issue of export price volatility also played a pivotal role in 
SSA’s poor macro-economic performance. As Bleaney and 
Greenaway (1998) pointed out, export price volatility harmed SSA’s 
growth in the 1980s and 1990s due to over reliance on primary 
commodity exports compared to manufactures. This view is 
consistent with the Prebisch-Singer thesis which predicted that the 
prices of primary products, in the 1980s and 1990s, were on a long 
run downward trend relative to the price of manufactures. And 
because of the volatility of primary product prices, exporters of 
these products experienced greater instability of export revenues. 
Moreover, in a growth regression model of 83 countries over the 
period 1965-1990, Sachs and Warner (1997) found that the share 
of primary exports in GDP, had a significantly negative coefficient. 
Other scholars like Deaton (2000) also attributed Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s poor economic performance to commodity price variability 
which emanated from flawed internal political and fiscal 
arrangements. 
4.2.3 Sub-Saharan Africa’s Economic Renaissance (1999 – 2008) 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic performance in the 1980s and 
1990s was clearly disappointing, with much of the region unable to 
break away from paths of low or negative per capita incomes 
growth, high inflation and balance of payments difficulties.  
Nevertheless, after two decades of economic stagnation and little 
progress in poverty reduction, the seeds of an economic 
renaissance in Sub-Saharan Africa were sown. From 1999, Sub-
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Saharan Africa’s performance actually started to improve with real 
per capita incomes beginning to rise steadily. According to the IMF 
(2000), this renaissance reflected a new commitment by SSA 
countries to sound macroeconomic policies as well as windfalls of 
better terms of trade. 
Table 5:  Sub-Saharan Africa – selected economic indicators (2002 
– 2007) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Real GDP (%) 3.5 4.0 6.0 6.0 5.4 6.7 
Exports (% of GDP) 32.4 33.8 36.0 39.3 42.1 40.6 
Imports ( % of GDP) 32.8 33.3 34.6 39.3 42.1 40.6 
Gross Domestic Savings  
(% of GDP) 
15.5 18.6 21.0 22.2 23.2 21.5 
Gross Domestic Investment  
(% of GDP) 
16.4 18.7 19.3 19.2 20.4 21.4 
Fiscal Balance -2.7 -2.2 -0.4 1.5 4.1 -0.1 
Current Account (Oil Exporters) -3.3 -2.5 -1.8 -0.6 -0.6 -1.7 
Revenue  
(in months of import cover) 
4.4 4.1 4.9 5.3 6.2 6.8 
Sources:  IMF African Department Data Base and World Economic Outlook (various 
issues). 
Oil exporting SSA countries improved on their exports while 
oil importers benefited from debt relief and used their resources to 
make progress towards the realization of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). According to Maruping (2006), aid 
commitments to SSA countries improved, including actual 
disbursement, inclusive of debt relief. Debt relief became a reality 
when the World Bank and IMF approved the financing and 
implementation of the Multi-lateral Debt Relief Initiative starting 
July 2006. Seventeen countries benefited from this initiative, which 
entailed 100% debt cancellation. The benefiting countries were: 
Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (Maruping, 2006). According to the 
IMF (2007), average growth in Sub-Saharan Africa for 2006 was 5% 
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and 6.7%  in 2007 due to higher production by oil exporters, while 
oil importers grew by 5% in 2006, although some oil importers, 
including the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 
zone and post conflict countries failed to catch up to the regional 
average. Sub-Saharan Africa managed to preserve macroeconomic 
stability with policies intended to support and sustain the region’s 
higher growth (IMF, 2007). The higher growth in the region was 
reinforced by both private external developments such as strong 
foreign demand, strong domestic investment and productivity gains 
supported by sound economic policies in most countries (IMF, 
2007). As the IMF (2007) further observed, the trend growth 
performance inched toward the 7% rate target set out for Sub-
Saharan Africa in order to achieve the income poverty Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG). 
Table 6:  Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP growth rates of strong 
performers 
 1982-91 1991-94 1995-98 1999 2000 2001 
 Average 
Botswana 10.8 4.0 6.3 7.3 8.5 7.1 
Cameron 1.3 -3.1 4.6 4.4 4.2 5.3 
Mali 2.1 1.8 4.7 1.1 3.8 5.6 
Mozambique 0.1 3.2 8.6 8.8 6.1 10.4 
Rwanda 1.5 -13.9 17.7 5.9 5.0 6.1 
Tanzania 3.4 1.4 3.7 4.6 5.2 5.6 
Uganda 2.4 0.5 3.7 2.1 3.3 4.3 
Average 2.4 0.0 6.4 5.9 5.3 6.4 
SSA Average 2.0 0.5 3.7 2.1 3.3 4.3 
Source: World Economic Outlook, (various issues). 
As the above table shows, strong growth was registered in the 
above selected sub-Saharan African countries between 1991 and 
2001. During this period, the average growth rate increased from 
2.0% between 1982-1991 to 4.3% in 2001. Rwanda, Mozambique 
and Botswana were the leading strong performers. 
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The World Bank (2006) points out that higher oil prices did 
not diminish economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and real GDP 
grew by 5.1% in 2005, only slightly below the 5.5% figure of 2004. 
Furthermore, growth in oil exporting countries continued to be 
buoyant with rates as high as 7.8% in 2007. However, this 
impressive performance was not repeated in 2008 due to 
constraints in oil supply in Chad, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria. 
Overall, oil importing countries did very well and their economies 
grew by an average of 5% in 2005 compared to 4.9% in 2004. 
The World Bank (2006) views the region’s higher economic 
performance as not transitory but rather as a structural break from 
the past. The World Bank argued that a significant and durable 
improvement in the policy and institutional environment was 
evident among a growing number of SSA countries. Even the World 
Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) scores 
for SSA shows an increase and the number of African countries with 
scores equal or greater than the threshold of  3.5 for good 
performance has also been rising. 
Several African countries including Ghana, Uganda, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Senegal have had higher growth 
accompanied by diversification of their economies and exports. 
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Table 7:  Sub-Saharan average per capita GDP growth (1996 – 
2005) 
Little or no Progress 
Countries 
(20% of Africa 
Population) 
Slow Growing 
Countries 
(16% of Africa 
Population) 
Sustained 
growthCountries  
(36% of Africa 
Population) 
Oil Countries 
(29% Africa 
Population) 
Swaziland 2.8 Namibia 4.0 Mozambique 8.4 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
20.9 
Kenya 2.8 Zambia 3.6 Rwanda 7.5 Angola 7.9 
Lesotho 2.7 Guinea 3.6 Cape Verde 6.5 Chad 7.8 
Eritrea 2.2 Niger 3.5 Uganda 6.1 Sudan 6.4 
Comoros 2.0 Togo 3.3 Mali 5.7 Nigeria 4.0 
Seychelles 2.0 
Madagasc
ar 
3.3 Botswana 5.7 
Congo 
Republic 
3.5 
Ivory Coast 1.5 Malawi 3.2 Ethiopia 5.5 Gabon 1.7 
Burundi 1.2 
South 
Africa 
3.1 Tanzania 5.4  
Sierra Leone 1.1 Sao Tome 3.1 Mauritius 4.9  
CAR 0.9  Mauritania 4.9  
Guinea Bissau 0.6  Benin 4.8  
DRC 0.0  Ghana 4.7  
Zimbabwe -2.4  Senegal 4.6  
  Burkina Faso 4.6  
  Gambia 4.5  
  Cameron 4.5  
Simple 
Average 
1.3  3.4  5.5  7.4 
Median 1.5  3.3  5.1  6.4 
Source: World Bank (2006) 
As regards inflation,  in recent  years SSA made significant 
strides in reducing inflation by maintaining sound and prudent 
macroeconomic policies and managing the impact of external price 
shocks, which had boomerang effects on consumer prices in both oil 
exporting and importing countries. Despite the better policies, the 
price shocks resulted in SSA inflation going up slightly, returning to 
double digit levels at 10.8% in 2005, compared to 9.8% in 2004. 
As a result of the higher commodity prices and aid flows, 
coupled with a weak US dollar, some African  currencies appreciated 
significantly relative to a basket of currencies in real terms, bringing 
up renewed concerns about the potential negative impact on the 
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tradable sector (the Dutch Disease) in some of these countries 
(World Bank, 2006). 
Chinese Influence 
According to Zafar (2007) Sub-Saharan Africa’s robust 
economic performance since 1999, has led to renewed Chinese 
interests in various spheres of investments, including the extractive 
sector. In 2006 trade between Africa and China totaled more than 
US$50 billion with Chinese companies importing oil from Angola and 
Sudan, timber from Central Africa, copper from Zambia. Chinese 
investments have taken the form of investment in infrastructure, 
thereby bringing the much needed capital to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The downside of Chinese investments is, however, often cited as the 
export of low cost textiles, which despite benefiting African 
consumers, nevertheless threaten to displace domestic production 
(World Bank, 2007). Others criticize China for posing a challenge to 
governance and macroeconomic management in Africa because of 
the potential Dutch Disease implications of commodity booms 
(Zafar, 2007). 
Governance 
Good governance has been at the epi-centre of 
macroeconomic policies in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1999. The IMF 
and World Bank now insist on good governance as a condition for 
balance of payments support. The nexus between governance and 
macroeconomic performance is well documented in the literature 
(Kaufman, 2002, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2000, Naming and 
Schoeman, 2007). 
Naming and Schoeman (2007) studied a panel of 28 African 
countries between 1990 and 2005 and found that countries with 
poor governance records allocated their budgets away from 
education, health and social welfare and tend to post poor economic 
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growth and investment outcomes.  Moreover, Alesina (1999) argues 
that corrupt governments generally tend to receive less foreign aid. 
These views are supported by Collier and Gunning (1999). 
Investment 
According to Delechat and Kovanen (2008), after 1999 
investors in SSA countries were attracted by the region’s better 
macroeconomic performance and benefits of capital flows depended 
on better domestic institutions and stronger financial markets.  
Private capital inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa reached an estimated 
US$50 billion in 2007. For the first time, private capital flows 
overtook aid flows in 2007. The rise in portfolio investment to the 
region has been impressive although about 90% of it went to South 
Africa while most of the remainder went to Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia, Mozambique and Angola in response to risk 
ratings and attractive yields (IMF, 2008). On the other hand Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) flows continued to go to resource rich 
countries led by Nigeria which in 2007 received 29.4% of FDI, 
Angola 5,2%, Chad 3.8%, Equatorial Guinea 9.1%, South Africa 
18.2% and other Sub-Saharan African countries 34.2% (IMF, 
2008). 
The World Bank (2006) summarized the key developments in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and how they affected economic performance in 
2006/7 as follows: 
• The continuing strong economic performance of several 
countries in spite of the oil price shocks 
• High commodity and export prices that ameliorated the 
impact of the higher oil prices in oil importing countries 
• The increase in aid flows coupled with the announcement of 
significant debt relief, and 
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• Because of the high commodity prices and aid flows, the 
potential issue of the Dutch Disease (i.e exchange rate 
appreciation and its likely harmful consequences on the 
tradable sector). 
The global financial crisis which started in the US sub-prime 
market (mortgage lending), and spread across Europe and Asia, is 
expected to trigger disinvestments in developing countries, 
including Sub-Saharan Africa. It is anticipated that the credit crunch 
will lead to the slowdown of private capital flows to SSA and this 
could harm SSA countries’ growth prospects. The global financial 
crisis has reopened the debate on the efficacy and stability of free 
markets (Soros, 2008).  
In summary, two major themes explain Africa’s poor growth 
performance in the 1970s and 1980s – namely deteriorating terms 
of trade and poorly conceived macroeconomic policies. In the 
1990s, early adjusting countries managed to control their deficit  
and inflation better than the so called late adjusters. However, 
beyond structural adjustment, in the 2000s, African countries began 
to register steady growth which spurned macroeconomic and fiscal 
balance. This so called renaissance was attributed to better 
macroeconomic policies, improved foreign direct investment and 
improved terms of trade. As a result, the deficit mode was slowed. 
The following section (4.3) now looks in a little more detail, at 
specific country experiences regarding their handling of public 
financés and how this impacted on overall economic performance. 
The following section therefore looks at the fiscal stances pursued 
by selected African countries, beginning with Ghana. 
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4.3 Ghana 
4.3.1 Introduction 
In this case study, we are interested in the experiences of 
Ghana as the first African country to be independent from colonial 
administration. In the literature it is argued that in general, during 
colonial administration, budgets in developing countries remained in 
a surplus position because of the accumulation of huge foreign 
exchange reserves, favourable international commodity prices and 
robust economic growth rates which, nevertheless, was 
accompanied by a skewed income distribution pattern which 
excluded the majority of the people from the economic mainstream,  
making it possible to maintain public expenditures at much lower 
levels than revenues (Islam and Wetzel, 1991). But on the other 
hand, fiscal sustainability in colonial Africa was achieved more 
because of the absence of fiscal profligacy and state predatory 
policies and the curtailment of rent-seeking activities than the lack 
of socio-economic development programmes, per se. Therefore, in 
looking at Ghana, we are keen to see how a typical African 
government, the first to get black majority rule, managed its public 
sector and how this impacted on fiscal sustainability. 
4.3.2 Political history 
Ghana became the first African country to gain independence 
from Britain in 1957 under Dr Kwame Nkrumah (whose party was 
called Convention People’s Party - CPP). Nkrumah ruled Ghana for 
close to a decade until he was deposed in a military coup in 1966 by 
Brigadier A. Afrifa (National Liberation Council) who ruled Ghana 
only for two years.  
In 1969 an elected government led by K Busia (National 
Redemption Council) took office. However, in 1972, Busia was 
overthrown by I.K. Acheampong (Supreme Military Council), who 
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was later replaced by General Akuffo, also of the Military Council, in 
1978. 
In 1979, Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings staged an abortive 
coup. He and his supporters were rounded up and court marshaled. 
During the trial, Rawlings was so eloquent in articulating the cause 
of the army mutiny and given the publicity of his high profile trial, 
his junior officers were further incited to re-stage the coup in 1981, 
leading to the overthrow of Limann and his Provisional National 
Defence Council.  
After taking over in 1981 through this successful coup, 
Rawlings introduced an IMF backed Economic Recovery Programme 
(ERP). He stepped down in 2000 and was replaced by the New 
National Party (NNP) of John Kufour. 
This case study first briefly looks at the overall fiscal 
performance of the Ghanaian economy over this long and turbulent 
economic and political history. Thereafter, we again briefly focus 
specifically on the interaction of the budget deficit and 
macroeconomic variables such as inflation, exchange rate and trade 
deficit in post independent Ghana.  
4.3.3 Government finances  
Empirical studies of fiscal deficits in Ghana have revealed that 
Ghana’s economic development program since independence in 
1957 emphasized ambitious public investment and huge social 
expenditure as a panacea to economic growth (Islam and Wetzel, 
1991). This development model, led to recurring fiscal deficits 
(Killick, 1982). 
After independence, the Ghanaian state was characterized by 
bureaucracy. The government created national social security and 
national insurance schemes and established many state owned 
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enterprises, the biggest of which was the Cocoa Marketing Board. 
Apart from minerals and other agricultural products, Ghana relied 
heavily on cocoa for its foreign exchange earnings and trade 
revenues. Because of ambitious projects such as the Upper Volta 
Hydroelectric project and social expenditure, revenues failed to cope 
with expenditures and a funding gap occurred very early into 
Ghana’s independence under Nkrumah. Under Nkrumah’s 
administration, 65% of successive budgets went into recurrent 
expenditure (Killick, 1982). Several military regimes which ruled 
post Nkumah Ghana were not only corrupt but lacked fiscal 
discipline. Huge public expenditure led to the deterioration of the 
fiscal position and the printing of money. For instance, General 
Ampicheong’s regime printed money to finance deficits and 
provoked external creditors (e.g Britain) with his refusal to pay 
external debt obligations which the Ghanaian government owed. 
Poor fiscal management, compounded by the erosion of the 
resource base generated large budget deficits that fuelled inflation 
(Ghartey, 2000). 
Studies by Islam and Wetzel (1991) examined the manner in 
which Ghana financed its deficits and how these affected the 
economy. They found that before the implementation of structural 
adjustment programs in 1983 under Jerry Rawlings, the preceding 
military governments that came after Kwame Nkrumah heavily 
relied on money creation for deficit financing due to the 
unavailability of external lending. This policy led to high inflation, 
negative real interest rates, an overvalued currency and the 
emergence of black markets. These factors further eroded the tax 
base and compounded the budget deficit. 
Other studies (Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1999) have 
argued that fiscal deficits in Ghana, however, had a negative effect 
on private consumption as public sector investment in completely 
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substituted private investment. However, the fiscal deficit actually 
had a significant negative effect on the external side as the official 
real exchange rate tended to appreciate, the trade balance 
worsened and the black market premium also increased. 
By 1969, consolidated government expenditure was 19% of 
GDP and peaked to 26% of GDP in 1975/76. It dropped sharply 
thereafter to a minimum of 8% of GDP in 1983 due to improved 
cocoa export revenues. However from 1983 consolidated public 
sector expenditure rose and reached a plateau at about 14% of GDP 
before rising to 17% in 1987. It must be pointed out that like any 
other African country, Ghana received part of its revenue from taxes 
on international trade (in particular import and export duties). 
Inflation averaged 24% per annum from 1988 to1994 and 
accelerated sharply to 70% in 1995 (Nashashibi and Bazzani, 
1998). 
The percentage of total revenue and grants from indirect 
taxes averaged 66% over the period. Import duties and export 
taxes averaged 16% and 22% respectively while indirect taxes on 
goods and services averaged 27% of total revenue. In contrast, the 
percentage of total revenue and grants from indirect taxes and 
income and corporate taxes and PAYE averaged 21% (Chibber and 
Shafik, 1989). 
With expenditure consistently more sizable than revenue over 
the two decades, the central government was constantly in deficit. 
The collapse of the economy in general meant that more and more 
people were moving away from the formal sector into the informal 
sector. 
An overvalued Cedi (Ghanain currency) combined with the 
decline in cocoa production meant reduced exports and hence 
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reduced receipts due to lower import levels. The situation was 
compounded by the emergence of the black market in cocoa 
exports and other parallel market activities, which in general are 
not subject to taxation (Rimmer, 1989). 
All these distortions had occurred during Nkrumah’s later 
years in power and were exacerbated during the volatile periods of 
military rule from 1969, until Rawlings took over in 1983 and 
subsequently introduced the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), 
which considerably improved central government finances and 
reduced the deficit. In 1986, the central government budget 
enjoyed a surplus for the first time in many years at about 0.5% of 
GDP. Thus, following the introduction of structural adjustment, the 
Ghanaian economy was dubbed “a star” economy in Africa South of 
the Sahara.  
The balancing of the government budget was a key condition 
for IMF/World Bank support. Under Rawlings revenues increased 
from 5.6% of GDP to 13.6% of GDP in 1986. Massive sales of state 
enterprises such as Ashanti Gold Mines gave respite to the budget 
and yielded brief surpluses until 1992, when the budget deficit as a 
share of GDP rose to 5.2%. The improved revenue position was due 
to exchange rate and tax reforms. By adjusting the exchange rate 
from 2.75cedi/$ in 1983 to 90cedi/$ in 1986, this augmented the 
tax base of import and export duties by over 30 fold. Tax 
administration was improved and this increased the revenue flows.  
However, typical of electoral politics, as the 1992 elections 
neared, fiscal discipline was thrown out of the window. The deficit 
moved from a surplus of 1.6% of GDP in 1991 to a deficit of 5% in 
1992. Thereafter government expenditure rose rapidly surpassing 
Nkrumah’s most lavish years (which was in 1965 at 25.8% of GDP) 
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in 1994. In 1996 VAT was introduced and there was massive rioting 
due to lack of proper public education. 
The Rawlings government was forced to withdraw the VAT. 
However, it was reintroduced at a level of 10% in 1998 compared to 
the originally proposed rate of 17.5% in 1996. The introduction of 
VAT was done in order to raise revenue to meet the growing public 
expenditures. Government financed its deficit through central bank 
finance and the issuance of treasury bills, which were both highly 
inflationary.  
Financing the Deficit 
Prior to 1984, access to foreign borrowing was limited. 
External debt flows generally ranged between –0.74% and 1.62% 
of GDP and Ghana had to finance her deficits domestically. The 
principal financier was the Bank of Ghana. In the first years of the 
seventies, debt held by monetary authorities was relatively small. 
The debt increased to 3.25% of GDP in 1974 but over time 
government reliance on the central bank increased, as shown by the 
following deficit levels - 
• 5% of GDP (1975) 
• 8.23% of GDP (1976) 
• 9.14% of GDP (1977) 
• 9.37% of GDP (1978) 
The deficit as a percentage of GDP dropped sharply to 0.13% 
in 1979, rose again to 3.2% in 1980 and 2.38% in 1981 before 
rising to 4.12% in 1983. In at least half the years considered, the 
financing provided by the central bank to the central government 
was greater than all other sources of domestic financing combined. 
Over the same period, parastatals also depended on the central 
bank for financing their quasi-fiscal operations. 
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The other notable source of finance for central government 
was the Social Security Fund, which was by law required to invest 
its surpluses in prescribed government assets (which in many years 
were considerable in government stock). Thus the Social Security 
Fund became a captive source of finance. 
The reliance on borrowing from commercial and secondary 
banks was generally low at 2.02% of GDP and –0.59% respectively. 
Similarly, borrowing from the private sector and proceeds from the 
sale of public enterprises were not a significant source of finance for 
the Ghanaian government. 
From 1994 onwards, the Ghanaian government borrowed 
from abroad. External borrowings increased from 4.8% of GDP in 
1994. In addition to borrowing to augment tax revenues, 
government also began to run up arrears in payment of some of its 
bills internally. Government also received funds from the divesture 
of parastatals. In 1995, proceeds from sale of parastatals amounted 
to 2.2% of GDP, rising to 5.2% of GDP in 1998. Economists argue 
that the divesture helped in reducing the deficit, which would have 
grown to more than 10% of GDP without the proceeds from the 
disposal of parastatals (Green, 1996). 
Despite these measures, government expenditure continued 
to surpass tax revenues. This placed the whole reform program in 
danger. Furthermore, domestic debt was compounded by external 
debt from increased external borrowing under Rawlings. 
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Table 8:  Ghana: Debt Profile (1983 – 1995) 
 
Total Debt 
Stock (US$m) 
Debt 
Service/Exports 
(%) 
Debt 
Service/Exports 
(%) 
Total Debt/GNP 
(%) 
1983 1.666 30.4 348.6 41.1 
1984 1.963 21.6 318.6 45 
1985 2.257 23.6 333.6 51 
1986 2.767 28.3 343.6 49.4 
1987 3.313 45.8 365.3 67.1 
1988 3.128 56.6 324.2 61.8 
1990 3.110 52.8 341.0 48.6 
1995 2.788 48.9 342.1 61.9 
Source: Global Development Finance (1999) 
Debt rescheduling was done in 1987, 1991 and 1996. In 
1999, Ghana qualified for the HIPC Initiative outlined at the Cologne 
summit in 1999 in terms of the major criteria of debt 
unsustainability. 
With the Economic Recovery Program, access to external 
borrowing increased by 9.89% of GDP by 1987 when government 
substituted domestic borrowing with foreign borrowing.  However, 
the damage had already been done. To the extent that borrowing 
from the central bank led to the increase in money supply growth 
that surpassed the increase in demand for money balances, such 
borrowing implied inflationary consequences. Financing the deficit 
by borrowing from the central bank inevitably pushed up money 
supply growth from 10% in 1990 to over 50% in 1992. Even an 
increase in the discount rate failed to stop increases in inflation and 
offset money supply growth and blunt the inflationary pressures.  
The high inflation rates that Ghana experienced over the 
period thus implied negative real interest rates – both deposit and 
lending rates remained negative throughout the period. Financial 
repression compounded the situation. Negative real interest rates 
and taxes on financial intermediation reduced the return on assets 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
 115
in the economy and thus reinforced any tendencies toward financial 
disintermediation (for example informal credit markets). 
In addition to causing negative interest rates, the inflation 
that was engendered by money financing of the deficit led to the 
overvaluation of the official exchange rate, given the fixed nominal 
rate. This overvaluation affected Ghana’s trade performance and 
increased the premium on Ghana’s parallel market activity (defined 
as the black market exchange rate over the official exchange rate 
minus one). May (1985) estimated that parallel market activity 
reached 32.41% of the official market GDP in 1982. Furthermore, 
high inflation in Ghana adversely affected seignorage revenues in 
the sense that there was a Laffer curve effect where after a certain 
point an increase in the inflation rate caused reduction in 
seignorage revenues (Rimmer, 1989). 
Islam and Wetzel (1991) assessed the overall interaction 
between the public sector deficit in Ghana and other  underlying 
macro-economic and policy variables since independence in 1957 
through the coup years up to the reforms introduced by Rawlings in 
1983 and reached the following conclusions, namely that:  
• For a long period in Ghana, inflation was found to contribute 
significantly to deficit movements. For example, the positive 
effect of the reduction in inflation reduced the deficit by 
21.6% of GDP in 1984 whereas in 1983 the converse 
happened – inflation contributed to an increase in the deficit 
by 35.8% of GDP. 
• Changes in real interest rate increased the deficit by 11.3% 
of GDP. 
• The positive effect of GDP growth on tax bases contributed to 
the reduction in the deficit of 0.7% of GDP and the 
denominator effect (due to the fact that the deficit and every 
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budget item are expressed as ratios to GDP) reduced the 
budget deficit by 0.2% of GDP.  
• Policy variables under the government ‘s control were found 
generally not to   have had as much impact on the deficit as 
the macro-economic variables had, except the large wage 
increase of 1985 which contributed to a 2.5% increase in the 
deficit. Other policy variables such as transfers and subsidies, 
government consumption and investment had little effect on 
the deficit. 
4.3.4 Budget Deficits and Economic Mismanagement 
In this section we now look at the relationship between the 
deficit and economic performance, especially whether the deficit 
had any effect on price stability, the exchange rate and trade 
position.  
Budget Deficits and Inflation 
The hallmark of Nkrumah’s policies was a regime of 
expansionary fiscal policies in a bid to fund what he saw as the 
imperative of redistribution.  Large government expenditures were 
pursued with the objective of promoting economic and social 
development. Riding on the success of cocoa exports, Nkrumah built 
schools, hospitals and dams (the most famous of which is the Upper 
Volta). The public service was expanded. Nkrumah created many 
loss making parastatals in the mid-1960s. Killick (1978) reports 
several measures of relative parastatal inefficiency, which included 
low productivity, low profitability and considerable overstaffing. The 
overly ambitious government expenditure program pushed the 
budget deficit to over 6% of GDP as a result of excess aggregate 
demand. 
In contrast before independence, government expenditure 
budgets were set by the colonial governors, and strict financial 
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controls ensured that budgets were not overspent. The currency 
was the pound issued by the West African Currency Board, with a 
fixed exchange rate against the pound sterling. Nkrumah threw all 
these sound policies out of the fiscal window. By 1965, inflation 
under Nkrumah had reached 22%. By 1960, government 
expenditure as a share of GDP rose to 70%. In the early years 
budget deficits were financed by foreign borrowings, including the 
already mentioned draw down of foreign reserves. Later on the 
deficit was financed from domestic sources, initially by drawing on 
balances in the central bank, which were exhausted by 1961. 
Government thereafter issued bonds, thereby increasing its credit 
from the banking system to 12% of GDP (Killick, 1978) 
When Nkrumah was deposed in a military coup by the 
National Liberation Council (NLC) in 1966, the NLC inherited 
budgetary and balance of payments problems which were not easy 
to reverse. Economic performance continued to decline.  Revenue 
fell drastically and the budget deficit continued to run in excess of 
5% of GDP up to 1969, when the deficit came down to 3.3% of 
GDP. Inflation dropped due to the reduction of the budget deficit, 
price controls and a bumper harvest. 
In 1969, new elections were held and the Progress Party led 
by K.A. Busia won. Critics argue that Busia never went beyond his 
rhetoric to address fiscal indiscipline which had characterised the 
Nkrumah and NLC governments. Under the Progress Party, state 
owned enterprises continued to be a drain on the fiscus, especially 
the State Gold Mining Corporation and the Ghanaian Airways. With 
no substantial tightening of the fiscal belt, the excess demand 
pressure was not alleviated. 
During the NRC rule, cocoa and gold exports performed well 
and this induced growth and economic stability, thereby stabilizing 
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inflation. In fact Ghanaians enjoyed a higher real per capita GDP in 
1974 under the NRC government than they had ever experienced.  
But this was more to do with improved revenue streams than fiscal 
discipline. 
The NRC revalued the cedi and returned to price controls. The 
NRC believed an economy could be run the same way as the 
military – by command rather than by incentives. Budgetary limits 
on government expenditures were often ignored. The budget deficit 
reached a record 11% of GDP during the NRC administration in 
1976. The deficit was financed largely from domestic sources and 
not by international borrowing. This pushed money supply upwards 
and caused inflation to rise to over 100% in 1977. 
Inflation, which was caused by the government deficit, 
contributed to the deterioration of government’s own revenue base. 
In 1978, revenue amounted to a meager 7% of GDP. Roads, 
schools, communications and health facilities ceased to function in 
most parts of Ghana.  General Akkufo forced Achiempong to step 
down and he devalued the cedi but failed to stop rent seeking 
activities such that by 1979, the Ghanaian state had become 
dysfunctional. 
When Rawlings took over after a failed coup first in 1979 and 
later a successful military coup in 1981, under the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), he launched an anti-inflation and 
anti-corruption drive that left a permanent imprint on the minds of 
all Ghanaians. Goods and property allegedly acquired by corrupt 
means were seized and alleged speculators or hoarders were beaten 
or shot. The anti-corruption campaign led to the execution of former 
army leaders, including Achiempong and Akuffo. It is said that the 
Rawlings regime went as far as burning the central Accra market in 
a bid to attack the symptoms of the high prices of essential 
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commodities, without of course tackling the huge government 
expenditure which was the source of the problem.  
Before his second coup, Rawlings briefly surrendered power to 
an elected civilian government under Limann in September 1979. 
The Limann government failed to meet macroeconomic 
expectations. Inflation accelerated. At the heart of inflation was 
government’s unwillingness to address excess demand in the 
economy. Government revenue dropped to 5% of GDP in 1981. CPI 
inflation which had dropped to 50% jumped to 120% again in 1981. 
This ineptitude by Limman to deal with the problems of excess 
demand, licensing control, state enterprises and price controls 
invited another coup from Rawlings in December 1981 when he 
installed his Provisional National Defense Council.  
In 1983, Rawlings launched economic reforms with the 
support of the IMF and World Bank, having failed to eradicate 
corruption by force.  The objective of reforms was to free up 
markets and eliminate the government budget deficit. In 1983, 
government expenditure at 11% of GDP was unsustainable.  The 
state was no longer able to perform the most elementary functions 
and public sector wages lagged behind inflation. Many state-owned 
enterprises were shadows of their former selves and often 
financially bankrupt. Cocoa and mineral prices had also fallen. We 
now want to see whether these reforms had any impact on the 
budget deficit and inflation. 
A key condition imposed by the IMF was the balancing of the 
government budget. During the Rawlings regime, GDP growth 
accelerated from 5.6% of GDP to 13.6% in 1986. This growth in 
GDP gave the government a room to maneuver. The Rawlings 
government further expanded government expenditure to over 13% 
of GDP. A combination of exchange rate reform and tax reforms 
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helped to improve revenues. By 1991, government deficit had been 
reduced to 1.6% of GDP suggesting that strict fiscal discipline had 
been followed. However, the following year (1992) elections were 
coming and Rawlings loosened fiscal policy, leading to a deficit of 
5% of GDP. Thereafter government expenditures rose to 25.8% of 
GDP, even surpassing Nkrumah’s most lavish year – 1965.  
The choice for financing the deficit was a combination of 
printing money (borrowing from the central bank), borrowing from 
the public, borrowing from abroad and selling off parastatals. 
Financing the deficit from borrowing at the central bank pushed up 
money supply growth from 10% in 1990 to over 50% in 1992 and 
the current account deficit stood at 9.9% in 1993. The anticipation 
of another election in 1996 pushed up expenditure and net lending 
to one third of GDP. Rawlings tried to replace sales tax with VAT in 
1995 in order to augment revenue but this did not help arrest 
declining revenues. VAT was withdrawn two months later after riots 
erupted.  
Using Granger causality, impulse response functions, vector 
decompositions and sensitivity analysis, Ghartey (2000) concluded 
that in Ghana, deficits as a share of GDP were inflationary because 
they were financed by base money through money printing. 
Inflation was monetized, self sustaining and retarded economic 
growth (Ghartey, 2000). This evidence was corroborated by Ramsey 
(2005). 
Budget Deficits and Trade Deficits 
The exchange rate of Ghana’s currency – the new cedi, which 
was created in 1967 – was fixed until April 1983. Several 
devaluations were done in the intervening 16 years to adjust the 
value of the new cedi relative to the US dollar or to gold. The fixed 
exchange rate system together with foreign currency rationing and 
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strict capital controls led to the development of a large black market 
in foreign exchange. 
The parallel market exchange rate, which represents the 
marginal cost of foreign exchange, depreciated from 8.86 cedes to 
the dollar in 1978 to 76.56 cedes /dollar by 1983 while the official 
rate remained at 2.75 cedes/dollar. During the late 1970s and the 
early 1980s printing money financed Ghana’s fiscal deficits. This led 
to higher inflation rates with Ghana suffering triple digit inflation in 
1977, 1981, and 1983. There were two currency reforms, one in 
1979 and another in 1982 in an attempt to deal with the effects of 
high inflation on currency values. The increase in government 
spending led to an increase in total domestic spending and 
worsened the trade balance. 
High public sector expenditure contributed to Ghana’s external 
sector problems and if Ghana had pursued more moderate fiscal 
and monetary policies, the economy might have done better and 
there could have been fewer black market activities.   
Budget Deficits and Exchange Rates 
This section looks at the impact of excess demand on the 
exchange rate. 
Following independence in 1957, the Bank of Ghana was 
established as the central bank. Monetary policy became 
independent as the central bank began to issue currency and took 
over foreign exchange reserves from the West African Currency 
Board. However, Ghana still remained part of the sterling area 
which enabled free movements of imports and exports as well as 
capital inflows within the sterling area. Changes in the foreign 
assets were mirrored by changes in the domestic money stock. This 
situation changed in 1961 when monetary policy became 
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independent of the sterling area. Import licensing was introduced 
and foreign exchange reserves declined.  The decline in foreign 
exchange reserves was triggered by government’s lack of fiscal 
discipline (excess demand) as shown by Nkrumah’s government 
failing to live within its means. The Volta dam cost 60% of Ghana’s 
export earnings (Killick, 1978). 
As pointed out above, from 1957 to 1960, excess demand was 
met from drawing down of foreign exchange reserves. With the 
tightening of the exchange controls and import licensing in 1961, 
inflation accelerated, while the exchange rate remained fixed. This 
implied a real appreciation of the currency. Exports fell sharply.  
According to Killick (1978) the exchange rate cum import 
licensing policy contributed to the fiscal deterioration which in turn 
caused further real exchange rate depreciation – a chicken and egg 
situation. At the end of Nkrumah’s rule, cocoa revenues dwindled, 
the budget deficit bloomed and the exchange rate became further 
overvalued and remained fixed. Exports dropped from 30% of GDP 
at independence to under 18% by 1965. 
It can therefore be concluded that under Nkrumah, excess 
demand invariably affected the exchange rates through the run 
down of foreign exchange reserves, the introduction of import 
licences and the fixed exchange rate which appreciated the currency 
and led to the fall in exports. 
When the National Liberation Council (NLC) ousted Nkrumah 
in 1966, the most pressing economic problem was the deteriorating 
balance of payments position. In spite of the use of import licensing 
and exchange controls, foreign exchange reserves were dwindling 
rapidly. All this had arisen from excess demand due to the previous 
regime’s loose monetary and fiscal policies. By the end of 1966, net 
foreign assets in the monetary system were negative. The NLC tried 
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to reduce government expenditure in its first five years by slashing 
the capital budgets. By rescheduling short term debt the NLC 
government managed to ease balance of payments pressures 
(Islam and Wetzel, 1991) 
In July 1967, the NLC government devalued the currency. A 
further devaluation was done under Busia in 1971 (Leith, 1974). In 
1972, Ghana experienced another military coup. A new government 
under Colonel Achiempong took over and the National Redemption 
Council formed the government – a military junta (Huq, 1989) 
When Rawlings took over, the budget deficit was 11% of GDP 
and the exchange rate was fixed. Export earnings had fallen to a 
puny 5% of GDP. Revenue from exports fell because duty was 
charged at the official rate when the pararell market rate had 
increased. Reforms introduced by Rawlings were meant to bring the 
exchange rate to its scarcity value in an environment of huge 
budget deficits and public spending. An imaginative scheme of 
export bonuses which was financed by import surcharges was 
introduced. This raised the official exchange rate from 2,75cedi/$ 
which Akuffo had set to 25cedi/$ roughly offsetting the cumulative 
inflation from 1978 through 1983 without creating a budgetary 
drain on government. In 1984, further devaluations were done 
taking the exchange rate to 50cedi/$ then 90cedi/$ in 1986 (May, 
2002) 
By the time Rwalings put himself forward as a candidate for 
the 1992 presidential elections, the parallel market had been 
eliminated by the opening of foreign exchange bureaus which 
bought forex at black market rates  on a “no questions asked” 
basis. Thereafter a market determined exchange rate became 
widely accepted in Ghana. However, by 1992, the expanding 
government deficit and rising inflation spilled over into expectations 
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of rapid depreciation of the cedi in the foreign exchange market 
(Bank of Ghana, 1993).   
Deficit and economic performance since 2000 
Since 2000, Ghana’s economic performance has improved and 
GDP grew at its fastest pace since more than a decade. In 2004, 
GDP grew by 5.8% on the back of a good agricultural season, and 
record cocoa production. The overall budget deficit narrowed to 
3.6% of GDP in 2004. Revenue and grants performed well due to an 
increase in grants, new tax measures, and a strong growth 
imperative. As a result of good fiscal performance as shown by the 
domestic debt to GDP ratio, inflation declined by half to 11.8% by 
the end of 2004. The central bank’s inflation target was 6% (IMF, 
2005). 
The external sector also improved significantly to a position 
where gross international reserves were built-up to US$1.8billion, 
which was equivalent to 3.7 months of imports. Under Kuffor, a new 
managed exchange rate float was introduced (IMF, 2005). 
Table 9:  Ghana: Deficit since 2000 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Budget Deficit  
(% of GDP) 
4.8 2.4 2.3 0.7 2.6 3.1 
Real Effective 
Exchange Rate 
(cedi:USD) 
0.6 -0.6 1.4 -1.0 0.8 1.4 
Inflation (annual %) 32.9 14.8 26.7 12.6 14.3 15.0 
Trade Balance  
(% of GDP) 
-5.3 0.5 1.7 -2.7 -4.0 0.9 
Source: IMF, 2007 
The above table shows the progress made by Ghanaian 
authorities towards deficit reduction since 2000, apparently with the 
assistance of the IMF Technical Teams.  
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One of the key benchmarks emphasized by the IMF in their 
Article IV consultations is the question of fiscal consolidation. In 
2000 Ghana suffered from a combination of terms of trade shocks 
arising from the fall in cocoa prices and high oil prices. Weak 
macroeconomic policies and poor management of state enterprises 
worsened the budgetary position. This led to a trade deficit of 
US$900 million or 16% of GDP. Presidential and parliamentary 
elections also pushed up government spending. As a result the 
average inflation rate doubled and the nominal exchange rate 
depreciated by 50% as a result of lack of fiscal consolidation (IMF, 
2002). 
The budget deficit was financed from domestic sources 
resulting in annual broad money supply accelerating to 40% at end 
of 2000 up from 16% the previous year. Money supply growth was 
also a direct effect of the growth in credit to the private sector, 
public enterprises and government itself (IMF, 2002). 
John Kufor’s new government vowed to break the culture of 
budget deficits. The government set a deficit target of 4% of GDP 
and a domestic financing limit to the tune of 1.8% of GDP as well as 
seeking debt relief to meet fiscal and balance of payments gaps. 
Other measures implemented to cut the budget deficit included – 
introducing new taxes on petroleum products, levies on company 
profits, reduction in import tariff exemptions, cuts in domestically 
financed capital expenditure and a freeze on government 
consumption (outlays on goods and services). 
The net present value of Ghana’s external debt by end of 
2000 was 557% of fiscal revenues and 154% of exports, compared 
with the estimated sustainable thresholds of 250% and 150% 
respectively. It is against this backdrop that Ghana applied and 
qualified for the HIPC Initiative. 
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In making its overall assessment, the Executive Board of the 
IMF (2000) pointed out that inappropriate management of public 
finances had compounded Ghana’s poor economic performance, 
despite the external shocks.  Weak fiscal and monetary policies at 
end of 2000, prior to elections, had led to a rise in inflation, a 
substantial depreciation in the exchange rate, a decline in foreign 
exchange reserves, and a significant rise in domestic and foreign 
debt as a share of GDP (IMF, 2002). 
The IMF went on to recommend that parastatals operate on 
full cost recovery basis, and privatization, including petroleum, 
water and electricity tariff reviews. The IMF Directors urged 
restraint in public sector wages in order to strengthen the budget 
and reduce inflation. The IMF urged the new government to press 
ahead with its anti-corruption campaign in order to assist in fiscal 
recovery. 
Table 10: Ghana: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators % 
(1996 – 2008) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Budget Balance 
(% of GDP) 
-9.6 -11 -8.7 -8.0 -9.7 -9.6 -5.0 -4.4 -3.6 -3.0 -4.6 -4.4 -4.5 
Current 
Account (% of 
GDP) 
-3.1 -14 -5.0 11.5 -9.2 -6.5 1.0 1.7 -2.7 -7.0 -4.8 -3.7 -4.2 
Real Effective 
Exchange Rate 
(Cedi to USD) 
9.0 6.1 8.2 0.5 33 -9.6 1.9 2.4 -0.5 19.9 1.4 4.5 8.7 
Inflation 
(%chg,pa avg) 
32.7 20.8 15.8 13.8 40.5 25.0 24.8 23.6 11.8 14.8 10.9 9.8 10.5 
Source: Ghana – IMF Article Consultations (various issues); EIU, 2009 
On 18 May 2007, the Executive Board of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded Article IV consultations in Ghana 
and found that due to sustained fiscal adjustment, inflation had 
fallen to 10.5% by end of 2006. In 2007, the fiscal deficit increased 
to 7.7% of GDP due to strong public sector wage pressures and a 
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nominal effective depreciation of the currency. In 2007, the 
government also came up with a supplementary budget due to 
revenue shortfalls caused by wages (in the health sector), subsidies 
and transfers to state owned enterprises in the energy sector. The 
Ghanain government planned to introduce a fiscal responsibility law 
to curb expenditure in 2007. 
In 2008, after years of austerity which saw inflation kept 
within lower limits and an average deficit of between 3.6% of GDP 
and 4.5% of GDP, there were fears that Ghana might turn back to 
overspending considering the December 2008, Presidential and 
Parliamentary elections. In many developing countries, election 
campaigns are characterized by populist measures such as 
inflationary wage increases and the loosening of fiscal policy in 
order to ingratiate voters. Nevertheless, the discovery of oil 
promises to bring new fortunes to this country provided that Ghana 
can avoid the “oil curse” and continue on its reform path, whose key 
planks have been macroeconomic and fiscal adjustment as well as 
poverty reduction (IMF, 2008). 
4.3.5 Conclusion 
In concluding the study on public sector financing in Ghana, 
we draw lessons from Islam and Wetzel (1991) and IMF (2008) and 
thus summarize as follows- 
• Lack of access to external lending and weak domestic financial 
markets meant that the bulk of the public sector deficit in 
Ghana, after independence, was financed by money creation. 
Access to external lending allowed the government to 
substitute foreign financing for money creation after 1984, but 
money creation did not fall as much as one would have 
expected. In the mid seventies, the correlation between 
money creation and inflation was found to be high, suggesting 
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that fiscal deficits contributed to the high levels of inflation at 
the time. 
• Inflation had a significant, negative influence on the demand 
for money and the demand for deposits. The domestic interest 
rate was not found to have any significant effect on either the 
demand for money or deposits. Perhaps this was due to the 
nature of Ghana’s highly regulated financial markets. 
• High rates of inflation in the late 1990s provided the Ghanaian 
government with seignorage revenues of only 1-2% of GDP 
greater than it would have received with a lower inflation rate 
of 20%. 
• Private investment was negatively affected by public 
investment, thus indicating that some crowding out did occur 
in Ghana. The real interest rate was not found to have a 
significant influence on private investment. 
• Public expenditure had a significant impact on the official real 
exchange rate, the trade balance and the black market 
premium. Increased public expenditure was found to have a 
negative effect on the trade balance. It was also found to 
have a negative effect on the official exchange rate (higher 
public expenditures tended to appreciate the real exchange 
rate). A rising public sector deficit along with stringent 
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions led to a very 
high black market premium. 
• Excess aggregate demand interacted with a fixed exchange 
rate to create excess demand for foreign exchange. When the 
reserves got depleted, exchange control led to currency 
overvaluation, shrinking exports, declining imports, and falling 
government revenues. 
• In recent years (2006 – 2008), with the assistance of the IMF, 
Ghana managed to reduce inflation and lower fiscal deficits 
and pursued tight monetary and fiscal policies. These policies 
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were pursued by President Rawlings and President John 
Kufour (2000-2008). However, the discovery of oil deposits 
may spur new aggregate demand which may increase the 
deficit hence the dangers posed by the “oil curse”.  
• In the 2008 elections, President John Kufour lost to the 
opposition. It is too early to tell what the fiscal stance of the 
new Government will be. However, it is instructive to see that 
fiscal deficits were at the centre of macro-economic instability 
in Ghana since the days of Nkrumah. Moreover, political 
instability contributed to the deterioration in economic 
performance in Ghana as governments were changed so 
frequently until the late ascendancy of Jerry Rawlings in 1983.   
4.4 Morocco 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Morocco, like other African countries, enjoyed an economic 
boom owing to phosphate revenues during the 1970s. Morocco 
maintained high interest rates and kept inflation subdued at single 
digit levels. Fiscal and macroeconomic stability was pursued 
although challenges still remained in areas like tax reform, public 
spending, information systems and financial liberalization. 
However, as in Zambia, the tragedy was the failure to build 
up reserves that would act as deficit buffers when commodity prices 
fell. The phosphate boom of the 1970s triggered the rise in 
government spending and saw an unprecedented expansion of 
public investment. Faini (1991) noted that the sudden reversal of 
terms of trade in the 1970s emanating from a plunge in phosphate 
prices, prompted Morocco to borrow from external capital markets 
to maintain an unabated level of spending. This phenomenon is 
what development economists call “the resource curse” (Collier, 
2008)   
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4.4.2 Fiscal Expenditure 
The origins of the fiscal deficit in Morocco can be traced to the 
commodity (phosphate) boom of the mid 1970s, which coincided 
with rising government expenditure and an unprecedented 
expansion of public investment programs. The sudden reversal in 
the terms of trade in the late 1970s as a result of the plunge in 
phosphate prices and the second oil shock prompted Morocco to 
increasingly resort to external capital markets in order to maintain 
an unabated level of public expenditure.  
In 1983, Morocco was plunged into a foreign exchange crisis 
as a result of worsening terms of trade, the rise in international 
interest rates and the severe drought from 1980-1983. 
In response to this crisis, Morocco launched a medium term 
program of economic reforms at the behest of the IMF and World 
Bank. A comprehensive set of stabilization and structural 
adjustment measures were thus introduced. Since then, the overall 
budget and current account deficits were reduced from 9% and 
12% of GDP in 1982 to 4.5% and 0.4% respectively in 1988 (Melo, 
1990).  
Furthermore, structural adjustment led to the reduction of 
inflation, which declined from 12.5% in 1984 to 2.3% in 1988 while 
GDP growth averaged 4.3%. Analysts have expressed surprise at 
the decline of inflation even against the backdrop of a 20% real 
depreciation during the eighties. However, studies have concluded 
that wage moderation and judicious monetary policies were 
instrumental in restraining inflation as monetary authorities 
remained firmly committed to eschew any inflationary financing of 
the budget deficit (Schmidt-Hebbel and Muller, 1990). 
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Budget Deficits 
In the seventies, the budgetary situation in Morocco 
registered a continuous deterioration as the financial needs of the 
Treasury bludgeoned.  In the early eighties, the fiscal repercussions 
of the fall in Morocco’s terms of trade, the increasing burden of 
foreign debt attendant on the steep rise of international interest 
rates and the growing weariness of foreign commercial banks to 
provide continuing financing to the Treasury brought to the 
forefront the issue of fiscal sustainability.  
The budget deficit averaged 3.2% in 1971-1974 and rose to 
13% in 1976-1981 before declining to 8% in 1984-85. The budget 
deficit was measured on a cash basis. But according to Faini (1991), 
cash based measures of the deficit can be misleading. Faini argues 
that Treasury may resort to the use of financial arrears to cope with 
mounting financial difficulties. This is what happened in Morocco 
until 1982 when the government embarked on structural 
adjustment. A further correction in regard to interest payments is 
important in the correct measure of the deficit. In Morocco, interest 
payments steadily increased as a share of GDP, thereby 
compounding budget difficulties. 
The table below shows the trend in central government 
expenditure between 1971 and 2005. 
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Table 11:  Morocco: Central government expenditure as 
percentage of GDP (1971-2005) 
Year 
Current 
Expenditure 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Goods & 
Services 
Interest Subsidies 
1971 14.12 3.72 12.51 1.01 0.60 
1974 19.25 5.77 12.20 0.85 6.21 
1977 18.58 18.93 14.44 1.50 2.63 
1979 19.46 12.89 15.05 2.19 2.21 
1981 24.60 12.33 15.42 3.88 5.30 
1983 23.72 9.64 15.05 4.86 3.81 
1984 24.00 8.09 13.63 6.08 4.29 
1985 23.09 7.18 12.63 6.23 4.23 
1986 20.62 3.61 12.20 5.92 2.50 
1987 20.36 6.03 12.64 5.91 1.81 
1988 20.31 6.34 12.17 6.01 2.13 
1990 16.25 11.28 12.11 6.11 2.10 
1995 22.49 13.10 12.80 4.99 1.81 
2000 25.00 15.68 15.66 5.69 4.54 
2005 31.26 7.90 18.22 6.75 6.23 
Source: World Bank (various issues) 
In the above table, expenditure on goods and services fell 
somewhat, reflecting mostly the drop in public employees real 
wages and the more sober trend in public employment. The share of 
subsidies in GDP also fell substantially, mainly because the decline 
in imported food prices reduced the need for government 
intervention. This is incidentally a good example of the direct impact 
of terms of trade fluctuations on the budget. 
With the introduction of structural adjustment, public 
investment fell from 11.54% of GDP to 3.61% in 1987 and 1988. 
This reduction precipitated massive retrenchments of the civil 
service. The share of subsidies in GDP fell substantially, mainly 
because the decline in imported food prices reduced the need for 
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government intervention. The petroleum levy and VAT introduced in 
1986 provided a revenue windfall as well as foreign exchange 
earnings from the export of phosphates (the main foreign exchange 
earner). 
Deficit Financing 
Regarding the financing, prior to 1983, foreign borrowing 
financed nearly 60% of the Treasury deficit. The availability of 
foreign finance came to an abrupt halt in 1983, precipitating a 
major payment crisis. The government was forced to rely to an 
unprecedented extent on Central Bank borrowing. At the same time 
government resorted to the accumulation of arrears as a source of 
involuntary finance from the private sector. This meant the delaying 
of payments for goods and services procured due to cash flow 
problems). In 1984, government started tapping non-financial 
sources of domestic financing.   In the case of Morocco, the deficit 
was in the form of the primary deficit.   
The Primary Deficit 
The primary deficit was equal to 7.2% of GDP in 1983 and 
steadily declined to reach a surplus of 1.9% of GDP in 1988. The 
decline in the deficit was also facilitated by low and even negative 
real interest rates on domestic debt.  This improvement was less 
significant due to the increased burden of nominal and real interest 
payments. 
Furthermore, improvements in tax revenues especially after 
the introduction of VAT in 1986 helped to stabilize the Moroccan 
budget. The process of trade reform also positively affected 
government revenues as a special import tariff was increased from 
5% to 12.5% in 1987. However, as already highlighted, terms of 
trade fluctuations negatively affected trade revenues as the 
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phosphate prices tumbled leading to a fall in tax and dividend 
payments to central government 
Implications 
The effect of the deficit on macroeconomic conditions largely 
depends on the method of its financing. Prior to 1983, foreign 
borrowing financed 60% of the treasury budget. However, the 
availability of foreign finances came to an end in 1983, thereby 
precipitating a payment crisis. The government was forced to rely 
on an unprecedented basis on borrowings from the central bank. In 
order to eschew inflation, central government shifted to non-
inflationary sources of finance in 1984, including the direct sale of 
bonds and treasury bills to the private sector. Financial repression 
also helped to channel low cost finance to the Treasury.  
4.4.3 Budget Deficits and Economic Performance 
Despite the budget deficit rising (9% of GDP in 1982, 4.5% in 
1988) as a result of international interest rates and terms of trade 
shocks as discussed above, it is interesting to note that historically, 
Morocco has had low inflation rates ( e.g 6.2% in 1983). In 
achieving this, the Moroccan government was clever enough to 
concentrate on borrowing from the non banking sector in order to 
avoid inflationary implications.  
The government also reduced its borrowing requirements by 
resorting to the accumulation of arrears as a source of involuntary 
finance from the private sector. Thus the Moroccan government 
successfully avoided the monetization of the deficit by tapping non-
inflationary sources of domestic finance. Furthermore, government 
encouraged voluntary domestic lending by liberalizing domestic 
interest rates which helped shift private sector portfolios from 
currency to time deposits. At the same time, the ceiling introduced 
on credit allowed commercial banks to channel their financial 
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resources to the treasury again, thereby creating a dependable 
source of finance for government. Another non-inflationary strategy 
was the direct sales of Treasury bills and bonds to the non-bank 
sector. All these measures managed to eschew inflationary 
pressures. 
In a sense, financial repression assisted the Moroccan 
government to access cheap funds from the bank (to a lesser 
extent) and non-banking sectors to finance its debt without risking 
inflationary shocks. 
The other reason why inflation was subdued in Morocco during 
its structural adjustment period was that growth remained buoyant, 
Hence the notion that large deficits will foster inflation is at least 
contradicted in the Moroccan study. Even with a real depreciation of 
20% in the 1980s, inflation still remained low. Scholars like Faini 
(1991) argued that in addition to the other measures discussed 
above, wage moderation and judicious monetary policy were 
instrumental in restraining inflation. Despite high deficits, Morocco 
is one country which managed to maintain macroeconomic and 
fiscal stability 
In the 1990s and in recent years, the Moroccan economy has 
remained stable, with inflation and the budget deficit confined to 
single digit figures.  
Budget Deficits and Exchange Rates 
There is little evidence to suggest that the budget deficit 
affected the exchange rate or vice versa because, as already 
pointed out, Morocco did not run down its foreign exchange 
reserves because it was able to access international capital markets 
for assistance. Moreover, the exchange rate remained very 
competitive against other major currencies and a 20% devaluation 
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in 1983 helped to promote exports, and improve trade taxes. The 
rebound in the prices of phosphates in the 1990s and thereafter 
helped a great deal to keep the exchange rate strong and stable. 
Therefore, the budget deficit and its interaction with the exchange 
rate was inconsequential. 
Budget Deficits and Trade Deficits 
Morocco is one good example of a success story of fiscal 
management. Despite, the initially high budget deficits caused by 
the adverse impact of  international prices and interest rates on 
borrowing, which tended to erode the revenue base, this was 
however, not a long lasting phenomenon and the trade surplus was 
restored in a short space of time.  Since 1983, the government 
made great strides to maintain internal and external equilibria. The 
current account deficit was reduced from 12% of GDP in 1982 to 
0.4% in 1988 and to a surplus position after 2000.  
The comprehensive set of stabilization and structural 
adjustment measures introduced in collaboration with the IMF and 
World Bank since 1983 helped to mitigate the impact of deficits on 
the tradable sector. 
Fiscal Consolidation 
Morocco is still implementing IMF/Word Bank backed 
economic reforms. As such every year the IMF sends its delegation 
of technical staff to Rabat, to do program assessment and 
monitoring and to give technical advice. In order to get an 
understanding of the most recent budgetary performance and fiscal 
policy in Morocco, we look at findings of IMF country teams since 
2001. 
In 2001, the Executive Board of the IMF concluded the Article 
IV consultation with Morocco. The Report (IMF, 2003) observed that 
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due to two successive years of drought, Morocco had continued to 
experience economic stagnation with GDP contracting 0.3% in 2000 
after a negative growth rate of –0.7% in 1999. Inflation however, 
remained subdued at 2%. External reserves amounted to US$4.8 
billion and were expected to reach US$6billion, which is equivalent 
to 5.5 months import cover. The current account deficit widened to 
1.5% of GDP in 2000, up from 0.5% in 1999 due to the increase in 
imports. 
The fiscal deficit that stood at 3.4 % of GDP in 1996,  3.4% 
(1997), 2.5% (1998), 2.5% (1999) rose to  4.3% of GDP in 2000, 
due to excess demand, which was compounded by loose monetary 
policies as evidenced by the growth in broad money supply from 
4.8% in 1996, to 9.0 % (1997), 10.3% (1999) and 8.4% in 2000. 
Tax revenues were blunted by a high wage bill, price subsidies for 
petroleum products and failure to realize proceeds from the 
privatization of Maroc Telecom in good time. 
Table 12: Selected economic and financial indicators (1999 – 
2007) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Real GDP % -0.1 1.0 6.3 3.2 5.5 3.0 2.4 8.0 2.5 
Inflation % 0.7 1.9 0.6 2.8 1.2 2.0 1.0 3.3 2.5 
Current Account 
Balance 
1.6 -0.4 3.8 0.6 1.8 1.3 2.4 3.4 1.8 
Budget Balance -4.5 -6.4 -5.8 -4.7 -5.5 -5.4 1.6 1.1 1.1 
Exchange Rate: 
dirham/US$ 
9.80 10.63 11.30 11.02 9.54 9.54 9.6 7.5 8.8 
Budget Balance (plus 
privatization receipts) 
-1.3 -6.4 0.3 -4.5 -2.7 -2.7 1.0 -2.0 0.4 
Gross Official 
Reserves (US$b) 
5.7 4.8 8.4 10.1 13.6 15.2 16.08 19.97 23.61 
Total Government 
Debt (%of GDP) 
81.3 81.5 74.8 71.5 68.2 67.6 66.9 70.1 65.4 
Domestic Gvt Debt  
(% of GDP) 
45.6 47.3 45.9 48.2 49.7 51.4 63.7 58.2 58 
Total external Debt 
(% of GDP) 
56.1 53.9 46.9 43.7 36.2 31.7 25.4 23.3 22 
Source: Bank AI-Maghrib (BAM): 2005 
Because of fiscal discipline, between 2000 and 2007, Morocco 
has managed to avoid the inflationary financing of the deficit by 
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resorting to other non-inflationary instruments. As a result, the 
macroeconomic fundamentals remained stable. 
The 2004 Article IV Consultation (IMF, 2005) concluded that 
Morocco had managed to maintain macro-economic stability, with 
inflation remaining low and the exchange rate stable. The external 
current account had moved into a surplus position since 2001, and 
external reserves had increased.  Fiscal performance however had 
deteriorated badly due to the decline in revenues and the pressures 
emanating from the public sector wage bill. Security related 
expenditures increased after the Cassablanca bombings in May 
2003. Total government debt increased dramatically thereby 
adversely impacting on other macroeconomic indicators.  
According to the IMF (2007), fiscal policy remained geared 
toward medium-term fiscal consolidation. The progress achieved in 
this area during the last few years strengthened Morocco’s 
economic performance. In the medium term, continued 
improvement of the public finances position l opened up fiscal 
space, private sector confidence, and helped consolidate growth. In 
the short term, continued fiscal discipline, particularly for the wage 
bill, helped contain demand pressures 
In their concluding statement of the 2007 Article IV 
Consultations in Morocco, the Executive Board concluded that the 
external position had further strengthened, the fiscal position had 
also improved as a result of improved tax performance and fiscal 
consolidation, especially the civil service reforms which reduced the 
wage bill, the proceeds from privatization and improvement in 
import revenues. The public debt went on a declining trend. Fiscal 
prudence helped to contain inflation to levels within the targeted 
range. Improvement in fiscal adjustment led to low inflation, 
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surplus current account position and a stable exchange rate, which 
are the critical pillars for macro-economic stability (IMF, 2008). 
4.4.4 Conclusion 
The key lesson from the Moroccan study is that not all deficits 
are inflationary. The Moroccan deficit proved sustainable due to its 
moderate size and the methods of its financing. Deficits are good 
and bad depending on their financing and their causes. Deficits 
arising from recurrent expenditure are normally problematic 
compared to deficits on capital projects which have a bearing on 
economic growth. All that the Moroccan story tells is that a 
moderate deficit, financed appropriately, is not necessarily a 
problem. We also see that political stability and good governance 
helped the situation in Morocco. Morocco is therefore a typical case 
of how to manage the deficit under capable leadership. 
In the below section, we proceed to look at the 
macroeconomic effects of public sector financing in Zambia. The 
objective is to ascertain whether or not deficits impacted negatively 
on macroeconomic performance in Zambia. Of particular concern is 
the extent to which the development of the public sector, and 
nationalization affected fiscal balances. We also look at the post 
Kaunda policies and see whether they were sustainable, fiscally. 
4.5 Zambia 
4.5.1 Introduction 
Zambia’s economic history since independence can be divided 
into three periods, namely: (1) the period from 1964 to 1975 when 
high copper prices spurred economic expansion, nationalization of 
the economy and public expenditure growth; (2)  1975-1990 when 
copper prices began to fall, triggering macro-economic decline 
which was accompanied by poor fiscal performance and structural 
difficulties and lukewarm economic reforms; and (3) 1991 and 
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beyond when under President Chiluba radical structural and 
macroeconomic reforms were undertaken but without adequate 
attention to fiscal prudence and debt management (Kumbula, 
2003). 
4.5.2 Fiscal Expenditure 
Zambia got its independence from Britain on 24 October 1964 
under the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda. In the early years of 
independence, the Zambian economy prospered on the back of 
good copper prices and strong agricultural production. Prospects for 
economic robustness were high.  Government increased its 
expenditure on infrastructural projects, education, health and social 
amenities. The economy registered impressive growth rates. 
Kaunda nationalized all foreign owned companies through the 
Mulungushi Economic Reforms of 1968 where government declared 
its intention to acquire equity holdings (51% or more) in a number 
of key foreign owned firms.  
The first casualty of these predatory policies was Anglo-
American Corporation whose assets were appropriated. Other 
foreign assets mainly in the mining sector were also seized. The 
Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines was formed at the peak of 
nationalization in Zambia (Saasa, 1996).   
Ambitious economic and national development plans were put 
in place along the Soviet Union Model. Kaunda’s high budgetary 
expenditures were short-lived. These had been propelled by copper 
revenues. By then Zambia was the world’s fourth largest producer 
of copper. In 1973, a massive increase in oil prices was followed by 
a slump in the prices of copper resulting in a diminution of export 
earnings. In 1973, copper had accounted for 93% of all export 
earnings. This was reduced to half in 1975 due to the collapse of 
international prices of copper. By 1976, Zambia was in serious 
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balance-of-payments crisis leading to the abandonment of the third 
National Development Plan (1978-83). Inflation started to increase 
on the back of an overvalued exchange rate and excess liquidity of 
the copper booms. The budget deficit worsened and Kaunda 
resorted to external borrowing to bridge the gap created by the fall 
in copper revenues (Saasa, 1996).  
Faced with this situation, especially high indebtedness, 
Kaunda turned to the IMF. The IMF recommended structural 
adjustment to reduce overdependence on copper. The proposed 
measures included: ending of price controls, devaluation of the 
kwacha, cut-backs in government expenditure, and cancellation of 
subsidies on food and fertilizer. Kaunda incurred the wrath of 
Zambians when he removed food subsidies. Public riots erupted 
after prices of basic foodstuffs increased following the removal of 
these subsidies. 
Kaunda broke off the relationship with the IMF in May 1987 in 
a huff and introduced a homegrown version of economic reforms 
which he called the New Economic Recovery Program in 1988.  But 
without external balance of payments support, this did not work. 
Macroeconomic instability worsened and Zambia rejoined the IMF in 
1989. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 
1990, Kaunda was forced to make a major policy volte face by 
partially privatizing parastatals. At the same time Glasnost and 
Perestoika were being introduced in Russia in the last days of 
communism by Michael Gorbachev (Graham, 1992). 
Kaunda had no choice except to introduce reforms since his 
philosophy of humanism was another way of African socialism based 
on the Soviet Union – he was left with no option except to introduce 
glasnost and perestoika in his own country. In 1991, Kaunda called 
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multi-party elections and lost to Chiluba’s Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy (MMD). 
The analysis of the economic policy under Kaunda reveals a 
pattern of how public finances were mishandled during periods of 
economic boom. Public expenditure programs mainly of a recurrent 
nature were pursued without due regard to budgetary discipline. 
Import substitution meant that the country was insulated from 
competition and industries became inefficient. The kwacha remained 
fixed and overvalued, thereby making exports uncompetitive. High 
budgetary overruns precipitated successive budget deficits whose 
financing through first domestic financing caused inflationary 
pressures and second through external borrowing led to 
indebtedness and the now famous Zambian debt crisis. No wonder 
that in 1988, the IMF identified the need to diversify economic 
activities away from copper so as to create budgetary sustainability 
in the medium to long-term. This illustrates how the budget is such 
a central tool of economic policy that it can either reinforce 
economic prosperity or cause macroeconomic instability. In short, 
Zambia fell victim to Kaunda’s economic populism and lived beyond 
its means. Living beyond its means led to budget deficits whose 
implications on economic performance have already been alluded 
to. 
In the next section we look at whether Chiluba’s economic 
policies made any difference in so far as fiscal discipline was 
concerned.   
Economic policy under Chiluba 
Under Chiluba’s administration (1991-2001), government 
started with the rhetoric of privatization and for the first ten years 
failed dismally to put it into practice. It was not until 2000 when 
Zambia started privatization in earnest. Divesture took place in 
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many state owned enterprises. Chiluba liberalized the exchange 
rate, maintained positive interest rates and embraced free market 
economics. By 2000, Chiluba had completely denationalized the 
assets of the Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) and 
donors resumed balance of payments support (IMF, 2000).  
In 2000 Zambia qualified for the HPIC debt relief after donors 
were satisfied by the reform program, (Mumba, 2005). 
After 2005, new investor interest in copper mines emerged. 
The Chinese have become the major investors in the Zambian 
copper industry. This has rekindled hope in the prospects of turning 
around the fortunes of the Zambian economy. In February 2007, 
China and Zambia announced the creation of Chinese-Zambian 
Economic Partnership zone around the Chambishi copper mine. 
Although copper has once more taken center stage in the Zambian 
economy, concerns remain that the economy is not diversified 
enough to cope with a collapse in international copper prices. 
4.5.3 Budget Deficits and Economic Performance 
In the first period after independence (1964-1975), Zambia 
enjoyed a surplus despite the fact that the government borrowed 
from both the domestic and foreign sources to finance its expanding 
operations, which included nationalization, and ambitious 
infrastructural projects (Mwanza, 1996). 
In the second period (1975-1990) domestic revenue receipts 
started to fall as a share of GDP because of balance of payments 
problems following the fall in international copper prices and the 
advent of the oil crisis. Government heavily borrowed from the 
domestic sector and foreign markets. External debt mounted, 
especially in the 1980s. Donors intervened to ameliorate the debt 
situation through debt relief measures (World Bank, 1990). 
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However, this was not successful due to the sometimes 
strained relations between the Zambian government and the IMF. 
In the period 1990 and beyond, significant inflows of 
concessional assistance from bilateral sources increased following 
significant structural and economic reforms under Chiluba. However 
in 1991, there was an exceptionally high and pronounced spike in 
public expenditure and domestic borrowing (Dalamagasase, 1995). 
Budgeting, fiscal discipline, public expenditure management 
and the effectiveness of public expenditure programmes declined 
over the decades as a consequence of repeated ad hoc adjustments 
to diminishing resources (Roberts, 2004). In addition medium-term 
expenditure programming was weak hence supplementary budgets 
were routine. Moreover, dysfunctional cash budgeting arrangements 
introduced in the 1990s blunted the thrust of public expenditure 
strategy (Fagernas, 2004). 
Furthermore Zambia ran a consistent fiscal deficit since the 
1970s. Public expenditure and net lending (mainly to parastatals) 
were sustained at high levels in excess of 30% of GDP up to the 
1980s, reaching a plateau in 1991 at 60% of GDP (election year), 
and thereafter declined to 20%-25% of GDP from the mid 1990s 
onwards. 
Revenues dropped in tandem with the fall of the copper prices 
from around 30% of GDP on average between 1965-1975 to below 
20% in the mid 1980s before picking up to 20% in the 1990s 
following structural reforms. 
In the years after independence there was a modest real GDP 
growth averaging 3.6% on the back of copper revenues and sharp 
increases in public and private consumption. The domestic financing 
(difference between revenue and expenditure) grew by 10.93% 
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(1972-74); 13.58% (1975-1979); 20.13% (1980-1984); 19.47% 
(1985-1989); 13.96% (1990-1994) and 31.13% (1995-2000) (GoZ, 
2002).  
In 1991, electoral politics led to the relaxation of fiscal 
discipline. Public expenditure increased from 28% of GDP in 1990 to 
60% in 1991, giving rise to a fiscal deficit of 45% of GDP which was 
financed by domestic borrowing equivalent to 25% and foreign 
financing equivalent to 20% of GDP. The incoming Movement for 
Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) thus inherited a legacy of increased 
public debt and higher inflation and was soon to reap the 
hyperinflationary consequences (Kumbula, 2003). 
In general, Zambia’s fiscal accounts have been chronically in 
deficit since the early 1970s and there was routine recourse to 
inflationary domestic financing (printing money). 
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Table 13:  Zambia  Inflationary trends (1970 – 1999) 
Year Low Income Group 
(%) 
High Income 
Group(%) 
1970 10.1 8.5 
1975 11.7 11.9 
1980 14.0 10.4 
1981 12.5 13.2 
1982 19.6 11.7 
1983 20.0 20.0 
1984 37.5 35.1 
1985 51.6 55.4 
1986 21.0 21.0 
1987 54.4 54.4 
1988 63.1 62.5 
1989 50.5 15.0 
1990 32.0 80.0 
1991 18.5 74.0 
1997 31.0 55.0 
1999 45.0 67.0 
Source: Bank of Zambia (2003) 
Budget Deficits and Exchange rates 
At independence and up to early 1980s, Zambia maintained a 
fixed exchange rate. The Kwacha was highly overvalued. Zambia 
boasted of huge foreign reserves as a result of copper exports. 
.However, the resurgence of the budget constraints following 
adverse shocks of falling terms of trade and a rising debt service 
burden, led to the devaluation of the Kwacha in the late 1980s 
(Carlsson, 1996.) 
Successive agreements with the IMF committed Zambia to 
restrain public expenditure, to limit its borrowing and to introduce 
foreign exchange auctioning in 1986. However, the foreign 
exchange auctioning system was abandoned as it failed to meet the 
private sectors’ demand for foreign exchange and was accompanied 
by the revaluation of the Kwacha in 1987. 
Structural adjustment and economic reforms since 1991 
under President Chiluba, led to the liberalization of foreign 
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exchange, the introduction of bureau de changes, the wholesale 
privatization of parastatals, civil service reforms and increased 
donor support. This reduced the budget deficit and enabled the 
floatation of the kwacha as a freely tradable currency on the inter-
bank market. 
Table 14:  Zambia:  Exchange Rate Movements (1970 – 2004) 
Year US$:Kwacha 
1970 1.40 
1975 1.55 
1980 1.27 
1981 1.15 
1982 1.08 
1983 0.80 
1984 0.56 
1985 0.37 
1986 0.16 
1987 0.05 
1988 0.12 
1990 0.07 
1991 0.03 
2000 3.11 
2001 3.61 
2002 4.31 
2003 4.73 
2004 4.78 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (Various Issues)  
After the year 2000, the exchange rate continued to 
depreciate against the dollar from 3.111 in 2000 to 4779 in 2004 as 
a result of the liberalization of the exchange rate.  
Budget Deficits and Trade Deficits 
From 1964 to 1974, Zambia enjoyed a trade surplus and a 
positive balance in factor service payments and current transfers. 
During this period aid receipts were low and most external financing 
of the balance of payments were on commercial terms. However, 
with the fall in copper revenues, the budget deficit increased and 
external debt to the tune of US$5.8 billion was accumulated. The 
current account stood at 8% of GDP between 1975 and 1990. 
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Falling revenues prompted heavy borrowing from bilateral and 
multilateral sources and in the 1990s, Zambia’s indebtedness 
peaked. Fortunately the HIPC Initiative of the 1990s considerably 
reduced Zambia’s debt burden (Mwanza, 1996) 
However, critics still argue that debt relief did not completely 
eradicate the debt stock which stood at US$6 billion as at 2006 
(Evans, 2008). Be this as it may, Zambia’s balance of payments 
situation was less prone to crisis than was the case in the 1980s 
and perhaps early 1990s.  
The overall macroeconomic picture in the late 1990s is 
illustrated below. A look at the government accounts will show the 
trend gap between revenues and expenditures over a period of time 
and how other macroeconomic indicators tended to move in 
sympathy, in the same direction. 
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Table 15:  Zambia:  Economic and financial indicators (1995 – 
1999) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Output and prices  
(change in percent) 
     
Real GDP -2.3 6.4 3.5 -2.0 4.0 
Consumer prices (period average) 34.9 43.1 24.4 24.5 21.6 
Investment and savings  
(% of GDP) 
     
Gross Investment 13.1 14.8 13.6 14.4 17.6 
Public Investment 6.6 6.0 5.4 7.7 8.5 
Private Investment 6.5 8.7 8.2 6.7 9.0 
Gross domestic savings 7.3 8.5 8.1 5.4 5.1 
Public Domestic savings 3.6 3.5 3.7 1.5 0.5 
Private domestic savings 3.7 5.0 4.4 3.8 4.6 
Central Government Finance 
(% of GDP) 
     
Total Revenue and Grants 29.1 26.8 24.8 24.5 27.8 
Total Expenditure and net lending 32.9 29.4 26.8 28.8 31.0 
Overall government deficit 
(excluding grants) 
-13.0 8.7 -7.0 -10.6 -12.3 
Overall government deficit 
(including grants) 
-3.8 -2.6 -1.9 -4.3 -3.2 
Primary balance (including grants) 4.3 2.2 2.2 -1.0 -0.9 
Total domestic public debt 
outstanding 
…. 11.7 10.0 14.3 10.0 
Money and Credit      
Broad money (end-year, percent 
change) 
55.3 34.4 23.9 18.5 20.4 
Treasury bill yield (91 days; 
period average, in percent) 
…. 52.5 30.6 26.6 30.7 
External sector  
(% of GDP) 
     
Current account  
(including official transfers) 
-4.2 -3.7 -6.1 -8.1 -8.9 
Current account  
(excluding official transfers) 
-13.4 -13.0 -11.1 -15.2 -19.8 
Total foreign public debt 
outstanding 
197 210 179 197 221 
Exchange rates      
Zambian kwachas per U.S. dollar 
(period average) 
1865.9 1,207.5 1,341.6 1,861.8 …. 
Real effective exchange rate 
(1995 = 100) 
100.0 104.6 125.3 114.4 …. 
Sources:   IMF (2002) 
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Recent budgetary challenges in Zambia are succinctly 
revealed through IMF’s Public Information Notices (PIN) which 
covers annual (articles) of consultation. Under article IV of the IMF’s 
Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with 
members, usually every year.  A staff team visits the country, 
collects economic and financial information, and discusses with 
officials the country’s economic developments and policies.  On 
return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the 
basis for discussion by the Executive Board.  At the conclusion of 
the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, 
summarizes the views of directors and this summary is transmitted 
to the country’s authorities.   
Budget Deficits, Macroeconomic Policy and Structural 
Reforms beyond 2000 
Under the auspices of the IMF, Zambia improved her 
economic performance significantly in the four years 2000 to 2003, 
with an average growth rate of 4%. This reversed the two decades 
of decline which had seen inflation reaching an average of 50% 
(IMF, 2005). 
In 2002, the country experienced a severe drought and the 
mining sector performed badly. However real GDP grew by 3 
percent although inflation rose to 26.7% in the twelve months to 
December 2002 due to the drought-induced food shortages.  The 
overall budget deficit was reduced from 8.1% of GDP to 6.3% in 
2001. The current account deficit, after grants, narrowed to 6.5 
percent of GDP from 10.8 percent in 2001, despite a sharp 
slowdown in the growth of copper exports. International reserves at 
the bank of Zambia rose to 2.2 months of imports in 2002 from 0.9 
month at the end of 2001 (IMF, 2005). 
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In 2003 the budgetary position deteriorated as a result of civil 
service wage increases and housing allowances which were awarded 
in April the same year. This caused the IMF to revise its staff 
monitored program, which had to be modified to partially 
accommodate the wage increases without increasing inflation while 
at the same time maintaining expenditure on poverty reduction 
programs in the new Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). 
According to the IMF, the overall fiscal deficit (including grants) and 
domestic financing were estimated to have exceeded target by 1½ 
percent of GDP.   This reflected large unbudgeted security-related 
spending and payment of retrenchment benefits and wage arrears 
of 0.8 percent of GDP to facilitate the sale in December 2003 of the 
Luanshya Mine.  Expenditures on poverty reducing projects again 
fell short of budgeted levels.  To contain the wage bill, the 
government reached agreements with some unions to reduce 
housing allowances awarded earlier in the year by two-thirds.  
Domestic arrears continued to accumulate (Mumba, 2005). 
Despite the fiscal setbacks, growth improved and inflation 
declined in 2003, aided by a recovery in agricultural production.  
The increase in real GDP in 2003 was estimated at 4.2 percent, 
while the 12-month inflation rate of 17.2 percent in December 2003 
was the lowest since 1982. 
Broad money supply increased by 23.4 percent during 2003, 
compared with a target of 17 percent in the economic blueprint, 
largely because of the widening fiscal deficit.  In late October 2003, 
the Bank of Zambia eased monetary policy by lowering the cash 
legal reserve requirements from 17.5 percent to 14 percent with a 
view to providing banks with additional liquidity for lending to the 
agricultural sector and other production sectors.  As a result, 
interest rates on treasury bills, which had remained in the range of 
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30 – 35 percent for most of the year, declined sharply to around 20 
percent in December 2003 (World Bank, 2006). 
In regard to the exchange rate, the relatively stable trend in 
the real effective exchange rate since the mid-990s continued in 
2003 and supported the growth of non-traditional exports.  The 
nominal effective exchange rate depreciated by 15 percent, in 2004 
Reflecting a sharp increase in copper prices and further 
growth in non-traditional exports, the current account deficit (after 
grants) and overall balance of payments deficit narrowed to 5.9 
percent and 7.6 percent of GDP respectively. 
According to the IMF (2004) progress in implementing 
structural reforms was mixed during 2003.  A medium-term 
expenditure framework (MTEF) was discussed with stakeholders in 
preparation of the 2004 budget.  The Bank of Zambia introduced an 
inter-bank foreign exchange market; completed a draft Financial 
Sector Development Plan (FSDP), and made some progress toward 
developing plans to deal with the insolvent non-bank financial 
institutions.  However, effectiveness of the strengthened 
commitment control system was undermined by unanticipated 
spending decisions.  Delays were also experienced in the 
procurement of hardware and software for an integrated financial 
management and information system (IFMIS) and the preparation 
of a multi-year plan for clearing domestic arrears.  Negotiations 
were initiated with the preferred bidder for the sale of 49 percent 
shares and management rights of Zambia National Commercial 
Bank (GoZ, 2006). 
As the IMF (2004) observed, Zambia’s mixed record of 
implementation was indicative of incomplete program ownership, 
limited capacity and lapses in co-ordination. 
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Against this background, IMF has been emphasizing the need 
for a determined implementation of prudent macro-economic 
policies and structural reforms over the medium term to boost 
economic growth, reduce poverty and achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals (World Bank, 2007).  Of particular importance 
was fiscal adjustment to achieve fiscal sustainability, increase 
spending on poverty reduction and free up resources to support 
private investment.  IMF also encouraged the authorities to take 
steps to diversify the sources of economic growth and exports with 
particular emphasis on agricultural development and exports.  IMF 
urged the authorities to accelerate efforts to meet the HIPC 
Initiative completion point triggers, as this was essential for debt 
sustainability and poverty reduction. 
In 2004, the Zambian parliament passed a budget which 
aimed to sharply reduce domestic borrowing in order to contain the 
domestic debt and interest payments.  The IMF pointed out that 
expenditure restraint should be the main basis of fiscal adjustment, 
and urged authorities to ensure that the wage bill was held to 8 
percent of GDP as budgeted to provide more room for priority 
expenditure.   However, the IMF welcomed the emphasis on 
measures to broaden the base of the value added tax system and 
simplify its administration and to streamline exemptions (IMF, 
2006). 
In addition, the IMF also welcomed the progress made in 
strengthening the expenditure commitment control system.  To 
ensure further progress, the IMF recommended that the system be 
backed by tight enforcement of procedures, including sanctions 
against officials responsible for overspending and unauthorized re-
allocation of funds, and a firm commitment to avoid unbudgeted 
spending.  They stressed that the Ministry of Finance and National 
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Planning needed to receive full political backing for strict adherence 
to the budget and avoidance of ad hoc spending. 
In order to help the Zambian government in managing the 
fiscus, the IMF recommended the development of a medium-term 
expenditure framework as an important step towards the 
preparation of more realistic budgets and the setting of expenditure 
priorities that were consistent with the goals of the PRSP.  In this 
regard, they welcomed the intention to contain the government 
wage bill over the medium term.  They considered that 
development of a medium-term strategy to “right-size” government 
operations and complete the pay reform would be essential to allow 
priority poverty-reducing expenditure to increase.  The IMF together 
with the World Bank have been working with the Zambian 
authorities on the design of further reforms to reduce expenditure. 
On monetary policy, since 2000, the IMF has been urging the 
Zambian authorities to monitor monetary developments closely 
particularly in light of the reduction in interest rates, and to tighten 
monetary policy, if necessary based on a more ambitious inflation 
target.  They observed that a sustained reduction in interest rates 
would require a durable reduction in government borrowing and 
inflation, as well as greater efficiency in the financial sector.  They 
supported maintenance of the flexible exchange rate system to 
allow adjustment to changes in Zambia’s external circumstances.  
They welcomed the introduction of the broad-based inter-bank 
foreign exchange market (The Economist, 2001). 
Furthermore, the IMF noted that the financial system was 
generally sound.  They considered the completion of the Financial 
Sector Development Plan to be a useful first step toward addressing 
the concerns identified in the 2002 Financial System Stability 
Assessment.  They encouraged the authorities to prioritize the 
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reforms to ensure that urgent issues such as the insolvency of the 
non-bank financial institutions were addressed in 2004.  IMF 
considered the privatization of the Zambia National Commercial 
Bank to be an important element of financial sector stability and 
fiscal sustainability. 
Private sector development and foreign investment in order to 
accelerate economic growth has been one of the key planks in the 
IMF advice.  IMF encouraged the buy-in from the private sector on 
policy formulation and legislative review. IMF advised on the need 
for public and private sector partnerships especially in areas of 
strategic investment such as the Konkola Copper Mines and the 
commercialization of the electricity company to enhance efficiency 
and pre-empt potential strains on the budget.  IMF advised the 
government to improve governance through an anti-corruption 
drive and the enhancement of transparency and accountability in 
government operations, including the commitment to adhere to 
budgetary procedures (IMF, 2005). 
In addition, efforts to privatize loss making parastatals 
improved revenues. Revenue improvement was also augmented by 
the resurgence in copper prices. As a result, the budget deficit was 
kept within reasonable limits. Inflation was reduced to 15.9%. Real 
GDP grew grown by an average of 4.5% per annum and the fiscal 
deficit stood at 1.7% of GDP in 2007 compared to 6.6% in 2003. 
Zambia’s debt sustainability was achieved through the HIPC status.  
After years of monetary expansion, the Bank of Zambia maintained 
tight monetary policy. In addition, the external sector performed 
well following the rebound of copper prices in 2005. There was also 
an improvement in the public sector management system, including 
the introduction of a medium term expenditure framework in the 
budget making process (GoZ, 2006).  
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Table 16:  Zambia:  Selected economic indicators (2001 – 2007) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Budget Balance  
(% of GDP) 
-8.1 -6.3 -6.6 -1.7 -2.5 3.0 5.0 
Inflation (%) 21.4 22.2 21.4 18 18.3 15.2 14.0 
Exchange Rate: 
Kwacha/US$ 
-7.7 -19.3 -14.1 -2.6 1.3 2.8 1.9 
Trade Balance (%) -13.9 -9.2 -9.6 -5.4 -6.0 -8.3 -9.7 
Source: Bank of Zambia (various issues) 
4.5.4 Conclusion 
The overall economic outlook is that Zambia’s macroeconomic 
stabilization will continue to hinge on external budgetary support, 
debt relief initiatives and structural reforms. Reliance on external 
budget support has enabled Zambia to maintain fiscal sustainability. 
But the problem with over dependence on donor support is that 
once certain agreed conditionalities are not met, there is a danger 
of donor pull out. This will affect the national budget and compound 
the deficit. Zambia needs structural reforms in order to diversify its 
economic activities and move away from over dependence on 
copper revenues. Other sectors like manufacturing, agriculture, 
tourism and services need to be developed so as to expand the 
domestic revenue base. 
The review has shown that Zambia’s economy suffered from 
the deficit during the rule of Kaunda and Chiluba. During Kaunda’s 
days, nationalization led to the bleeding of state coffers and growing 
fiscal deficit which was harmful to the economy. During Chiluba’s 
rule, corruption and rent-seeking activities brought the economy to 
its knees. Zambia eventually became a HIPC case. After losing 
power, Chiluba went through a long trial for corruption. We 
therefore conclude that fiscal deficits and bad governance had a 
negative impact on the Zambian economy. 
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4.6 Botswana 
4.6.1 Introduction 
Botswana is a good example of how macro-economic stability 
can translate into fiscal stability through a balanced budget or more 
often a surplus budget. Macroeconomic stability refers to a situation 
where macroeconomic fundamentals (or key variables) are within 
an acceptable ball park (as benchmarked by international economic 
standards). For example, the Maastricht Treaty sets a manageable 
budget deficit as a figure around 5% of GDP. This is the general 
target, which all European Union states strive to achieve.  
On the other hand, the IMF views a single digit inflation figure 
as appropriate for a stable economy. An average real economic 
growth rate of least 3-5% would indicate a buoyant economy. A 
stable exchange rate, which is determined by forces of demand and 
supply (free float) would also be regarded as competitive as 
opposed to a fixed exchange rate whose rate is pegged by the 
central bank. Using all these criteria, Botswana passes the test. 
4.6.2 Public Finances 
At independence in 1966, Botswana was one of the poorest 
countries in the world (Guest, 2005). Botswana depended on 
foreign aid which virtually funded all government investments and 
recurrent expenditure. In 1971, foreign aid accounted for 98% of 
state revenue until diamonds were discovered the same year and 
Botswana’s fortunes changed.  
Diamond revenue was used in infrastructural development, 
education and health. The private sector was allowed to grow 
unmolested and foreign investors poured into Botswana, taking 
investments in key sectors of the economy (especially mining) in 
partnership with the government. Notable investments included the 
diamond mining firms and safaris in the Okavango Delta. Economic 
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aid fuelled growth and the diamond trade surplus was invested in 
the building up of reserves. Public expenditure was kept within 
budgetary limits, hence avoiding fiscal overruns.  
Unlike other failed states, like Zambia, which ran into debt 
problems as a result of  lack of fiscal probity, high public 
expenditure overruns and external borrowing, Botswana managed 
to look after its economy so well that it progressed from a lowly 
developing country to a middle income country according to the 
World Bank. In this regard, Botswana never suffered from the crisis 
usually emanating from an unbalanced budget. As a result, the 
problems of high inflation, fixed exchange rate and balance of 
payments associated with excess demand have never been an issue 
in Botswana. Botswana is thus a typical case of macroeconomic 
stability whose main trajectory was good fiscal policy. 
Guest (2005) interrogated the reasons why Zambia and 
Botswana, which got independence almost at the same time (with a 
negligible two year difference), depended on aid initially and were 
endowed with rich minerals, ended up with fundamentally different 
economies. Guest (2005) argued that aid helped Botswana out of 
poverty but was wasted in Zambia. He goes on to argue that what 
mattered was that Botswana had good economic policies, soundly 
administered, whereas Zambia did not. In his comparative economic 
assessment of the two countries, Guest (2005) gave Botswana an 
“A” grade (denoting successful economic policies) and Zambia an 
“F” grade (denoting failed economic policies). 
Despite its very small population of 1.4 million people, 
Botswana’s economic record has attracted worldwide attention.  The 
praise that has often accompanied analysis of Botswana’s economic 
progress is well deserved.  Starting from a GDP of US$ 50 million 
(in current terms) at independence in 1966, the level of GDP rose 
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rapidly to US $3 700 million by 1992.  Data from the 1991 and 
1994 World Development Reports (1991&1994) suggest that on 
average, Botswana was the world’s fastest growing economy over 
the period 1965 to 1992.  It achieved average growth rates of 
13.9% and 10.1% during the periods 1975-80 and 1980-92 
respectively, compared with a world average of 4.1% and 3.0% 
respectively. 
When compared with the performance of sub-Saharan Africa, 
which experienced growth rates of 4.2% and 1.8% over the 
respective periods, Botswana’s experience becomes even more 
startling.  Botswana’s per capita income, which stood at US$ 2 790 
in 2005 was the second highest for sub-Saharan Africa (exceeding 
South Africa’s US $2 670), only behind oil-rich Gabon’s (US $4 
450).  The weighted average for sub-Saharan Africa was only US $ 
530 (2005).  Its per capita GNP growth rate of 8.5% (1995-2005) 
was much higher than the weighted average of 0.3% for sub-
Saharan Africa over the same period (Kanyenze, 1996) 
Public Finance Management 
The government’s sound and effective management of its 
budget has been widely acclaimed (World Bank 1985, 2006, Lewis 
et.al 1990, Harvey, 1992; SAPEM, 1993; Southern Africa 
Economist: 1999, among others).  The country has pursued a 
strong market-oriented development strategy, with very limited 
public ownership. This was complemented by liberal exchange 
control measures, freely available import licenses and little control 
of the private sector.  Development planning was used as a central 
part of macroeconomic management.  Economic Plans sought to 
define government’s future expenditure and set out government’s 
revenue path.  Once parliament had passed these plans, no public 
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department could exceed set expenditure targets without the 
approval of parliament. 
Sources of government revenue were closely associated with 
the performance of minerals, and in particular the diamond sector.  
The expansion of diamond production through the opening of 
Jwaneng Mine in 1981, coupled with favorable prices, accelerated 
the inflow of revenue to government.  Mineral revenue accelerated 
markedly from a nominal rate of 46.4% of GDP during 1982/83 – 
1990/91, decelerated to an average growth rate of only 1.9% for 
the period 1991/92-1994/95 before peaking to 45% of GDP after 
1999.  Likewise, tax revenues, which were at a level of 33.1% of 
GDP, continued to be steady. This boosted surplus reserves which 
were later to be used as a buffer against rising government 
expenditure in the later years (Kanyenze, 1996). 
On the other hand government expenditure, increased at an 
annual average rate of 27.4% since the 1980s, though decelerating 
to a level of 14.5% for the period after 2000.  However, the slow-
down in expenditure growth was not as pronounced as that for 
revenue.  The bulk of recurrent expenditure was allocated for 
general public service, which included general administration and 
public order and safety.  Education continued to receive the second 
highest vote, which represented 23.1% of recurrent expenditure 
since independence. The most important point is that expenditure 
was kept within the realm of the diamond revenue base (World 
Bank, 2002). 
Botswana rapidly increased public expenditure (including 
infrastructure).  Consequently, net primary school enrolment 
increased significantly from 58% in 1975 to 97% in 1988 and down 
to 91% in 2005 (World Bank: 2005).  The primary pupil/teacher 
ratio decreased sharply from 40 in 1965 to 30 by 1991.  In 
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contrast, the weighted average primary pupil/teacher ratio for Sub-
Saharan Africa decreased only from 42 in 1965 to 41 by 2005. The 
government also heavily invested in primary health care and other 
social sectors. However, all this was being done within the 
budgetary limits. 
However, in 1982/83 due to drought, the budget slipped into 
deficit but thereafter the budget maintained a remarkable 
improvement from this deficit position in 1982/83 to an overall 
surplus after 1995.  Botswana’s prudent and effective use of its 
mineral revenues has been widely acclaimed.  In fact, she has been 
able to manage her mineral resources in such a way that it avoided 
the so-called “Dutch Disease” commonly associated with mineral 
based development.  In most mineral-based economies, quick and 
often unproductive spending of revenue often results in the real 
appreciation of the domestic currency, rendering the economy 
uncompetitive on the world markets, as happened in the case of 
Zambia (Kanyenze, 1996). 
However, in more recent years, government appears to have 
allowed spending to increase gradually.  Salkin (2005) argues that 
misplaced priorities, mismanagement and wasteful spending that 
have been evident in recent years echo the litany of causes for 
failure that have been identified in other developing countries.   
Harvey (1992) quotes examples of the adoption of projects 
with low or negative economic return, poor planning and 
implementation of development projects.  He observed that 
overspending became a problem, with actual expenditure 
representing 91% of estimates in 1986, rising to 115% (1987) and 
132% (1988) before falling to 123% (1989) and 119% (1990).  The 
1994 budget speech conceded that development expenditure had 
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expanded so quickly that government’s capacity was overstretched, 
resulting in poor quality and inefficiency.   
It also noted that ministries found that approval of 
supplementary budgets was less complex, resulting in excessive 
supplementary requests.  These issues were addressed in the Mid-
Term Review of NDP 7 (GoB, 1994).  Apart from falling mineral 
revenues, the issue of economic management in recent years has 
featured as one of the constraints on achieving high growth rates. 
The dearth of sufficient skilled human resources to implement, 
monitor and run development programmes led the government to 
reduce these programmes to a manageable level.  According to the 
IMF (2007), inadequate supervision of staff often combined with 
excessive workloads and the lack of proper motivation to keep 
productivity up, affected the implementation of these development 
programs.  In addition, many service departments were trying to 
manage huge amounts of data using manual technology that was 
inadequate to the task (GoB, 2005).  Unfortunately, this problem 
arose at a time when government’s managerial capacity was most 
required, especially in view of the growing unemployment problem 
and the need to find alternative sectors that could take over from 
mining as the engine of growth.   
In 2003, the Minister of Finance – Baledzi Gaolathe – 
presented a belt tightening budget, whose growth forecast was 5%, 
which, compared to the historical growth rates, was below average. 
A 20% civil service salary increase and the leave encashment policy 
introduced in 2002 worsened the budget and led to a deficit of 6% 
of GDP. Suppressed diamond market conditions resulted in revenue 
shortfalls. 
Botswana’s main revenue sources continued to be dominated 
by minerals (mainly diamond revenues), grants, VAT, customs and 
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excise duties and grants, while expenditure was comprised of total 
expenditure of central government and net lending. 
In the 2004/5 budget, the proposed outcome was a balanced 
budget (including a small contingent surplus of P206 million) with 
total revenues and grants of P17.54 billion and total expenditures 
and net lending of P17.33 billion. 
Notwithstanding its stable economy, economic development in 
Botswana still requires an even more adroit management of the 
economy.  As the former President, Festus Mogae, had conceded “… 
we still have a long way to go on the path to development.  There 
are still far too many Batswana without adequate incomes and our 
economy is relatively undiversified  and vulnerable to extreme 
fluctuations due to climate conditions and swings in international 
markets for our mineral and non-traditional exports”(GoB,2004). 
All in all, the discovery of diamonds in the early 1970s led to 
the rapid growth of a small modern economy, co-existing with a 
relatively backward large rural sector.  This resulted in the 
development of a dualistic economy.  It has been estimated that 
half of the rural population (the rural sector accounts for about 76% 
of total population) lives in poverty (World Bank 2008).  Cattle 
rearing, the mainstay of the rural economy is heavily concentrated 
with an estimated 5% of the rural household, accounting for half 
the national herd.   
About three quarters of the rural households depend on arable 
farming, growing mainly maize and sorghum for their livelihood.  
Yields are however very low and unpredictable due to low rainfall 
and recurrent droughts.  It may therefore not be surprising that at 
an annual average figure of 8.8%, Botswana has one of the highest 
rates of urbanization in the world (it comes second after 
Mozambique) (World Bank, 2008). 
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On the other hand, Botswana has one of the worst income 
patterns in the world.  Recent statistics show that the top 10% 
accounts for 42.9% of total income, with the lowest 20% 
responsible for only 2.1% (World Bank: 2005).  In fact, some 
observers have noted that Botswana has been able to achieve high 
rates of growth without addressing issues of equity.  Due to heavy 
reliance on market forces, observers argue that the case of 
Botswana does illustrate the limits of the market in terms of 
achieving equity (Mhone, 1993, Cokorinos, 1993, ILO SATEP: 
1987).  However, issues of equity cannot be adequately addressed 
outside the framework of a growing economy.  In this respect, the 
failure to diversify the economy away from heavy reliance on 
diamond sector and beef industry constitutes the most fundamental 
structural bottleneck that undermines future growth.  Government 
is aware of this constraint and has suggested that the diversification 
of the economy should involve a shift towards the industrial, 
manufacturing and tourist industries (GoB, various issues) 
Although the tourist industry has been identified as a possible 
alternative way of diversifying the economy, its potential is limited.  
The current focus on high cost tourism, geared towards preserving 
the fragile natural beauty (the Okavango Delta), entails limited 
scope for substantial growth in tourism.  Exporting financial services 
to the sub-region also features among the alternative ways of 
diversifying the economy (Bank of Botswana 1993).   
Government’s economic and fiscal policy has been 
characterized by a strong reliance on private sector growth to 
sustain employment creation and provide increased government 
revenue.  To achieve this goal a policy of low direct taxation and 
subsidies for job creation in the manufacturing and tourism sectors 
has been implemented.   
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The continuous increases in diamond revenue ensured budget 
surpluses between 1983 and 1997.  However, in 1998 a mixture of 
falling diamond revenue and the culmination of three years of sharp 
rises in expenditure meant that a deficit was unavoidable.  The 
deficit was financed from the government’s large savings and posed 
no threat to economic stability.  Otherwise, the Botswana budget is 
almost always in surplus. 
However, excess liquidity in the economy remains a major 
concern due to the country’s large reserves and the inflow of foreign 
exchange.   
Fiscal Sustainability 
According to various IMF Article IV Consultations held since 
2000, Botswana continues to be rated as one of the best performing 
economies despite emerging budgetary challenges. Botswana is a 
country which has evolved from one of the poorest countries in the 
world to a middle income country with the highest sovereign credit 
rating in Africa. This success has been attributed to sound economic 
policies, especially in managing its fiscal surplus derived from its 
diamonds over more that 35 years, underpinned by a fledging 
democracy. Botswana still heavily depends on the diamond sector, 
which accounts for a third of GDP and 70% of export earnings. This 
is the reason why in 2003 Botswana launched its Ninth National 
Development Plan for the period 2003/04-2008/9 with much 
emphasis on economic diversification as a strategy for fiscal 
sustainability. 
Continued fiscal consolidation saw inflation further declining in 
2004 from over 12% in June to 6.4% in December. Good fiscal 
management was accompanied by tight monetary policies. 
However, the IMF (2005) warned against the rise in poverty and 
HIV aids and the likely impact on the budget in future. 
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Table 17:  Botswana: Selected economic and financial indicators: 
1999 – 2008 
Indicators 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Budget 
Balance (%) 
5.9 9.2 -3.3 -4.3 -0.8 -4.1 -1.7 2.2 1.9 2.0 
Inflation (%) 7.8 8.5 6.6 8.0 9.3 7.8 6.5 5.9 6.0 7.6 
Exchange 
Rate 
Pula/US$ 
4.6 5.1 5.8 6.3 4.9 0.21 4.8 5.3 6.9 4.8 
Trade Balance  
($m US) 
619 546.7 600.7 616.7 812.7 892.5 917 876.0 599.1 755.8 
Source: Bank of Botswana and IMF (various issues) 
The above table shows growing pressure on the budget since 
2002, when the budget churned out successive deficits, though of 
smaller dimensions. Analysts have attributed the emerging deficit to 
socio-economic development challenges facing Botswana in the 21st 
century, chief among which is the failure of the growth trickle down 
mechanism and funding challenges emerging from the HIV/AIDS 
scourge – all this seen against the decline in diamond revenue and 
the slow progress in the diversification of the economy away from 
diamond dependence towards tourism, services and manufacturing.   
4.6.3 Conclusion 
The Botswana study confirms the view that the budget is an 
important tool for macroeconomic and fiscal stability. By managing 
its budget surpluses prudently, Botswana was able to avoid the 
catastrophe of fiscal deficits which other African countries like 
Zambia and Ghana experienced as a result of over reliance on 
mineral or commodity booms. Unlike these   failed states, Botswana 
carefully managed the revenue bubble making sure that when it 
burst, the economy would not suffer. 
Because of budget surpluses that were enjoyed for 16 years 
up to 1998, key economic indicators such as inflation, the exchange 
rate and the terms of trade remained stable and posed no threat to 
macroeconomic stability, stable growth and fiscal balance. The 
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Botswana study demonstrates the catalytic effect of a stable 
democracy towards the robust performance of the economy.   
4.7 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, we started by reviewing the literature on the 
development paths chosen by African countries in their post colonial 
eras. This chapter has established that in general, African 
governments were buoyed by initial years of commodity booms in 
their early years of independence. However, the lack of 
diversification and overdependence on a single commodity exposed 
these countries to the vagaries of international terms of trade 
shocks.  
We have also seen how in the early years of independence, 
African governments maintained economic distortions shown by 
fixed exchange rates, overvalued currencies and import controls. 
These policies bred high budget deficits and caused severe 
deterioration in macro-economic stability.  
In order to finance the unsustainable deficits, some 
governments, like for example Zambia and Ghana, resorted to 
inflationary financing by heavily relying on central bank financing of 
the deficit and external borrowing. This increased money supply 
growth, further putting more pressure on excess demand and led to 
more inflationary pressures. External borrowing worsened the 
economic performance of these countries. 
On the other hand, overvalued exchange rates in the cases of 
Ghana and Zambia led to serious terms of trade problems as 
exports were uncompetitive and trade taxes were diminished. 
We conclude that in the cases of Zambia and Ghana, 
abundant resources in the first instance, triggered poor public 
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finance management, thereby adversely affecting macro-economic 
performance – the so-called resource curse. 
In contrast, in the cases of Botswana and Morocco, we saw 
two classical examples of good fiscal probity and the abundant 
benefits derived from the maintenance of a balanced budget in 
Botswana and, in the case of the latter, financing the deficit from 
non-bank sources. In the case of Botswana, it is instructive to note 
the sustained surplus position of the government budget, 
throughout its economic history since independence, with the 
exception of 1998 and intermittently after 2000. We conclude that a 
sound fiscal balance is definitely a key sine qua non for a stable 
economy.  
Overall, the comparative studies of Ghana, Zambia, Morocco 
and Botswana show how important the public sector is. Poor 
management of public finances has far reaching implications on 
macroeconomic stability and fiscal balance. The deficit (and how it 
is financed) emerges as a central theme in understanding the 
macroeconomic challenges commonly faced by developing countries 
whose revenues always lag behind expenditures. 
The comparative and qualitative reviews of the experiences of 
Ghana, Morocco, Zambia and Botswana have helped us appreciate 
pervasive effects of high public expenditure and its implication on 
macroeconomic performance. We can also clearly see the nexus 
between governance and macro-economic stability.  
In the following section, we now look at the Zimbabwe Case 
Study.  
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CHAPTER 5 
The Experiences of Zimbabwe (1980 – 2008) 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter four, a comparative study of budget deficits and 
macroeconomic performance was done, first for Sub-Saharan Africa 
in general and then for a number of selected African countries, in 
particular. We saw that African countries in the post colonial era 
started off on a sound economic footing, registering positive 
economic growth rates usually on the back of commodity booms. 
Revenue windfalls were used for social expenditure and ambitious 
infrastructural development projects until the exhaustion of these 
revenues. To make up for the revenue gaps, governments either 
borrowed on the domestic and external markets or printed money 
to finance their deficits. 
Fiscal imbalances arising out of public expenditure had 
adverse effects on macroeconomic performance in varying degrees. 
However, other non-economic factors such as corruption and poor 
governance also significantly contributed to economic slow-down. 
Botswana was able to use its budget surpluses prudently since 
independence in 1966. However, it has to deal with the over-
dependence on diamonds, whose prices in recent years have been 
volatile on the international market, the HIV/AIDs pandemic and 
growing poverty, whose budgetary implications pose great 
challenges for the future economic prospects of Botswana. As for 
Morocco, high budget deficits did not affect macroeconomic stability 
as inflation remained in the single digit zone. This was due to the 
fact that borrowing was confined to non-inflationary sources of 
finance. 
The experiences of Ghana and Zambia showed us the extent 
to which the lack of fiscal consolidation and excess demand posed 
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dangers for macroeconomic performance in these countries. Studies 
of these countries showed us there was a connection between fiscal 
imbalances and macroeconomic performance. In the case of 
Zambia, fiscal imbalances were worsened by external indebtedness. 
Both Zambia and Ghana became successful candidates of the Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Overall, we deduced from 
the comparative studies that there was a connection between poor 
public sector financial management and macroeconomic 
performance. 
Following these comparative experiences, we now do a case 
study of Zimbabwe. The purpose of this chapter is to review the 
political and economic history of Zimbabwe, track the budget deficit 
and its occurrence, and examine its cumulative effect on the 
performance of the Zimbabwean economy between 1980-2008. 
5.2 Political Background 
Zimbabwe became independent on 18th April 1980 after the 
Lancaster House negotiated settlement (in Britain) that culminated 
in the Lancaster House Constitution, which many observers 
regarded as a ceasefire and power transfer document. The 
Lancaster House Agreement brought an end to the war which had 
intensified in the then Rhodesia especially after 1972 when guerilla 
infiltration from the north east, south east and northwest of the 
country from Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia, almost crippled 
the Rhodesian economy. This economy was already reeling from 
sanctions imposed after the then Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian 
Douglas Smith, had declared the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI) 11 November 1965 (Stiff, 2006). 
After Lancaster, the country was briefly ruled by a British 
Governor, Lord Christopher Soames, who had been dispatched by 
the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, to oversee the 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
 171
ceasefire and the organizing of free and fair elections in Rhodesia, 
which were held in March 1980 and won by Robert Mugabe’s ZANU 
PF party with 57 seats out of the 80 contested seats. However, 20 
seats were reserved for whites. 
On 18 April 1980, foreign heads of states and governments 
came to the then Salisbury to witness the swearing-in of the new 
Prime Minister (Robert Mugabe) and the lowering of the Union Jack 
and the hoisting of a new Zimbabwe flag. Among the dignitaries 
who attended the ceremony was Julius Nyerere, the late Tanzanian 
President who advised the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe that 
he had inherited the jewel of Africa and should look after it. 
Indeed, the new black government had inherited a jewel – the 
robust economy, which despite sanctions, had a low budget deficit, 
good infrastructure, single digit inflation, a strong currency, a highly 
educated labour force and a relatively developed industry. During 
UDI, the Salisbury regime developed the manufacturing sector to 
robust levels, only second to South Africa (Mandaza, 1986). 
However, in my view the economy was still very fragile given the 
fact that the import substitution policy pursued by the UDI 
government had created competition barriers and the 
manufacturing sector remained highly uncompetitive and inefficient. 
The economy remained inward looking and badly needed injection 
of new capital and international credit lines. The robustness of the 
Rhodesian economy can therefore not be exaggerated because it 
was a war economy sanctions. Moreover the Rhodesian economy 
had evolved as essentially an enclave economy designed to cater 
for a minority population. The opening up of the economy so the 
majority could access social services would eventually put pressure 
on the economy in the ensuing post independence years and cause 
the fiscal deficit to increase. 
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5.3 Overview 
This Chapter is a case study of how the post colonial 
authorities mishandled the public finances of the country and how 
this impacted on macro-economic performance in Zimbabwe 
between 1980 and 2008.  Data beyond 2008 was not available due 
to the economic crisis which also affected the ability of statistical 
agencies to collate and publish up-to-date information on 
Zimbabwe.  
For the purpose of this study, the economic history of 
Zimbabwe is periodized as follows: 
Economic Dirigisme (1980-1988) 
• This part deals with the early independence period of 
dirigisme (1980-1988) which was characterized by a 
command economy and independence euphoria. The new 
government sought to address historical socio-economic 
imbalances, especially the rural-urban divide in terms of 
education, health, and other amenities. This period saw 
massive public expenditure on defence, health, education and 
public service. Massive public spending was done on the 
public sector employment, public sector investment programs, 
transfers/subsidies and expenditure on other goods and 
services. Government maintained the policies used by Smith 
to bust sanctions. The state already had a huge stock of 
public companies (98). The new government added to this by 
buying out more private companies. Zimbabwe’s involvement 
in the Mozambican civil war and the Gukurahundi1 in 
Matebeleland in the early 1980s gradually put pressure on the 
fiscus, thereby sowing seeds of budgetary deficits in the 
ensuing years. In this 1980-1988 period, ZANU (PF) followed 
                                                 
1  A brutal military operation to suppress insurgency in the western region of Zimbabwe 
which is dominated by the Ndebele tribe. 
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a Marxist-Leninist ideological rhetoric, which tended to give a 
more populist and statist developmental paradigm. In this 
regard, government followed Development Planning models 
and rolled out development plans, such as the Growth with 
Equity, Transitional National Development Plan and a series of 
Five-Year National Development Plans. The first section 
concludes that between 1980 and 1988, dirigist and populist 
policies sowed the seeds of perennial fiscal imbalances for the 
later years. Government incurred fiscal deficits arising from 
challenges of transformation, reconstruction and state 
security. 
Market based reforms (1989-1996) 
• The second part looks at the period 1989-1996, which can 
generally be referred to as the period of market based 
reforms, which was marked by the introduction of IMF and 
World Bank Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(commonly referred to in Zimbabwe as ESAP) in 1991. The 
ESAP period saw a further deterioration in fiscal and macro-
economic performance, which the IMF in its various Article 1V 
consultations blamed on “lack of fiscal consolidation” on the 
part of government and its half hearted implementation of 
economic and institutional reforms (IMF, 2006). In our 
opinion, the IMF was partly to blame for the failure to control 
excess expenditure. Year in and year out, the IMF would 
dispatch its technical assistance teams to provide advice on 
how the government could reduce expenditure. The IMF saw 
the fiscal position deteriorating over its watch. During this 
period, the fiscal deficit became unsustainably high (at 8% of 
GDP) and the IMF suspended balance of payments support to 
Zimbabwe in 1998 because of fiscal unsustainability and 
payment arrears. ESAP was replaced by the Zimbabwe 
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Program for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) 
in 1996 - which government officials touted as homegrown, 
but in reality was never implemented. In 1997, the 
Zimbabwean dollar crashed following the payment of 
unbudgeted gratuities to the restive war veterans. The market 
was hit by the speculation that the move would spark a 
general depreciation of the Zimbabwean dollar and there was 
a rush to hold money in foreign currency as opposed to the 
local currency.   
Failed Controls (1997-2003) 
• The study looks at the period (1997-2003) as a period of 
failed controls as government attempted to go back to pre-
ESAP command policies, with disastrous consequences. On 
the political front, this period saw the military participation by 
Zimbabwe in the DRC war (1998). The period was also 
marked by the suspension of balance of payments support to 
Zimbabwe, thereby precipitating a foreign exchange crisis. 
The period saw the launch on 11 September 1999 of a 
formidable opposition party in Zimbabwe, the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai, a trade 
unionist turned politician, which nearly grabbed power in the 
2000 Parliamentary Elections, were it not because of alleged 
massive violence and electoral irregularities. The elections 
were declared not free and fair by Commonwealth Observers, 
the European Union and the SADC Parliamentary Forum. This 
led to the international isolation of Zimbabwe and the 
imposition of economic and targeted sanctions, which took the 
form of travel bans for individuals on account of human rights 
violations and the freezing of ZANU (PF) officials’ assets. This 
period marked the beginning of the worst phase in the history 
of Zimbabwe, when the country registered consecutive 
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negative growth rates as a result of the decimation of the 
agricultural sector following violent land invasions of 2000 
which displaced 4500 white farmers and repossessed 15 
million hectares of land which were parceled to ZANU (PF) 
loyalists in a dual resettlement program dubbed A1 and A2 
resettlement. 
Chaos (2004-2008) 
• The last part of the study dwells on the period (2004 to 2008) 
- a period of chaos. During this period, fiscal performance 
worsened especially after 2004 when the new Governor of the 
Reserve Bank, embarked on disastrous quasi fiscal operations, 
which saw the Reserve Bank resorting to the printing press 
and advancing concessionary finances to various sectors of 
the economy (without due diligence), bailing out loss making 
parastatals, importing fertilizers, tractors and agricultural 
equipment, all of which were outside the Reserve Bank’s core 
business.  
The Reserve Bank financed government deficit by printing 
money and the President of Zimbabwe praised the Governor for 
being a practical man who did not stick to “textbook economics”. 
The bank even printed money to buy foreign exchange on the black 
market to meet external debt obligations and government’s day-to-
day budgetary requirements. The Treasury had virtually collapsed. 
This section reveals that although the budget deficit 
negatively impacted on inflation, the exchange rate, interest rates 
and trade balance, overall, the economic meltdown, especially after 
2000, was also exacerbated by corruption and governance issues. 
These other factors played a significant role in the decimation of the 
economy but are however not measurable. The section deals with 
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these issues beyond the economic discussion on the implication of 
the budget deficit on macro-economic performance. 
Data 
The statistical nominal data used in the study is based on 
Zimbabwean dollars. The nominal figures especially after year 2000 
and beyond 2008 (until the introduction of multiple currencies in 
November 2008) are soft data. This is the usual problem associated 
with hyperinflationary economies.  Hyperinflation is defined as rates 
of inflation (month-on-month) above 50% (Hanke, 2010). However, 
for Zimbabwe this definition is too simplistic because inflation 
reached million percent in 2008 and became immeasurable 
thereafter.  The combination of a grey market of foreign exchange 
and hyperinflation made conversions of nominal to real inflation 
figures impossible. The data used is more useful on indicating 
nominal trends. 
Zimbabwe’s Public Finances 
The purpose of this section is to briefly explain the nature of  
the public sector in Zimbabwe. A proper understanding of the public 
sector is necessary as it has implications on the various dimensions 
of fiscal deficits. The Zimbabwean public sector is comprised of the 
non-financial public sector (the aggregate of public enterprises and 
local authorities) on the one hand, and the financial public sector 
(central bank, government controlled financial institutions, including 
the post office and savings bank, Zimbabwe development bank, 
industrial development corporation and other allied bodies). The 
structure fits very well into the IMF classification. The latter did not 
present significant deficits or losses at least in the 1980s and 1990s 
because they did not delve into quasi-fiscal activities. 
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Taxation 
Direct taxes on incomes and profits and indirect taxes on 
goods and services, including customs and excise duty, fees, VAT, 
sales and recoveries, miscellaneous taxes and grants are the main 
sources of revenue in Zimbabwe. However, direct grants were 
stopped after 2000 because of political differences with bilateral and 
multilateral partners. Development partners preferred to work with 
non-governmental organizations and civil society.  
On the expenditure side, most expenditure is on recurrent 
items such employment costs and public consumption, interest 
payments, subsidies and transfers (GoZ, 2000). 
Since 1980, government has been borrowing heavily to 
finance its budget deficit. Capital expenditure ranged from year to 
year between 6% and 10% of the total expenditure (GoZ, 2000). 
The legal and institutional framework of public finance 
management in Zimbabwe is set out in the Constitution. The 
Constitution of Zimbabwe sets out broad principles on which 
public finances operate. Chapter X1 presents the two constitutional 
principles of public finance management, namely that: 
• All revenues from whatever source are paid into one 
Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) (section 1) 
• No moneys can be paid out of the CRF without the authority 
of an Act of Parliament (section 102) 
The Constitution requires the Minister of Finance to present to 
Parliament a budget of the estimated expenditures within 30 days 
of the announcement of each financial year. It also sets out 
Presidential powers prior to the promulgation of the Appropriation 
Act, and for the meeting of urgent and unforeseen expenditures. 
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The effect of these provisions is to bring all government expenditure 
under the control of parliament (Constitution of Zimbabwe) 
Parliament authorizes yearly expenditures. It exercises this 
power by passing enabling legislation and leaving the executive to 
manage public affairs within the legal framework laid down. 
Parliament exercises its budgetary oversight role largely through 
Committees which carry out regular enquiries into ministries’ 
expenditures. The most prominent Committee on expenditure 
management is the Public Accounts Select Committee (PAC). The 
PAC carries a critical examination of and investigations into reports 
made by the Comptroller and Auditor General of unnecessary, 
wasteful or excessive expenditure of public money or state 
property. The functions of this Committee are to ensure that funds 
for each financial year have been applied to the purposes intended 
by Parliament (Constitution Of Zimbabwe). 
The PAC has the power to call for persons, papers or records 
based on the Privileges Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act. In 
carrying out his/her duties, the Comptroller and Auditor 
General(C&AG) is not subject to the direction or control of any 
person or authority except the House of Assembly. 
After examining the accounts submitted to him/her by the 
various ministries and departments, the C&AG prepares and 
submits to the Minister of Finance a report on his/her examination 
and audit of the public accounts for onward transmission to the 
House of Assembly. 
Section 20 of the Audit and Exchequer Act appoints Treasury 
as the manager of Public Funds. Treasury issues Treasury 
Instructions which set out the broad principles to be followed in the 
control of the Public Finances and an Accounting Procedures Manual 
for guidance to officers in their day to day accounting functions. 
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Treasury also issues circulars from time to time and is empowered 
to require Accounting Officers to issue written departmental 
instructions that expand on Treasury Instructions, which relate to 
the particular operations of the ministry concerned. The Accounting 
Officer is normally the most senior public servant in a Ministry and 
is held personally accountable to Parliament for proper budget 
administration and financial control. Instructions of Accounting 
Officers are deemed to have the same force of law as a statutory 
instrument. They are responsible for ensuring that adequate 
controls of the votes of their ministries or departments are 
introduced and that all instructions relating to the votes are 
complied with (GoZ, 1996). 
However, the above constitutional safeguards were never 
followed as government incurred unauthorized expenditure most of 
the time and thereafter tabled supplementary budgets almost 
annually until 2009. It is therefore not surprising that the deficit 
continued to grow. 
5.4 The Genesis of Budget Deficits in Zimbabwe (1980-
1988) 
5.4.1 Growth with Equity 
For analytical purposes, we start by looking at the early post 
independence period which we hereby refer to as the period of 
dirigisme. The new government pursued socialist policies,  while 
receiving international aid. The period 1980-1988 was characterized 
by high public spending and a growing fiscal deficit that were a 
result of expenditure on ambitious post colonial socio-economic 
programs (transformation, reconstruction and growth with equity). 
These programs and expansionist policies were later to sow the 
seeds of future macro-economic and fiscal imbalance. (Davies, 
2005). However, the jury is still out whether the new black 
government had an option. The colonial economy was an enclave 
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economy catering for a few whites and a small black middle-class. 
Growth had not been inclusive hence the justification to embark on 
redistribution. In other words, the key imperator was the political 
capital to be gained although at the expense of macroeconomic 
stability. 
Zimbabwe’s economic prospects in the first two years of 
independence (1980-1981), looked very promising. The 
international political isolation caused by the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence (UDI) by the settler regime in 1965 had ended 
with the advent of majority rule in April 1980 (Mandaza, 1986). The 
new government inherited one of the most structurally developed 
economies and effective state systems in Africa (Bradford, 2002). 
According to Morande and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991), during the 
end of the first post independence decade, Zimbabwe had the 
uncommon combination of a high public deficit, a balanced current 
account and low levels of investment and growth. Despite a surplus 
on the current account, the public sector ran deficits exceeding 10% 
of GDP since 1981. Inflation remained manageable and interest 
rates were repressed but rose steadily after partial financial 
liberalization in 1987 and domestic public debt stocks increased. 
Morande and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991: 1) pointed out that “heavy 
public spending crowded out private consumption and investment in 
the 1980s. The private saving rate is a staggering 20% of GDP 
which finances all of Zimbabwe’s investment. Public deficits must be 
reduced to ensure a sustainable path for public debt”. However, in 
my view, the fact that inflation remained manageable demonstrates 
the fact that the impact of high public deficits were blunted by the 
restraint in the monetization of the deficit hence the reason why 
perhaps the impact was more pronounced on the interest rates 
which tended to crowd out private consumption and investment. It 
is debatable to say that all of Zimbabwe’s investment was financed 
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by private savings alone. Indeed government also borrowed to 
finance public sector investment programs (PSIP). 
Because of the historical imbalances and the lopsided nature 
of the inherited economy, the new government enunciated a macro-
economic policy framework based on the twin objectives of Growth 
and Equity (1981).The Growth with Equity program was pursued 
from the middle of 1980 to 1982. This period saw the Zimbabwe 
economy experiencing economic boom. According to Kadhani 
(1986) this upswing in economic activity can be attributed to the 
following: 
• Once-off terms of trade gain with the lifting of sanctions. 
• Renewed access to sources of borrowed external finance. 
• A significant capacity underutilization of 25%, which could 
potentially be reactivated with the influence of foreign 
investment. 
• Exceptionally good rains in the 1980 and 1981 seasons, which 
impacted favorably on the agricultural production. 
• The relaxation of both budgetary and external account 
controls in sharp contrast to the tight reins exercised in the 
period 1973 to 1979. 
GDP grew by 11% (1980) and 12% (1981). Employment grew 
by 3% in 1981. Because of the lifting of sanctions and the inflow of 
foreign capital, capacity utilization rose from 76% in 1979 to 83% 
(1980), 95% (1981) before slightly declining to 91% in 1982. Gross 
capital fixed formation rose from 13.7% in 1979 to 14.8% (1980), 
15.5% (1981) and 17.5% (1982). In short, the economy was 
buoyant (Kadhani, 1986). In my own opinion, this analysis glosses 
over the role played by infrastructural rehabilitation during the 
dirigisme years, especially in the transport and communications 
sub-sectors. The other factor that contributed to good economic 
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prospects was the aggregate demand generated by an emerging 
black middle class and the participation by more black 
Zimbabweans in the mainstream of the economy (increased 
aggregate demand). 
However, this positive outlook gave the false impression that 
the economy would continue to grow and that government would 
continue its equity objectives at the expense of efficiency. As 
Jenkins (1997) correctly pointed out, the government’s difficulty in 
discerning the macroeconomic limitations on new initiatives was 
greatly increased by the unusual circumstances of the first two 
years. These unusual circumstances are classified by Jenkins (1997) 
as follows: a commodity boom, promises of more aid than 
eventually arrived, expectations of a peace dividend which did not 
come, initial high rates of economic growth (12% in 1981) and 
initially low foreign debt. 
As Jenkins (1997) notes, all of these circumstances created 
unrealistic expectations, concealing the probability that the 
government’s plans would be impossible to finance. However, 
Jenkins’s assertions can be challenged. It can be argued that 
government knew the implications of pursuing its plans but chose to 
go ahead because it was politically expedient to do so. The 
consequences of not addressing the historical imbalances would as 
well have been too ghastly to contemplate. We argue that 
government faced very limited options in this instance. Moreover, it 
is not entirely correct to say that aid did not come. Zimbabwe was 
one of the best investment destinations in the years following 
independence and massive aid flowed into the country. The problem 
was that of aid effectiveness. 
However, Jenkins’s analysis is important because it tells us 
why the new government went on to embark on nearly  a decade of 
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free education, free health, and infrastructural development without 
due regard to the constraints imposed by the budget under its 
Growth with Equity (1981) policy. 
In the following section, we look at the fiscal and macro-
economic implications of the subsequent economic plans that were 
unveiled during the dirigisme era (1980 – 1988). These plans 
provided the trajectory for pursuing development and expansionary 
objectives based on growth with equity. In order to mobilize 
resources to finance its ambitious development plans,  
ZIMCORD 
Zimbabwe hosted an Investment Conference in 1981. The 
conference was dubbed the “Zimbabwe Conference on 
Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD)”. ZIMCORD facilitated 
Zimbabwe’s open access to world trade, finance and capital 
markets. About 45 countries or organizations participated and 
approximately ZW$1.2 billion was pledged. The significance of 
ZIMCORD was that it was to contribute a third of the financial 
requirements of the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP). 
A total of (ZW$6.1billion was needed to finance the plan). It is 
significant to note that not all of the pledged foreign aid 
materialized. 
This meant that government counted its chicks before the 
eggs were hatched and in anticipation, engaged in huge socio-
economic developmental projects without the requisite resource 
back-up. This proved suicidal as the macroeconomic consequences 
of living beyond the budget became unsustainable while on the 
other hand, government remained unwilling (or politically unable) to 
engage in fiscal adjustment. 
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Government’s development policy trajectory during the period 
of economic dirigisme  was also set out in the Transitional National 
Development Plan and the First Five Year National Development 
Plan (Vol. 1 and 2). It is therefore imperative to understand these 
policy documents as they shaped the expansionist developmental 
paradigm in the first post independence decade.  
5.4.2 Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP): 1982-1984 
Unlike the Growth with Equity policy whose thrust was 
redistribution, the TNDP‘s emphasis was on Transformation 
(Kadhani, 1986). Unfortunately, the TNDP period saw the economy 
entering a down swing phase. 
The objectives of the TNDP were as follows: 
• Completing the program of post-war reconstruction 
• Generating sufficient growth to facilitate a rapid restoration of 
income levels, particularly at the lower end 
• Redressing the social imbalances that had characterized the 
pre-independence political order 
• Resettlement of 162 000 families (Mandaza, 1986) 
The TNDP aimed to achieve an 8% annual growth rate and a 
3% annual growth rate in employment. Gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF) was expected to rise from 19% of GDP in the 
fiscal year 1981/82 to 23% in 1984/85 while domestic savings were 
forecast to rise from 17% in 1981/82 to 27% in 1984/85. In 
addition, 37.5% of GFCF was expected to be funded from net 
external resource inflows in the form of loans, grants and direct 
investment, especially after the much publicized Zimbabwe 
Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) 
(Jenkins, 1997). However, in my view, the setting up of macro-
economic targets without an implementation matrix reduced these 
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targets to wish lists. This was the major weakness of post-
independence development planning. Without an implementation 
matrix, it is not possible to commit resources to the plan. In the 
end, the budget became the key economic policy instrument with no 
bearing to the plan. 
During the TNDP years, actual performance fell below planned 
targets. GDP registered a negative growth rate of –2% in 1982 and 
- 2.5% in 1983, with a slight recovery in 1984 to 1.3%.  
Employment fell by 2.5% in 1983 against a population growth rate 
of 3.5%. 
The economic downswing of the TNDP years (1982-1984) 
manifested itself through bottlenecks, job losses, sharp reduction in 
government revenue and a rapid escalation in pressure on the 
current account of the balance of payments. This had far reaching 
budgetary implications. 
After the TNDP, government abandoned the growth objective 
and pursued social programmes (education and health) on a 
planned course more by virtue of the political momentum they 
generated than as components of a consistent development 
framework (Kadhani, 1986). This in essence marked the rise in 
government expenditure and the growth of the deficit. Social 
development particularly in health and education and skills 
formation and service sectors grew by 4.2% per annum compared 
to 1.4% in the “real” sector, but in both cases still falling short of 
the 8% overall target. The expansion of social services also had 
significant employment increasing effects in the public sector. 
However, this was done against the backdrop of sluggish growth 
and increasing inflation. 
This wide divergence between plan and performance can be 
explained by the budgetary process which was inescapably skewed 
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in favor of non-discretionary expenditure as opposed to investment 
in the real productive sectors of the economy, thereby laying the 
seeds of domestic debt accumulation and macro-economic 
disequilibria. Analysts cited the drought, the world recession and 
the progressive deterioration in investment activity as causes of the 
failure of the TNDP. 
5.4.3 Short Term Stabilization (1985-1988) 
After the TNDP, the economy started to heat up as 
government revenues were stretched to the limit in a bid to fund 
the ambitious development agenda without the much promised 
foreign aid. Moreover, drought and terms of trade shocks made 
things worse.  The realities of the destabilizing effects of public 
spending dawned.  
According to Jenkins (1997), some of the policies 
implemented after independence and aimed at redistributing 
resources or alleviating poverty were unsuccessful or had perverse 
effects, creating distortions which pushed the economy towards 
macroeconomic instability. 
With the suspension of the TNDP, the economic crisis was 
reduced to a financial management level where an attempt at short-
term economic stabilization was made. This entailed budgetary 
squeezes in order to restore fiscal balance. The government also 
started negotiations with the IMF in order to get balance of 
payments assistance. The deficit on current account had risen from 
$156.7m in 1980 to $532.9m in 1984. As early as 1982, the IMF 
had observed that the deficit had been the result of excessive 
government expenditure (Kadhani, 1986). However, from the point 
of view of government, the expenditure was justified as necessary. 
For example, defense expenditure (in view of the destabilization by 
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South Africa, the problems of integrating armies, demobilization and 
post-war re-orientation), education and health. 
This is the reason why during the brief stabilization, IMF 
funding was targeted at the restoration of financial balances on the 
budget and external account. Regarding the former, the Fund would 
normally require a reduction of the total government expenditure 
and net lending levels while for performance measurement 
purposes, the size of the deficit would supply the benchmark. The 
essential feature of this condition took the form of curtailment of 
development programs unless these were externally funded, 
reduction of subsidies and curtailment of growth in social spending 
(IMF, 1986) 
The IMF recommended short-term demand management, 
which included the following measures: 
• Removal of subsidies on maize, bread and milk 
• Reduction of civil service employment programs by 1990 
• Devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar. 
In the external sector, emphasis was placed on downward 
currency re-alignments to strengthen financial incentives to produce 
for export and general domestic demand compression, on the 
argument, first, that resources can be diverted to exports, and 
second, that reduced domestic inflation and production costs 
enhanced export sector performance. 
Economists have argued that the short-term stabilization 
measures did not work to reverse the economic slump of the TNDP 
years (1982-84). As Kadhani (1986) points out, this virtually meant 
that the TNDP had been abandoned as the framework for guiding 
national economic policy and management.  
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Kadhani (1986) observes that in the absence of planning, the 
annual budget became not only the central and independent 
instrument for resource mobilization but also the major mechanism 
for the structuring of financial and economic policy. 
Economic management thus took an essentially short-term 
fiscal and external balance stabilization orientation and outlook. The 
budget, unlike the TNDP, programmed purely public sector activities 
(social and public administration) and the funding of the 
government sector.  This precipitated the crowding-out of the 
private sector. By 1988, signs of significant internal and external 
economic imbalances had begun to show, threatening to escalate 
pressure for the tightening of import controls and also to generate 
rapid deficit induced inflation. 
According to Stoneman and Cliff (1989), on the domestic 
front, rapid increases had taken place in government expenditures, 
especially on recurrent items, without corresponding increases in 
revenue, so that the overall budget moved from 7.7% of GDP in 
1981/82 to 10.7% in 1982/83. By 1988, the budget deficit stood at 
12% of GDP. As regards the external sector, the growth that was 
permitted in imports in the period 1980-1981 without a matching 
improvement in export earnings, led to an increase in the current 
account deficit from 6.5% of GDP in 1980 to 15.0 % by the end of 
1988. Net foreign assets declined from Z$178m at the end of 1980 
to negative levels by 1988. The debt service ratio stood at an 
estimated 60% by 1988, a six fold increase in three years from the 
1980 levels. 
Employment growth was poor with significant job losses 
suffered (except in the social sectors where total spending in 
education nearly tripled from Z$227.6million in 1980 to 
Z$628million in 1988 as did expenditure on healthcare which 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
 189
increased from Z$66.4million in 1980 to Z$188.6 million by 1988, 
thanks to the donor community). The land resettlement and 
redistribution program, which was one of the corner stones of the 
TNDP, only managed to resettle one fifth of the original target of 
162 000 families 
First 5 Year National Development Plan. 
Finally, the 5 Year National Development Plan (FYDP), which 
was put into place in 1985, aimed to achieve an average annual 
growth rate of 5.1% and the creation of 28 000 jobs a year. From 
the onset, the success of the FYDP critically depended on the 
restructuring of expenditure away from recurrent items and the 
realization of sustainable positive growth in the productive sectors. 
At the end, the FYDP failed dismally as GDP grew by an average of 
1.5% and foreign exchange bottlenecks emerged. 
It is however, difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of 3 
successive government programs (Growth with Equity, Transitional 
Development, Stabilization Plan and First Five Year Plan) which 
were crafted in a row for the period 1980-1985. The formulation of 
plan after plan demonstrates policy inconsistency on the part of the 
new government and casts serious doubt on the extent of the 
implementation of these rolling plans. 
5.4.4 Macroeconomic Implications 
The net effect of expansionary fiscal policies pursued during 
the dirigisme period was cumulative budgetary imbalances which 
sowed seeds of macroeconomic instability. In the next table, we 
summarize the budgetary picture that obtained as a result of the 
expansionist and populist public spending by the Zimbabwe 
government between 1980 and 1988. The table shows the effect of 
a loose fiscal policy and the fact that government lived beyond its 
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means. This is evident from the consecutive negative budget 
balances registered since 1980. 
The table below depicts the budgetary picture between 1980 
and 1990. 
Table 18:  Zimbabwe:  Central government budget account (Z$ 
thousand, 1980 –1988) 
Period 
(Year 
ended 30 
June) 
Revenue 
and 
Grants 
Expendi-
ture and 
net 
lending 
Deficit 
(-) 
/Surplus 
(+) 
Non-bank Bank 
Net 
Foreign 
Borrowing 
Total 
Financing 
1980 674.8 1 049.80 -375.0 +164.8 +137.5 -72.7 +375.0 
1981 949.1 1283.9 -334.8 +108.9 +159.7 +66.2 +334.8 
1982 1364.5 1681.1 -316.6 +109.9 -12.9 +219.6 +316.6 
1983 1780.7 2247.1 -466.4 +310.3 +106.2 +49.9 +466.4 
1984 1997.1 2627.2 -630.0 +373.6 +205.7 +50.7 +630.0 
1985 2212.3 2923.0 -710.7 +495.8 -274.3 +489.2 +710.7 
1986 2616.2 3307.8 -691.6 +703.4 -222.7 +210.9 +691.6 
1987 3056.4 4053.2 -996.9 +620.2 +166.0 +210.8 +996.9 
1988 3784.9 4680.7 -895.8 +601.5 +146.7 +147.6 +895.8 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Quarterly Economic & Statistical review 
(various issues). 
The central government budgeted expenditure was generally 
higher than revenue during the dirigisme period leading to 
cumulative budget deficits. The deficits increased rapidly between 
1980 and 1988 as a result of excess demand. High deficit levels are 
attributed to the rapid social sector expansion, which started at 
independence as already discussed. During the ensuing years, 
government made efforts to reduce the deficit and it dropped to 
Z$316.6 million in 1982 before rising again the following year,  
reaching  Z$710.7 million in 1985 due to increased recurrent 
expenditure. It remained at more or less the same level in 1986 but 
continued the upward trend again.  
The fiscal deficit was largely financed by borrowing from the 
domestic bank and non-bank sources.  This saw a progressive 
increase in the stock of domestic debt. 
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Table 19:Zimbabwe:  Escalation of Domestic Debt (Z$ million) 
(1980-1988) 
Year Debt 
1980 1843.3 
1981 2098.6 
1982 2481.3 
1983 2853.0 
1984 3746.7 
1985 4641.3 
1986 5452.8 
1987 6551.1 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (1990) 
The gross public domestic debt of central government 
increased from Z$1843.3 in 1980 to Z$6551.1 in 1987. Domestic 
borrowing constituted about 60% of the gross public debt. The main 
debt instrument was the domestic stock issue (short term treasury 
bills). During the period under review, there was a marked increase 
in external borrowings, particularly in registered bonds and other 
loans, especially from 1982 to 1987.  
Government debt and the budget deficit were worsened by 
government subsidies to loss making parastatals in the late 1980s. 
Parastatal performance was riddled by managerial incompetence, 
sub-economic pricing of goods and services and general lack of 
capitalization.
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Table 20:  Zimbabwe: Deficit (nominal increase) and % increase of 
macro-economic indicators (1980-1990) 
Years 
Inflation  
% 
Interest rate 
% 
Exchange 
rate 
Z$: US$ 
Deficit 
Z$m 
1980 8.5 7.5 1.6 375 
1981 9.8 13 1.4 334.8 
1982 11.1 13 1.1 316.6 
1983 13.3 13 0.9 466.4 
1984 15.5 13 0.7 630 
1985 16.9 13 0.6 710.7 
1986 19.3 13 0.6 691.6 
1987 21.6 13 0.6 996.9 
1988 23.3 13 0.5 895.8 
1989 23.8 13 0.4 1119.3 
1990 29.8 12 0.4 1137.7 
Source: Central Statistical Office, GoZ 
Deficit Escalation 
In 1980, the deficit was Z$375 and inflation stood at 8.5%. 
With the increase in the budget deficit to Z$334.8 in 1981, inflation 
rose to 9.8%. The Budget deficit slightly declined to Z$316.6 in 
1982 but inflation remained on an upward trend. The Budget deficit 
rose from Z$466.4 in 1983 to Z$1137.7 in 1980, while inflation 
jumped from 13.3% in 1983 to 29.8% in 1990. However, inflation 
was moderate during the dirigisme period despite the rising fiscal 
deficit because government borrowed externally to finance its 
budget. Moreover, the central bank did not monetize the debt. It 
must be borne in mind that the period 1980-1988 was characterized 
by relative adherence to strict financial rules and economic 
orthodoxy in the financing of the deficit as opposed to later years. 
There is debate however, regarding the connection of the 
deficit and inflation in Zimbabwe during the dirigisme period. While 
the anecdotal evidence above links movements in the inflation to 
deficit changes, this cannot be conclusive as it would amount to 
“casual empiricism”. In analyzing inflationary changes during this 
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period, it is important to note that changes in the food price index 
for both low and high income groups tended to drive prices 
upwards. Other inflationary pressures came from public utilities that 
charged monopolistic prices. The point is that, during the dirigisme 
period, there is little or no evidence that deficit changes directly 
caused higher inflation. Moreover, we also have to bear in mind the 
possible impact of lags in the deficit-inflation relationship.    
Deficit and Exchange Rate 
During the period 1980 – 1988, the exchange rate remained 
strong against other major currencies. The inflow of foreign 
currency following the opening up of the economy further 
strengthened the domestic currency. By then, Zimbabwe pursued a 
managed float.  
According to estimations done by Morande (1991), the deficit 
was found to be weakly responsive to the real exchange rate, “a 1% 
real depreciation would reduce the deficit by 0.06% of GDP, i.e. the 
strong effect on the deficit via higher interest payments on foreign 
debt was almost neutralized by higher tax revenue, as both direct 
and indirect tax payments are boosted by a depreciation” (1991:29) 
Deficit and Interest Rates 
The relationship between the deficit and interest rates was 
indirect. We argue that because government had to finance the 
growing deficit, there was a deliberate attempt to resort to financial 
repression. But despite financial repression, there was still a direct 
relationship between the deficit and the nominal interest rate. On 
the other hand, real interest rates actually fell in the face of 
inflation. This discouraged savings and deprived the money market 
of the much needed investible surplus. 
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Declining private investment until 1987 implied lower 
aggregate capital formation and probably, lower efficiency of 
domestic investment. The effect of the 1987 fiscal adjustment on 
private investment was encouraging as it allowed a recovery of 
2.4% of the gross domestic investment rate (Kanyenze, 1990). In 
this regard, there was some crowding-out relationship between the 
budget deficit and private investment. However, this relationship is 
complicated by the mechanism that operated in Zimbabwe, which 
was the requirement by government that insurance companies hold 
prescribed proportion of their assets in government bonds, which 
created a further channel of crowding out investment. 
The Twin Deficits 
The rising deficit interacted with a fixed exchange rate to 
cause foreign currency bottlenecks. This led to foreign exchange 
rationing and the introduction of import licensing. The removal of 
sanctions precipitated high import demand as the private sector 
began to increase its capacity utilization. Exports could not match 
imports hence the current account deficit. High budget deficits 
caused the overvaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar, so much so that 
in 1982, the first devaluation took place in order to enhance the 
competitiveness of exports. What sustained the capital account in 
the first five years after independence were the improvements in 
portfolio investment, external grants and foreign direct investment 
(FDI).   
Summary 
The period shortly after Zimbabwe’s independence is 
sometimes referred to as the “successful eighties”, Davies (2005:8). 
The government successfully improved social welfare in the 1980s. 
Davies argues that, “the rapid expansion of the education system 
and improved access to both preventive and curative health 
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services were the most notable successes. The rise in the marketed 
output of maize and cotton from communal farmers is often cited 
although it not clear, how widespread this success was. Minimum 
wage legislation probably raised wages in the early period at least. 
Although the resettlement program was small, there were also 
some successes there. No rewriting of history can negate these 
achievements and their significant outcomes” (Davies, 2005:14).  
However, notwithstanding the redistributive gains 
acknowledged above, the impact on the budget became 
unsustainable. Clearly government could not financially cope with 
the public expenditure. Moreover, protection sustained high cost 
companies but discouraged exports by raising the cost of inputs 
leading to a shortage of foreign currency needed to import new 
technology. Public spending skyrocketed, particularly in the realm of 
civil service employment, spending on social services, drought relief 
and subsidies. This in turn generated a chronic budget deficit, a 
high tax regime and a rapid increase in public debt, all of which 
created a drag on the economy, Sichone (2003) 
The major conclusion of this section is therefore that between 
1980 and 1988, post independence public expenditure, that was 
targeted at redressing colonial socio-economic imbalances, laid 
foundations for unsustainable fiscal deficits which were to later have 
far reaching effects on macro-economic stability in Zimbabwe. 
Government expenditure exceeded revenue and deficits were 
funded from domestic and foreign sources. However, the macro-
economic impact was diminished because between 1980 and 1988, 
government had good access to foreign finance, so the exchange 
rate remained relatively stable and deficit monetization was 
avoided. However, the most disturbing thing is that Parliament 
failed to censure government over its incurrence of successive 
deficits, even though they were not as yet harmful. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
 196
However, despite the criticism more often directed at the 
disastrous consequences of budget deficits in developing countries, 
the case of Zimbabwe during the dirigisme period proves that the 
impact of deficits can be minimized by avoiding inflationary 
financing. We can also argue that in the case of Zimbabwe, deficits 
incurred on social infrastructure were more justified than if they 
were spent on consumption per se. One important lesson derived in 
this instance is that for as long as the economy is growing, the 
impact of budget deficit is absorbed. The period between 1980-1988 
saw steady growth rates being registered, despite, as earlier on 
pointed, the fact that the country’s potential high growth rates could 
not be realized due to the distortions imposed  by economic controls 
and declining investment in the real sectors of the economy. 
The next section looks at the further deterioration of the fiscal 
deficit and the macroeconomic consequences thereof during the 
period of market based reforms (1989-1996). 
5.5 Fiscal deficits and macroeconomic consequences during 
the period of market based reforms (1989-1996) 
5.5.1 Introduction 
The second Five Year National Development Plan was 
supposed to be launched at the end of 1989. It was however, not 
the case. By 1990, the economy had reached  crisis proportions as 
many years of command economic policies and overspending 
precipitated economic stagnation, a budget deficit of 10% of GDP, 
declining exports, sluggish growth, rising unemployment, resurgent 
inflation and shortages of basic goods. In short, macroeconomic 
fundamentals were deteriorating. The Table below summarizes the 
economic scenario before the launch of the economic structural 
adjustment program. 
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Table 21: Zimbabwe:  Economic indicators (1980-1987) 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
GDP % 10.6 12.5 2.6 1.6 -1.0 6.8 2.6 -1.5 
Inflation 10.3 14.6 14.2 19.4 3.5 2.0 15.2 9.2 
Budget Deficit  
(% of GDP) 
9.1 13.5 13.1 14.4 12.7 14.3 14.4 10.9 
Real Exchange 
Rate 
1980=100 
100 115.1 132.0 134.2 123.3 108.7 119.7 108.2 
Nominal 
Interest On 
Deposit 
3.5 7.8 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.1 8.0 8.2 
Current Account 
(Z$m) 
-301 -739 -762 -527 -177 -166 -511 -300 
Source: Jenkins (1997) 
By 1989, it had become apparent that the dirigistic measures 
used to manage the economy had failed. The economy started to 
show signs of weak growth rates with increasing unemployment and 
public spending. The over-regulation of the economy had started to 
cause shortages of commodities and investment had started 
declining to insignificant levels.  
As a pre-condition for Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs), the government had adopted new investment guidelines in 
April in 1989. The Zimbabwe Investment Centre had been 
established in July 1989 as a move to create a one-stop investment 
window. Government signed the World Bank’s Multi-lateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency Convention (MIGA) in September 
1989. In June 1990, government signed the USA’s Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation Agreement (OPIC). As a way of providing 
incentives, a number of goods were put on the open general import 
license (OGIL) scheme until 1994 when the scheme was abolished. 
In addition, government introduced the export retention scheme 
whereby exporters could retain a portion of their earnings. Export 
processing zones were also established later in 1996 in order to 
boost investment and exports. 
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An Export Support Facility was put in place to finance exports. 
In addition, import quotas were replaced by tariffs. The foreign 
currency market was deregulated and exchange control regulations 
were relaxed and foreign exchange bureaus established together 
with individual and corporate foreign currency denominated 
accounts. 
These were transitional measures that eventually allowed 
Zimbabwe to migrate from dirigisme to market based reforms. 
Moreover, the introduction of ESAP in 1990 was not a sudden 
change of policy but the culmination of a trend noticeable 
throughout the 1980s. “ there were always strong undercurrents of 
neo-liberalism beneath ZANU PF’s socialist rhetoric from the outset 
of independence. The erosion of many of the control measures that 
the government had operated since independence in effect moved 
policy towards structural adjustment. With the end of the cold war, 
neo-liberalism had become the only game in town: it would have 
been more startling if, at that time, government had adopted more 
dirigisme or socialist policies. ESAP was therefore not a surprise”, 
Davies (2005: 19).  In Sub-Saharan Africa, market reforms were 
embraced as the panacea to the economic stagnation, unsustainable 
deficits and balance of payments problems.  This view was 
encouraged by the Washington Consensus. In Africa, Ghana was 
cited as the star economy of Africa as a result of structural 
adjustment.  
Faced with a balance of payment crisis, Zimbabwe finally 
succumbed to the IMF and embarked on a classical structural 
adjustment program in 1991 at the behest of the IMF and World 
Bank. This marked the beginning of market based reforms whose 
hallmark was the liberalization of the economy. However, 
liberalization worsened rather than abate the budget deficit. The 
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IMF failed to put in place a budget monitoring and tracking 
mechanism.  
Hence, the period under structural adjustment, still saw the 
pursuit of a loose fiscal policy by central government, underpinned 
by budgetary overruns and lack of accountability. This exacerbated 
the fiscal deficit, led to the severance of relations with the IMF, and 
the suspension of balance of payments support due to general lack 
of fiscal discipline. This had serious macro-economic repercussions 
for the country. 
5.5.2 Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), 1990-
1995 
The new policy regime designed by the government (ESAP) 
with the support of the IMF and World Bank, set out to encourage 
job creation, improving access to foreign currency, reducing 
administrative controls over investment and employment decisions 
and most importantly, reducing the budget deficit. A 40% 
devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar was allowed to occur and wage 
and price controls were removed. Thus, like other classical 
structural adjustment programs implemented in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Zimbabwe’s economic structural adjustment program aimed 
to achieve the following objectives: 
• Average growth rate of 5% 
• Investment level of 25% of GDP 
• Export growth rate of 9% per year, which would raise the 
share of exports to GDP to 44% while allowing imports to rise. 
• The liberalization of the trade and exchange rate regimes ( 
Devaluation)  
• Reduction of the budget deficit from 10.4% in 1990 to 5% of 
GDP in 1995 and reform of public enterprises. 
• Reduction of inflation from 17.7% in 1990 to 10% in 1995. 
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• Reduction of the civil service by 25% and deregulation of the 
labor market 
• Cutting of direct subsidies from Z$629m in 1990/91 to Z$40 
million by 1995 
• Establishment of a Social Dimensions Fund to deal with the 
social impact of ESAP 
• The liberalization of the financial sector (GoZ, 1991; World 
Bank, 1992) 
The above objectives were outlined in a government 
document entitled: Zimbabwe Framework for Economic Reform 
(1991-1995) and World Bank Policy Framework Paper (1992). 
During the first phase, lasting five years, progress was made in 
many of these objectives (Jenkins, 1997). However, urban poverty 
worsened due to the policy of labour market flexibility which saw 
incomes lagging behind the cost of living. Moreover, cost recovery 
policies compounded the plight of urban workers. 
However, the reform program was hamstrung by the failure to 
make progress in the management of the budget deficit. 
As already previously stated, the objective had been to reduce 
the deficit by 2% annually from 10.4% of GDP to a target of 5% of 
GDP by 1994/95. The deficit was to be reduced by a combination of 
additional revenue measures such as cost recovery and improved 
allocative efficiency, the postponement of capital spending, wage 
restraint, retrenchment and cuts in subsidies to parastatals 
(Jenkins, 1997). It is, however, strange that the IMF would advise 
the Zimbabwean government to cut capital spending, knowing very 
well that capital spending is a key enabler of growth. Moreover, it is 
doubtful whether cost recovery alone could improve revenue in the 
absence of sound revenue generating measures and improvement 
in revenue collection.  
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In order to cushion the vulnerable groups from the effects of 
adjustment, a Social Dimensions Fund was established and 
spending on education, health, social services and infrastructure 
was protected from expenditure rationalization.  
Tax rates were lowered rather than raised because it was 
believed that the tax ratio of 34% of GDP was already too high. 
Progressive tariff reduction also reduced tax revenues. It was not 
clear where additional resources would come from, except from 
foreign borrowing (Jenkins, 1997).  
Non-compliance with fiscal conditions stalled the 
implementation of the Second Economic Structural Adjustment 
Program (ESAP 11) because donors were not happy with the 
progress made on fiscal adjustment and parastatal reforms. 
In effect, aid (IMF Stand-by Facility) provided under the first 
phase of ESAP simply allowed high public spending to continue while 
simultaneously increasing foreign debt and interest obligations. 
Zimbabwe’s foreign debt rose from 45% of GDP in 1990 to 75% in 
1994, before falling to 67% at the end of 1995 (Mabugu and 
Kowero, 2000). 
Apart from Salaries and Wages and Subsidies to parastatals, 
government resources were absorbed in interest payments. Interest 
payments grew consistently. The average real annual growth of 
government spending on interest was 8.21% during the 1980s. At 
independence it was 7% of total expenditure. By 1990, interest 
payments were absorbing 16% of total expenditure (the equivalent 
of 6% of GDP), exceeding all departmental votes with the exception 
of education and defense (Jenkins, 1997). 
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In our view, government invariably abused and misused 
donor aid that was supposed to go towards ESAP programs. Rather, 
funds were diverted to fund discretionary expenditure. This 
reinforced the budget deficit, no wonder why the IMF had to 
discontinue the adjustment program. As the table below shows, the 
debt burden increased between 1990 and 1999. Government was 
caught in debt trap.  
Table 22: Zimbabwe:  Deficit financing (Z$m) 
Year Bank Non-Bank 
Total 
Domestic 
Net 
Foreign 
Borrowing 
Total 
Financing 
1990 58.9 877.3 936.2 201.5 1137.7 
1991 140.3 1362.1 1502.4 94.3 1596.7 
1992 208.1 1112.8 1320.9 388.4 1709.3 
1993 416.7 862 1287.7 1365.8 2644.5 
1994 1985.4 -209.1 1776.3 358.5 2134.8 
1995 5153.3 360.5 4792.8 989.5 5791.6 
1996 4111.6 139.1 3972.5 1174.9 5147.4 
1997 5006 161.8 5167.8 -91 5076.8 
1998 13553.6 -18.1 13535.5 -2908.2 10627.3 
1999 24457.8 -631.9 23825.9 -4895 18930.9 
Source:  Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Monthly Review, Vol.8. No.8, August 2000 
Note: Figures are in nominal terms. 
According to the World Bank Development Report (1994), 
Zimbabwe dropped from a low middle income country into the low-
income category during SAPS, suggesting an increase in poverty 
and a declining per capita income. Furthermore public spending 
continued to grow and this was largely on recurrent expenditure as 
opposed to productive investment. 
In an evaluation of ESAP in Zimbabwe the IMF (1996) pointed 
out that government had lacked the commitment that was critical to 
the success of SAPS especially in regard to trade liberisation, 
parastatal reform, exchange rate depreciation and most importantly 
fiscal consolidation. The evaluation concluded that the whole 
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program had failed because of lack of political commitment. Lack of 
political commitment was a term used to describe government 
unwillingness to reduce excess demand and the unsustainable fiscal 
deficit, which had far-reaching implications on economic 
performance. 
The austerity plan was followed by enormous difficulties. 
Growth, employment, wages and social welfare contracted sharply, 
inflation was not reduced, the deficit remained well above target, 
and many industrial firms notably in textiles and footwear closed in 
response to increased competition and high real interest rates. The 
incidence of poverty in the country increased. ESAP was 
undermined by extremely unfavourable weather conditions. Drought 
reduced agricultural output, exports, public revenue and domestic 
demand for local manufactures. Growth during the drought affected 
years (1992, 1993, 1995) averaged 2.6% compared to the good 
years (1991, 1994 and 1996) when growth averaged 6.5%. 
According to Davies (2005:20), “the government’s failure to 
bring the fiscal deficit under control, undermined the effectiveness 
of those elements in the program that were followed through. This 
led to growth in public borrowing, sharp increase in interest rates 
and upward pressure on the exchange rate. The government’s 
austerity plan coupled with a relatively weak and highly protected 
economy came far too quickly”. 
5.5.3 Implications for Macroeconomic Stability 
The annual rate of inflation shot up from 15.5% in 1990 to 
42% in 1992. The budget deficit grew from 8.4% in 1991 to 12.1% 
in 1995. According to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (1996) the 
high budget deficit was due to rising government expenditure. 
Furthermore, extensive borrowing coupled with high interest rates 
in the 1990s resulted in serious debt problems. Outstanding debt 
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rose from 42% of GDP in 1990 to 70% in 1995. The debt service 
ratio which had been targeted to fall to 20% during SAPs instead 
averaged 28% of GDP (Ncube 1998). Between 1990 and 1998 
government resorted to foreign and domestic borrowing to finance 
its fiscal expenditure. The following table shows the deteriorating 
debt position.  
Table 23:  Zimbabwe:  Increase in public debt from 1991 to 
December 31 1998 
Financial Year 
Nominal Public Debt 
Z$ 
Nominal increase in 
Public Debt Z$ 
% Increase of 
Public Debt on 
1989/90 Debt 
1990/91 12 636 265 252 2 189 506 491  
1991/ 92 17 063 584 125 6 617 095 364 63.3 
1992/93 21 824 135 687 11 377 376 926 108.9 
1993/94 27 860 380 877 17 413 622 116 166.7 
1994/95 37 137 925 573 26 691 166 812 255.5 
1995/96 51 597 501 738 41 150 742 977 393.9 
1996/97 57 545 478 726 47 098 719 965 451 
1997/98 116 861 740 848 106 414 982 087 1019 
Sources: 1. Comptroller and Auditor General reports (various) 
    2.  Central Statistical Office (CSO) (various issues) 
Government borrowing from the central bank rose from Z$2 
billion in 1990/91 to Z$106 billion in 1997/98. This increased 
financial seignoirage and money supply growth thereby increasing 
inflationary pressures in the economy. Compared to a 3.9% average 
growth rate in the pre SAP era (1985-90), GDP grew by only 0.9% 
between 1991-95. By the end of 1995, the budget deficit remained 
high at 7.1 % of GDP.  
During ESAP, social conditions had deteriorated rapidly. 
Employment grew by an average of 1.6 % per annum compared to 
2.4% in 1985-99 while real wages declined by 9.9% compared to 
1.2% in the period 1985-1990 (Ncube 1988). The removal of price 
controls and lifting of subsidies led to the escalation of prices of 
basic commodities. The Social Dimensions of Adjustment Fund 
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(SDF) failed because it was too small and moreover it became very 
difficult to target the vulnerable groups. 
According to Jenkins (1997) the burden of adjustment was 
pushed to the monetary authorities. Moreover, the uncertainty 
caused by the growing public sector debt reduced private 
investment. The result was a further reduction in the growth rate. 
Summary 
Market based reforms failed to rein in the budget deficit. 
Economic structural adjustment dismally failed to achieve macro-
economic and fiscal adjustment. In the absence of fiscal 
adjustment, it was clear that Zimbabwe was now treading on a 
dangerous economic path that was to graduate the economic crisis 
from a mild problem to a severe phenomenon in the coming years. 
The abdication of the IMF was the most regrettable development in 
Zimbabwe as it gave way to unbridled state bungling in the affairs 
of the economy. We therefore maintain that during the period of 
market based reforms, the lack of fiscal adjustment contributed to 
the macro-economic instability that followed.  Our view is however, 
contradicted by Davies (2004: 10) who thinks that although ESAP 
had many faults, “ the early 1990s saw some growth and by 1996 
there appeared to be a possibility that by its own criteria –the 
program was bearing fruit” 
5.6 Fiscal deficit and implications on macroeconomic 
performance during the period of failed controls (1997-
2003) 
In 1997, government abandoned the IMF-backed ESAP 
program and reverted back to a regime of controls. As Davies 
(2005: 13) points out, 1997 saw a reversal of some of the positive 
trends registered during and “marked the start of the current 
economic and political crisis. Many would date this from the collapse 
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of the Zimbabwe dollar on 14 November 1997. Numerous factors 
contributed to this, including the cumulative effects of the 
government’s failure to tackle the budget deficit since the beginning 
of ESAP and the unbudgeted payments to war veterans. The latter 
indicated once and for all, government’s unwillingness to exercise 
control over its expenditure in the face of demands and signaled the 
likely raveling of ESAP” However, in our opinion, the success of 
ESAP should be looked at from the vantage point of the ESAP 
benchmarks. It is our humble view that ESAP failed to meet its set 
macro-economic targets. But in terms of structural changes we tend 
to agree with Davies that indeed the liberalization of the economy 
helped it to face competition. 
After ESAP, Government launched the Zimbabwe Program for 
Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) which was dubbed 
a homegrown program to replace ESAP. However the program failed 
to achieve a 6% annual growth rate and the economy grew by an 
average of 3% while the budget deficit exceeded 5%. In the year 
2000, government launched the Millennium Economic Recovery 
Programme (MERP) which also dismally failed because it was based 
on an inflationary assumption of 35%, when inflation turned out to 
be 60% for the year 2000 while growth plummeted to –4,5% as 
opposed to the projected 3.5%. The millennium budget which was 
supposed to buttress the MERP was also revised from an 
expenditure of Z$98.7 billion (October 1999) to Z$164.6 billion in 
August 2000 – an increase of 66.8 %. Revenue estimates were 
revised from $87.2 billion in October 1999 to Z$89.3 billion in 
August 2000 – an increase of 2.5%. This led to a huge increase in 
the budget deficit from Z$11.5billion in October 1999 to Z$75.3 
billion in August 2000 (an increase of 55.4%) 
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The revised budget was necessitated by: 
• A Z$22 billion rise in wages and salaries following the 69% to 
90% public service wage increases awarded in February 2000. 
• A Z$27.3 billion increase in domestic debt-service charges 
taking the total debt service bill to Z$55.5 billion from Z$28.2 
billion in the original budget. 
• The cost of the war in the DRC, estimated at Z$412 billion as 
at December 2000. 
By the late 1990s, it was apparent that the government was 
losing the war on the deficit. Deficit levels were becoming 
unsustainable. As table 5.14 shows, the deficit as a percentage of 
GDP grew from 8.0% in 1986 to 12.7% in 1995 and reached 24.1% 
in 2000. 
Table 24:  Zimbabwe:  Deficit (1986-2000) as % of GDP 
 
Year Deficit as % of GDP 
1986 8.0 
1987 10.2 
1988 8.0 
1989 7.6 
1990 6.4 
1991 7.0 
1992 6.7 
1993 8.9 
1994 6.1 
1995 12.7 
1996 10.4 
1997 5.9 
1998 6.0 
1999 9.9 
2000 24.1 
Source: Budget Statements (GOZ) 
Political Expediency 
Besides the lack of fiscal discipline and poor policies, other ad 
hoc policy decisions and actions by government worsened macro-
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economic performance in Zimbabwe. For Example – the rewarding 
of unbudgeted gratuities to war veterans in 1997. 
After waging running battles with the veterans of the 1970s 
war of independence, government finally succumbed to the 
demands of the former freedom fighters for monetary and material 
recognition for their war effort. By then war, veterans under the 
leadership of Chenjerai Hunzvi (Ex-Zipra cadre) staged nationwide 
demonstrations to press for recognition. At one stage in 1997, the 
war veterans embarrassed President Mugabe when they booed him 
while officiating at the Heroes Day Celebrations at the Heroes Acre 
in Harare. After that, war veterans marched to State House to 
demand gratuities. 
Government responded by awarding Z$50 000 gratuity to 
each former freedom fighter. In addition, government unveiled a 
package that included pension, medical and housing facilities for the 
war veterans and their families. Inflation rose from 15% to 40%. 
Government paid the gratuities which were not budgeted in the first 
place. This put severe pressure on the budget, thereby worsening 
the budget deficit.  
Worsening Central Government Accounts 
The deficit in both monetary and percentage terms was just 
unsustainable and as already pointed out this was caused by 
expansionary fiscal policies and loose monetary policies which were 
designed to cope with the government’s insatiable appetite to 
spend. 
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In the year 2000, government continued with its failed 
controls. The Zimbabwean economy entered a phase of 
unprecedented economic meltdown, which was sparked by the land 
reform program. In fact, the extent of economic meltdown after 
2000 even exceeded the decline usually experienced by war 
economies. To make matters worse, the parliamentary elections of 
2000 and the presidential elections of 2002, further worsened the 
economic situation as the international community lost confidence in 
Zimbabwe due to the lack of credibility of the two elections. 
Zimbabwe withdrew from the Commonwealth. Donors withdrew 
funding and lines of credit. Government digged-in and introduced 
price controls and foreign exchange controls. The economy 
registered successive negative growth rates from 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2003 and beyond.  
The fiscal deficit grew from Z$74billion in 2000 to Z$2.4 
trillion in 2003. Government had to rely on supplementary budgets 
and borrowing to sustain its high appetite to spend. In fact, due to 
hyperinflation, Zimbabwean computers failed to capture the many 
zeros as budgets were denominated in trillions. As a result on 1st 
August 2006, the Central Bank introduced newly re-denominated 
currencies by removing three (3) zeros. 
Fiscal policy was characterized by increased financing 
requirements for government. Given the slow pace of privatization, 
and reduced foreign inflows, government financing was wholly met 
from bank sources (Reserve Bank, 2000). This contributed to sharp 
money supply growth (which increased from under 30% in 1999 to 
500% in 2003) and high inflation. High money supply growth was 
largely unrelated to economic activity and therefore had adverse 
effects on inflation, and on cost of borrowing, incomes and overall 
production.  Money supply growth during this period was 
underpinned by domestic credit expansion of 61.5%, against the 
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background of high public sector borrowing requirements (Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe, Annual Report 2005). According to the Reserve 
Bank, these very large public sector borrowings exerted upward 
pressure on interest rates and starved the rest of the economy of 
needed finance. This is consistent with the crowding out effect of 
budget deficits enunciated by economic theory. 
External debt stood at US$4.5 billion (public and publicly 
guaranteed external debt). The external debt to GDP ratio in 2000 
reached 68%, well above the critical benchmark of 50%, thereby 
precipitating a serious debt trap. Social expenditures were also 
increased beyond sustainable levels. 
Government expenditure ballooned after 2000. There was a 
huge jump (80% annual increase) in Health, Education, Defense 
and Home Affairs Expenditures between 2000 and 2003. This 
allocation of the budget towards recurrent expenditure worsened 
the deficit. In order to cover the funding gap, government heavily 
borrowed from the domestic market and printed money to meet its 
obligations. 
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Summary 
During the period of failed controls (or revisionism), the 
budget deficit increased due to the interest burden. The early 
impact of hyperinflation was already felt as shown by the high 
nominal budget revenue and expenditure figures typical of a 
hyperinflationary economy. It became evident that due to failed 
control policies, the economy’s capacity to grow was limited. In the 
absence of a new economic trajectory, the economy started to go 
on a free fall, especially after 2000. The drying up of external loans, 
meant that government over-depended on the domestic budget 
which became incrementally characterized by a growing funding 
gap. The non-performance of the “vote of credit” in the budget did 
not help the situation. Controls harmed the economy and reinforced 
structural rigidities and further distortions, making it very difficult 
for the economy to grow. Moreover, the land reform program of 
2000 also contributed to the ensuing economic meltdown as it 
decimated the viability of the agricultural sector, the main backbone 
of the economy. In summary, the period of failed controls was  
marked by a “ broad contour of events: the engagements in the 
DRC that started in 1998, the further deterioration of the economy, 
the rejected constitution in 2000, the immediately subsequent land 
invasions and their evolution into the fast track land reform 
program and the rise of the MDC as a serious opposition”, Davies 
(2005:14).  On the back of high and unsustainable deficits, the 
macro-economic situation deteriorated fast before the economic 
entered into the phase of chaos, which is the subject of the next 
discussion. 
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5.7 Fiscal deficit and implications on macro-economic 
performance during the period of political chaos (2004-
2008)  
The period 2004 and beyond was underpinned by political 
turmoil, corruption, capital flight, economic mismanagement, and 
economic plunder that was triggered by the Reserve Bank’s Quasi 
Fiscal Operations, which were introduced in December 2003. This 
became the major cause of macro-economic and fiscal instability 
(Hanke, 2008). The period, 2004-2008, was the most chaotic period 
in the history of Zimbabwe. Everything that happened during this 
period, defied all logic, whether economic or political. The 
application of economics was redefined and was replaced by voodoo 
economics or for lack of a better word – bush economics. Zimbabwe 
became a fragile state and indeed, a banana republic. The state as 
a functional institution virtually collapsed and became insolvent. 
Therefore, the reserve bank morphed into an executive decision - 
making institution and thereby abandoned its core functions in 
monetary policy. Of course, this happened with the tacit approval of 
President Mugabe and his powerless cabinet. During this chaotic and 
shambolic period, the reserve bank usurped the mandate and 
fiduciary functions of Cabinet and arrogated unto itself all the 
powers of the executive. In this regard, Zimbabwe became a state 
without cabinet. This was the de facto position. To call it a fragile 
state is to underestimate the extent of collapse. In our view, 
Zimbabwe became a failed state. Other countries which have been 
described by the IMF and World Bank as failed states include 
Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Ivory Coast and others. But the 
distinction here is that these states were fighting raging wars. But 
for Zimbabwe, whose conflict was a political one, to join the 
category of failed states, was an indictment on the governance of 
the country. A country with potential wealth in the form of its 
agricultural base, mineral deposits, including diamond and platinum 
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reserves, became a basket case.  Therefore, the policies and events 
that occurred during the period of chaos, transcends technical 
analysis as it requires political economy analysis in order to fully 
comprehend it. This approach answers the call for the qualitative 
approach set out in the methodology section of this study. The 
economic analysis of the budget deficit as happened in previous 
chapters, cannot explain the total collapse of the economy during 
the period of chaos. We have to look at other political economy 
issues that were at play beyond the budget deficit. In fact during 
the period of political chaos, the effect of governance on the 
economy overshadowed the economic impact of the deficit itself. In 
many ways it became a chicken and egg situation. Notwithstanding 
this, however, we hereby start with budgetary developments during 
the period of political chaos.  
As confirmed by the IMF in their Article IV Consultation 
Report, published in December 2003, the IMF Executive Board 
acknowledged the centrality of the large fiscal deficit in “the growing 
internal and external disequilibria in Zimbabwe” (page 1). 
Furthermore, since 2004, the IMF noted that the economic 
crisis had deepened due to the continued deterioration in the 
political situation. Negative growth rates were exacerbated by the 
decimation of the agricultural sector whose output declined by 60% 
between 2004 and 2005). This meant a reduction in the revenue 
base, in real terms. The manufacturing sector declined by over 15% 
due to the poor macro-economic environment, especially the dearth 
of international credit lines. According to the Reserve Bank (2005), 
poor performance was due to cumulative effects of high inflation 
and rising production costs, as well as increased competition from 
finished imported products. Shortages of foreign exchange also 
exacerbated the situation. Major declines were experienced in other 
sectors: transport (-31.2%), wood and furniture (-19.4%), clothing 
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(-19.2%), non-metallic products (-16.4%). mining declined overall 
by 14% (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2005). 
Hyperinflation 
After 2004, Zimbabwe entered an unprecedented phase of 
hyperinflation. Hyperinflation is defined as a rate of inflation above 
50% per month (Hanke 2008:1). In the history of hyperinflation 
(excluding Latin America) most of the countries that experienced 
hyperinflation had earlier on went through wars, for example 
Germany, Yugoslavia and Italy, after the first World War. But even 
then, their inflation never went as far as the hyperinflation 
experienced in Zimbabwe, a country not at war. 
The causes are arguably various – ranging from the printing 
of money and increase in money supply and high food prices.   In 
addition, the macroeconomic distortions caused by poor policies, 
economic meltdown and international isolation triggered the 
collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar. In 2005, Zimbabwe removed three 
zeros from the currency but that even fuelled more inflation. In 
early 2008, Zimbabwe again introduced further currency reforms 
that saw the decapitation of six zeros from the currency in order to 
move away from trillions and quad trillions.  
For someone who has not lived under a hyperinflationary 
economy, it is beyond imagination to talk of quad trillions, 
quintillions, sexitillions and all that. For most economies, a double 
digit inflation figure is bad enough. For that reason, We thought of 
giving a graphical insight to demonstrate what we are discussing in 
a manner that gives a vivid picture. The Zimbabwean dollar reached 
quintillion levels before the Reserve Bank introduced multiple 
currencies in November 2008 when the dollarization of the economy 
started in earnest. In fact because of the recurrence of the zeros 
soon after decapitation, statistical agencies abandoned the 
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publication of Central Statistical Office data in September 2007. 
Such was the impact of hyperinflation in Zimbabwe. 
Table 25:  Illustration of Hyperinflation 
Name Number of Zeros 
Million 6 (000 000) 
Billion 9 (000 000 000) 
Trillion 12 (000 000 000 000) 
Quadtrillion 15 (000 000 000 000 000) 
Quintillion 18 (000 000 000 000 000 000) 
Sextillion 21 (000 000 000 000 000 000 000) 
Septillion 24 (000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000) 
Octillion 27 (000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000) 
Nonillion 30 (000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000) 
Decillion 33 (000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000) 
Source: Zimbabwe Herald, Thursday, 13 November, 2008) 
Zimbabwe’s inflation sharply accelerated after 2004 with the 
appointment of a new Reserve Bank governor who resorted to the 
printing of money in order to finance credit to government and the 
private sector. The Reserve Bank played a more significant role 
because the state was broke and the economy had collapsed by 
normal standards. Quasi fiscal activities fuelled hyperinflation. 
Moreover, the controlled fixed exchange rate regime created a 
thriving black market for foreign currency (Hanke, 2008). Fuel 
shortages and shortage of the Zimbabwe dollar further triggered 
hyperinflation (Robinson, 2008).  The result was that prices in shops 
started increasing monthly, weekly, daily and then hourly 
(Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, 2008). 
The national payments system also fuelled inflation, especially 
the Real Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS) which enabled the 
electronic transfer of funds between accounts. Dealers sold US$ on 
the black market and using the RTGS, transferred Zimbabwe dollars 
into their clients’ accounts at highly inflated parallel market rates. 
This created high aggregate demand at a time when the economy’s 
capacity to produce goods was limited. 
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Table 26:  Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe (% change in CPI, 2000 – 
2008) 
Month 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
January 55.90 57.00 116.70 208.10 622.80 133.60 613.20 1593.60 100580.20 
February 48.90 57.70 116.30 220.90 602.50 127.20 782.00 1729.90 165000.00 
March 50.80 55.80 113.30 228.00 583.00 123.70 913.00 2200.20 406000.00 
April 53.70 56.90 114.00 269.20 505.00 129.10 1092.00 3713.90 500300.00 
May 58.70 55.50 122.50 300.10 448.80 144.40 1193.50 4530.00 2200000.00 
June 59.30 64.40 114.00 364.50 394.60 164.30 1184.60 7251.10 11200000.00 
July 53.40 70.10 123.50 399.50 399.50 254.80 993.60 7634.80 251000000.00 
August 53.60 76.10 135.10 426.60 426.60 265.10 1204.60 6592.80 n.a 
September 62.00 86.30 139.90 455.60 455.60 359.80 1023.30 7892.10 n.a 
October 60.80 97.90 144.20 525.80 525.80 411.00 1070.00 14840.00 n.a 
November 56.00 103.80 175.50 619.50 619.50 502.40 1098.80 26470.80 n.a 
December 55.20 112.10 198.90 598.70 598.70 585.70 1281.10 66212.30 n.a 
Source: Reserve Bank Quarterly Statistical Bulletins (various issues) 
Notes: n.a (not available) 
5.7.1 Acceleration of the budget deficit: quasi-fiscal operations 
during the era of political chaos (2004 – 2006) 
The period saw Zimbabwe adopting the so-called “Look East 
Policy” arguing that “The Chinese economy, which is now the envy 
of many today, growing at 9% per annum, has progressed through 
various stages of growth and development, overcoming challenges 
and setbacks of one form or another, using homegrown programs…” 
(RBZ Monetary Policy Statement 2003: 121). 
In his maiden Monetary Statement of December 2003, Dr 
Gono vowed that “failure was not an option”. He pointed out that, 
“my five year of term office as Governor, begins at a time when 
Zimbabwe is facing a host of challenges without precedent in its 
short history” (RBZ Monetary Policy Statement, December 2003, p. 
1). These challenges mainly related to the growing budget deficit in 
the wake of hyperinflation, growing international isolation and lack 
of foreign capital inflows which was slowly bringing the economy to 
its knees. 
On Inflation, the new Governor said, “inflation remains our 
number one enemy.” When Dr Gideon Gono took over the 
governorship of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in 2003, inflation 
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rose from 55.6% in 2000 to 365% in 2003. Money supply growth on 
the other hand stood at 500% in 2003. A dual interest rate system 
was introduced for productive sectors and non-productive sectors in 
order to stimulate the supply response. The Reserve Bank 
introduced the so-called productive sector support concessionary 
finance at very low interest rates of 50% per annum when 
commercial lending rates were over 800%. The result was 
disastrous. Companies accessed cheap funds and invested on 
speculative activities, not production. This had a major impact on 
interest rates, money supply and inflation despite the fear that Dr 
Gono had at the onset expressed thus , “monetary authorities 
recognize the negative inflationary impact that could arise from 
utilization of concessionary resources priced at below inflation 
levels” (RBZ Monetary Policy Statement 2003: 10).  
At this stage, the Reserve Bank tried to exonerate 
government: “government has had its own part to play in our 
inflation misery, but it is not entirely to blame” (RBZ Monetary 
Policy Statement, 2003:14) 
On the fiscal front, the Reserve Bank, observed that: “the rate 
of inflation is a function of government deficit and how that deficit is 
to be financed.” On the intention of government to borrow Z$1.9 
trillion in its 2004 budget, Dr Gono had this to say, “ monetary 
authorities recognize the inflationary impact this is likely to have 
unless government sticks to its commitments to reduce expenditure 
by line ministries through improved cash management and 
enforcement of discipline” (RBZ Monetary Policy Statement 
2003:13). 
The Bank said that it would work closely with government to 
ensure that most of the borrowing requirements are funded from 
non-bank sources adding that, “this will reduce pressure on money 
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supply (M3) growth” (p14). The Bank also promised to comply with 
the Finance Minister’s directive to dishonour parastatal cheques, if 
they were outside approved limits. However, fiscal policy remained 
expansionary. The budget deficit rose to 130.4% of GDP in the first 
half of 2004. The current account deficit rose to 6% of GDP. 
On the exchange rate, the Reserve Bank, following the 
Zambian model, introduced a foreign currency auction system of 
bids. Under this system, foreign exchange was auctioned through a 
currency exchange – an independent body that operated under the 
supervision of the Reserve Bank. The foreign exchange auction 
system failed dismally and had to be abandoned after it proved 
unworkable. The Reserve Bank would reject 90% of the bids and in 
the end, companies failed to secure the foreign exchange they so 
much needed for imports. 
Between 2004 and 2007, the Reserve Bank played a central 
role in the economic policy direction of the country. The battery of 
measures and policies put in place during this period hastened 
rather than slow down the economic meltdown as inflation became 
endemic and the economy registered negative growth rates on the 
back of high government expenditure. As the UNDP (2008:12) 
noted, “the resultant high inflation has reduced aggregate domestic 
demand, crowded out the private sector and brought the 
disarticulation of the economy and the collapse of real productive 
investment” 
In 2004, money supply growth was reduced to 490.9% on the 
back of government’s maintenance of a positive cash balance on the 
Reserve Bank account, which “ played a significant role in reducing 
monetary expansion” (p34). Hyperflation also fell from its peak of 
622.8% in January 2004 to 251.5% in September 2004. In this 
regard, the Reserve Bank was quick to point out that “it is critical 
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that the fiscal side remains vigilant to consolidate the disinflation 
gains made so far. This should be bolstered through containment of 
expenditure levels; avoidance of supplementary budgets; avoiding 
of unplanned benevolent or gratuity payments that are unrelated to 
current production activities or real economic growth.” (Monetary 
Policy Statement, October 2004: 44) 
Despite these measures, GDP declined by –5% in 2004. 
Agriculture, the backbone of the economy contributing about 16.5% 
of total output and a third of total foreign exchange earnings, 
declined by -3.3%. The Manufacturing sector which accounts for 
around 18% of GDP and about 33% of foreign exchange earnings, 
declined by –8.5% in 2004. 
Table 27:  Sectoral allocation of productive sector facility 
(Z$billion) by the Reserve Bank (quasi-fiscal operations) 
Sector Loan Amount Percentage of Total 
Agriculture 893.1 43.4 
Manufacturing 831.7 40.4 
Mining 143.8 7.0 
Transport 74.7 3.6 
Tourism 68.5 3.3 
Construction 15.3 0.8 
Distribution 15.0 0.7 
Communication 12.0 0.6 
Health 3.4 0.2 
Total 2 057.5 100.0 
Source: RBZ Monetary Policy Statement, October 2004, p95. 
Concessionary lending was also extended to loss making 
parastatals, without carrying out due diligence analysis. These 
quasi-fiscal operations proved to be dangerous to fiscal 
consolidation.  
In 2005, the Reserve Bank identified, among others, the 
following “inflation drivers” – “ corruption in its various forms and 
outlooks, lack of accountability in both public, parastatals, local 
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authorities and private sectors” (Monetary Policy Statement, May 
2005, p.5). After a downward trend in 2004, inflation resurged from 
123% in March 2005 to 129% in April. Money supply had declined 
to 177.6% by January 2005. In December 2005, inflation closed the 
year at 585.8% which the Reserve Bank attributed to, “quasi-fiscal 
operations of the central bank which fuelled money supply growth, 
the fiscal side of the inflation coin arising from the drought 
considerations in particular, international oil prices, parallel market 
activities as well as the general indiscipline in the economy” (p18) 
However, the year 2005 was marred by the increase in public 
spending  in the Parliamentary elections which took place as well as 
the prevalence of parallel market rates and perennial shortage of 
fuel. As a result the economy continued to melt down. 
In 2006 it was clear that Dr Gono’s turnaround programmes 
were failing. Dr Gono said, “in order to burst the inflation bubble, 
that is threatening to reverse the gains made over the past 24 
months, there is need for a comprehensive, holistic framework that 
significantly reduces money supply, align fiscal expenditures to 
budgeted levels…” (Monetary Policy Statement, January 2006: 21). 
Broad money supply (M3) had been on an upward trend from 
177.6% in January 2005 to 411.5% in November 2005. The 
Reserve Bank tried to shift the blame by arguing that, “while 
agreeing that high money supply growth arising from both ASPEF 
and other quasi-fiscal operations of the central bank contributed 
greatly to the inflation out-turn, it has to be appreciated by all 
stakeholders that Zimbabwe is not an economy operating under 
normal conditions. The country has been under international siege 
now for over 5 years arising from a multiplicity of factors, principal 
of which is the land reform program. Accordingly, with no balance of 
payments support for almost 9 years, no or little capital stock 
formation, maintenance and replacement, some of the critical 
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infrastructure, especially in parastatals and local authorities, needed 
and still require revitalization if the same parastatals are to play an 
effective role in the turnaround of the economy. To this end, as has 
been demonstrated with agricultural financing which had collapsed, 
the central bank could not fold its hands and allow these critical 
assets to go to waste, hence the expenditure outlay. In 
turnarounds, extraordinary situations demand extra ordinary 
responses, sometimes unorthodox in their character in order to 
survive. We chose simply to survive in 2005 and in 2006 we will 
begin to correct the side-effects of preserving our survival kit. 
Theory does not apply in survival situations but practical 
approaches do” (pp24-25). 
Clearly this was an excuse by the central bank to continue its 
quasi-fiscal operations, which however, pushed up money supply 
growth and triggered unprecedented hyperinflation in the ensuing 
years.  
In fact in 2006, the Reserve Bank went on to print Z$21trillion 
to encash on the parallel market to get foreign currency to service 
IMF arrears. President Mugabe publicly defended the printing of 
money arguing that “you don’t eat textbook economics”, (Herald, 
Sunday 20/08/2006). 
In 2006, Dr Gono warned that inflation control had to move 
from being a walk over the edge of the cliff by the “collective 
avoidance of precipitous acts of exuberance on the fiscal side” 
(p.25). This shows the extent to which public expenditure was 
feared to negatively impact on macro-economic stability in 
Zimbabwe especially after 2003. Parastatals continued to be heavily 
subsidized by Reserve Bank funds with no turnaround strategy. This 
prompted the Governor to aptly describe parastatals “as the missing 
link in the turnaround efforts” of the Reserve Bank. 
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In April 2006, inflation increased from 1042.9% to 1193% in 
May due to high money supply growth and benchmarking of prices 
on the parallel market exchange rate. M3 growth increased from 
528.2% in February 2006 to 669.9% in May 2006. These high levels 
of monetary expansion “reflected the inevitable interventions that 
the central bank is having to do in the economy to prevent further 
deterioration of infrastructure…” (p25).  
Thus, for example, the increase in broad money supply in May 
2006 was underpinned by expansion in domestic credit of 629.3%, 
driven by: 
• Credit to government, which grew by 927.5% (mainly through 
treasury bills to finance inescapable government expenditure).  
• Credit to the private sector, 455% 
• Claims on public enterprises, 635.5%. 
In his First Half Year 2006 Monetary Policy Review Statement 
(July 2006), Dr Gono surprised his audience when he announced 
that, “from Monday 21 August 2006, all current bearer cheques and 
other forms of old currency will become obsolete and valueless” 
(p31), Thus the Zimbabwe currency was redenominated by the 
removal of three zeros in an exercise code named “Operation 
Sunrise – From Zero to Hero”. Only 21 days of changeover were 
given. The Reserve Bank mobilized state machinery to enforce 
compliance. Redenomination meant that the Reserve Bank had 
finally capitulated to the number one enemy – inflation – and 
nobody ever talked of “failure is not an option”. It appears failure 
had become the only option. 
Government domestic debt rose from Z$11.7 trillion in June 
2005 to Z$50 trillion in July 2006 (327% increase) while external 
debt stood at US$6 billion, of which US$2 billion were external 
arrears. 
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The Reserve Bank called upon government to exercise fiscal 
restraint, “fiscal expenditures have to be streamlined to be in line 
with the economy’s revenue generative capacity. Monetary 
financing of the fiscal budget directly or indirectly through quasi 
fiscal outlays at the Reserve Bank is a boon for high inflation. We 
implore all ministries to stick to the resource allocation votes. It is 
imperative that we work to entrench a strong culture of fiscal 
discipline. Such a reflective mode allows us to clear our lenses so as 
to elevate the national budget and its implementation as a powerful 
tool to direct and influence the country’s economic growth and 
developmental programs” ( Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Monetary 
Policy Statement, 2005:47). 
With the deficit standing at 4.6% of GDP (Z$13.9 trillion) in 
2006, the Central Bank went further to recommend the following 
fiscal consolidation measures: 
• Measures that ramp up revenue collection  efficiencies and 
closure of evasion loop holes 
• Notable greater weight on capital formation, supported by belt 
tightening on recurrent outlays. 
• A steadfast commitment at ensuring that real expenditure 
levels in key social sectors such as health and education are 
defended and grown over time. 
• Realistic revenue expenditure targets are set in a manner that 
recognizes the extraordinary circumstances confronting the 
nation. Through this realism, scope will be created to allow 
the fiscal side to take on board some of the inflationary quasi 
fiscal outlay being inevitably discharged through the Reserve 
Bank as a second best survival intervention (Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe Monetary Policy Statement, 2005:47). 
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On public enterprises, the Minister of Finance commented 
that, “the debt stock of major parastatals as at June 2006, stood at 
Z$76.43 trillion. As a result parastatals are failing to service their 
debts, often calling on government to assume their obligations” 
(Mid Term Fiscal policy Review, July 2006, p 14). At the same time 
interest payments on debt amounted to Z$8.8 Trillion by July 2006. 
By the end of 2006, Quasi fiscal operations outlays stood as 
follows: 
• Agricultural Sector Productivity and Enhancement Facility 
(Z$19.54 trillion) 
• Parastatals Reorientation Programme (Z$6 trillion) 
• Distressed Companies Fund (Z$200 billion) 
• Local Authority Re-Orientation Programme (Z$300 billion) 
• Productive Sector Facility (Z$6.3 trillion) 
• Loans to Government Departments (Z$7.7 billion) 
• Troubled Banks (Z$3.2 Billion) 
In his National Budget Statement presented to the Parliament 
Of Zimbabwe on Thursday, 30 November, 2006, the Minister  of 
Finance fired a broadside at the Reserve Bank and attacked the 
Governor’s Quasi Fiscal Operations, “Mr Speaker Sir, Inflation 
remains one of the major challenges facing our economy. Year-on-
year inflation rose from 613.2% in January 2006, to reach a peak of 
1204.6% in August. Some of the major drivers of inflation remain – 
the impact of public sector borrowing requirements for budgetary 
financing; Quasi Fiscal activities funded through the Reserve 
Bank…” (p19). 
The Finance Minister announced that, “In this regard, 
combating inflation will require the phasing out of all quasi fiscal 
operations and adequately providing resources for prioritized 
expenditures within the budget. Hence consistent with our 
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Constitution and the Audit and Exchequer Act, beginning 2007, all 
such and any other additional public expenditures will be strictly 
and adequately reflected through the budgetary process” (p 19). 
The Minister announced that Quasi fiscal expenditures 
included, the budget deficit would stand at 43% of GDP, excluding 
interest, “such a high budget deficit underpins the very high money 
supply growth rates of over 1000% and the hyperinflation this 
nation continues to experience” (p33). In this regard the Minister 
set aside Z$100 billion towards the phased amortization of quasi 
fiscal operations. 
This was an open admission that all quasi fiscal operations 
were being done outside the authority of parliament, which was 
clearly unconstitutional. 
In the absence of external funding, arrears continued to 
accumulate to reach US$2.1billion in 2004 or 44% of external debt. 
Arrears to the fund totaled SDR 197 million as at end of April 2004. 
Zimbabwe has been in continuous arrears to the Fund since 
February 2001 and following a decision by the Executive Board on 3 
December 2003, the Managing Director issued a complaint on 
February 6, 2004 that initiated the procedure on Zimbabwe’s 
compulsory withdrawal from the Fund. 
5.7.2 Impact of bad governance and political blunders on 
Zimbabwe’s economy  
In the previous section, this paper discussed the interventions 
made by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to bridge the budgetary 
gap. We also saw how quasi-fiscal operations worsened the budget 
deficit and spurred hyperinflation as well as causing macroeconomic 
instability. However, economic reasons alone cannot explain the 
unprecedented economic collapse in Zimbabwe, during the third 
post independence decade which began in 2000.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
 226
The inclusion of governance issues, brings a new dimension in 
the understanding of the inter-relation between politics and 
economics and how this greatly affected economic growth and 
stability in Zimbabwe. 
The following section examines the extent to which other 
factors besides fiscal expenditures contributed to the worsening of 
the Zimbabwean economy. These factors include the land reform 
program, the Democratic Republic of Congo War, Corruption and of 
course the overall governance of the country. 
The Land Reform 
In their 2004/2005 Article IV Consultations, the IMF pointed 
out that “the disorderly implementation of the land reform program 
has contributed to a sharp reduction in agricultural production. 
Concerns about governance, the rule of law and human rights, and 
the continued lack of clarity about property rights have severely 
damaged confidence, discouraged investment, and promoted capital 
flight and emigration, thus contributing to the economic decline” 
(p.4). 
Despite criticisms directed at the land reform, other scholars 
like Moyo et al, (2002) argue that the land reform was necessary to 
correct the historical imbalances which were created by the colonial 
administration. During the colonial era and until 2000, about 4500 
white farmers occupied 85% of arable land with rich soils leaving 
the blacks who constituted 95% of the population to settle in semi-
arid and barren tribal trust lands. 
Moreover, in terms of the policy of black economic 
empowerment, land reform was seen as a vital tool to enable blacks 
to enter into mainstream economic activities (GoZ, 2000). 
Furthermore, government justified its land reform program on the 
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basis that the British had reneged on their promise to advance 
funds to the new Zimbabwe government to enable it to acquire land 
on a willing buyer, willing seller subject to compensation. 
Government also considered land reform as a key plank in the fight 
against poverty, hence the thrust of farm mechanization program 
and the heavy deployment of resources and inputs to new farmers.  
Corruption 
Corruption in any society is a serious scourge. Corruption 
leads to the sub-optimal and inefficient use of resources because of 
rent-seeking activities, overpricing and misallocation of resources.  
In macro-economic terms, corruption bleeds the economy. 
Unfortunately, most cases of corruption are never brought to book 
because they assume the white-collar form which is difficult to 
prove. In the late 1990s, corruption in Zimbabwe began to rear its 
ugly head. In 1989, government lost billions of Zimbabwe dollars in 
tax revenue in the infamous Willowgate Scandal. Willowvale 
Industry is the major manufacturer and assembler of MAZDA 
motor-vehicle kits in Zimbabwe. In 1989, the Chronicle newspaper 
unearthed a corruption scandal involving government ministers and 
public officials, whereby Toyota Cressida models were bought for a 
song and resold at high black market prices. President Mugabe set 
up a Commission of Enquiry chaired by High Court Judge, Justice 
Sandura. The findings of the Sandura Commission were horrendous 
– massive corruption. As a result, Enos Nkala, the then Home 
Affairs Minister was forced to resign and Maurice Nyagumbo, the 
then Senior Minister for Political affairs, committed suicide. The 
Willowgate scandal involved millions of Zimbabwe dollars. Later on, 
another Sandura 2 Commission on Willowvale was set up but this 
time, results were never made public.  
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Other cases of corruption which hit the headlines in the 
Zimbabwe press included, the export and re-importation of grain by 
the Grain Marketing Board, a government parastatal. This case led 
to the arrest of Kumbirai Kangai, who was a senior cabinet minister 
in charge of agriculture. The case of Wiridzai Nguruve and 
Augustine Chihuri – both Commissioners of Police – also 
demonstrated the pervasiveness of corruption in Zimbabwe. In the 
early 1990s, high profile cases of corruption involving senior public 
officials were suppressed. This had to do with the self allocation of 
government built villas, houses and apartments. 
In 2003, Parliament passed the Anti-Corruption Act. In 2005 
President Mugabe established a fully fledged Ministry called Anti-
Corruption and Anti-Monopolies Ministry headed by Paul Mangwana, 
a lawyer. Critics have however, chided the anti-corruption drive 
arguing that the swoop was selective and politically motivated. For 
example, the arrest of the Minister of Finance, Dr Chris Kuruneri, in 
2005 for alleged externalization of US$40million when he built a 
villa in Cape Town’s Constantia suburb was thought to be politically 
motivated as he was eventually not found guilty by the courts. 
Similar controversial cases of arrests took place after 2003, 
when the Reserve Bank Governor went on a crusade to punish the 
so-called offenders in the banking and financial sectors. A number 
of Chief Executive Officers of major banks fled the country, for 
instance National Merchant Bank, Barbican and Metropolitan Bank. 
Others who fled the country include business mogul, James 
Makamba, who had a majority shareholding in Telecel Zimbabwe. 
He was being charged for externalization. A number of companies 
were arrested for externalization and were prosecuted. But most of 
these people fled from the absence of due process rather than from 
the crimes allegedly committed. Government passed legislation 
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which allowed the state to re-arrest and re-detain a person even 
after courts would have granted bail. 
However, government argued that it was trying to get rid of 
corruption and was fighting corruption without fear or favour. The 
enactment of the Anti-Corruption Act was thought to be enough 
testimony to government’s seriousness.  
The point is that public resources were misused and 
furthermore, government committed further expenditures to try and 
investigate corruption cases but all these efforts did not yield any 
notable success. 
Military Intervention in the Congo 
Foreign currency reserves are the backbone of a robust 
economy. The general international practice on currency reserves is 
to aim to have at least three months of import cover. Adequate 
reserves act as a buffer against currency depreciation and 
strengthen the balance of payments position (Levacic, 1991). 
Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Congo war led to the running down 
of its foreign currency reserves (Melber, 2002).  
Zimbabwe’s military intrusion into the fighting in the Congo-
Kinshasa began in August 1998, but was pre-figured in 1996 when 
President Mugabe allegedly “donated” US$5million to Laurent Kabila 
to finance his rebellion against Mobutu (Melber, 2002). 
It is on record that the Zimbabwe Defense Industries (ZDI), a 
state owned firm, run by retired officers, arranged to supply Kabila’s 
forces with food, uniforms and weaponry, in a deal estimated worth 
US$53 million.  The war was very costly for the Zimbabwean people 
and deeply unpopular as it failed to be self financing. All payments 
had to be done in foreign currency. 
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According to Melber (2002) initially 6000 troops supported by 
Hawk and MiG 21 fighter planes and armed helicopters were 
dispatched in August 1998. By October, 2000 more soldiers were 
sent. This decision was made by President Mugabe and his Joint 
Operation Command (JOC), without parliamentary or cabinet 
approval. 
Many lives were lost. By the end of 1998, it was revealed that 
164 soldiers had been killed and 434 seriously injured in Congo. 
Considerable equipment had been lost, including an Allouette 3 
helicopter gunship, a MiG fighter, and Brazilian-made Cascavek  
tanks and armoured personnel carriers. The budget for the defense 
ministry had been set at US$9 million for the next year. The 
Zimbabwean government repeatedly denied that the Zimbabwean 
military was in Congo for profit: “You don't go where people lose 
lives just because you want to make a few dollars. But as a result of 
our presence, a number of Zimbabwe businessmen are taking 
advantage of the goodwill there. If they don't, others will”, argued 
the Minister of Defense (Melber, 2002: 18). 
Authorities grossly understated the cost of the Congo 
operations, assuring the IMF that their spending was around US$3 
million a month, when the actual expenditure through 1999 —on an 
internal Finance Ministry memorandum — was US$27.7 million 
monthly (Melber, 2002)  
The DRC war strained public finances, leading to the further 
increase of the twin deficits – the budget deficit and the external 
deficit. 
Despite the negative economic implications of the war, the 
Government justified the intervention in terms of a mandate of the 
SADC organ on Politics, Defense and Security. Most SADC countries 
for financial and economic reasons reneged on the SADC resolution 
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of 2007. In the end, only three SADC countries ended up 
participating. These were Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. These 
countries raised strong justifications for going into the DRC. Chief 
among those reasons was the defense of the sovereignty and 
legitimacy of the DRC government which had been invaded by 
Rwanda and Uganda.    
The Congo war was unbudgeted and it led to the severe 
bleeding of the Zimbabwean economy. However, government 
justified its intervention allegedly on the basis of a SADC resolution 
made in 2007 that urged SADC to send troops to the DRC. 
Government argued that other SADC countries had chickened out 
and left Namibia, Angola to sent troops.  
The Securitization of the State 
In many African countries, budgets are overrun due to heavy 
defense and security expenditures. In Southern Africa, Zimbabwe 
and Angola are examples of countries which have maintained high 
defense and security budgets. In the case of Zimbabwe, since 
independence in 1980, it faced security threats from the then 
Apartheid South Africa as well as economic threats on the Beira Oil 
Pipeline from Renamo in Mozambique. 
But even well after the security threats had gone, President 
Mugabe continued to increase the defense and security forces 
budget. 
President Mugabe created a team of securocrats who ran the 
country using repressive pieces of legislation such as Public Order 
and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Public 
Protection Act (AIPPA). Most public enterprises are run by retired 
military officers. The economy eventually was run by a National 
Security Council and the Reserve Bank, while cabinet had been 
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sidelined. Commercial farming was now done by the army under 
Operation Maguta. In fact, the country, since 2002, has been run 
through Operations. 
Linked to the securitization of the state, a system of 
patronage was introduced. Traditional Chiefs were put under full 
monthly payments plus a motor vehicle and an electrified rural 
home. These arrangements based on patronage proved costly to the 
fiscus and actually worsened the budget. 
However government justified the securitization on the basis 
of threats to the security of the state especially from the Movement 
of Democratic Change (MDC) and the Western powers, Britain in 
particular. 
Operation Murambatsvina (Clean-UP) 
In May 2005, President Mugabe destroyed all informal 
structures in urban areas, leaving more than 2 million people either 
destitute or homeless. The program was abruptly put to an end 
when it was roundly condemned by the United Nations envoy, Anna, 
Kajumolo-Tbaijuka. In fact the UN called for those who had 
orchestrated the program to be brought to book and tried of crimes 
against humanity. 
This exercise was unbudgeted and proved costly too. 
Government justified the operation and argued that it was 
necessary to combat urban illicit activities and improve town 
planning.  
The above sums up the fiscal and political crisis that engulfed 
Zimbabwe. What started as a simmering deficit in the 1980s later 
developed into a monster which paralyzed the delivery of service by 
the government, across all sectors of the economy. 
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All these were signs or symptoms of economic collapse whose 
roots had started in the 1980s, worsened in the 1990s and led to 
economic meltdown in the 2000s. 
Future Prospects 
After nearly 10 years of political conflict, the three major 
parties, namely ZANU PF, Movement for Democratic Change led by 
Morgan Tsvangirai and a breakaway faction led by Professor Arthur 
Mutambara signed a SADC brokered Global Political Agreement 
(GPA) on the 15th September 2008. The Agreement led to the 
formation of an inclusive government on the 13th February 2009. 
Since the formation of the inclusive government in February 
2009, the economy is slowly stabilizing. The Inclusive government 
demonetized the Zimbabwe dollar and adopted the multi-currency 
system (use of the United States dollar and South African Rand) as 
the major currencies of legal tender in Zimbabwe. This move has 
tamed inflation. The inclusive government has adopted a Cash 
Budget in order to avoid budget overruns. 
Food is now available in the shops due to the liberalization of 
food imports mainly from South Africa. However, the social sector 
which was the major casualty of the economic freefall of nearly 
three decades, has not yet fully recovered as recovery is based on 
heavy funding which is not available.  
The country is still under EU and USA sanctions and it appears 
sanctions might take a little longer to be uplifted because progress 
in their removal has already been linked to the pace of political 
reforms in Zimbabwe.  
Foreign direct investment and official development assistance 
so far has not been forthcoming. Balance of payments support is 
still being withheld due to payment arrears and the economic 
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embargo which is still in force. Zimbabwe’s total debt stands at 
US$11 billion (GoZ, 2011).  
In view of Zimbabwe’s large debt stock and its inability to 
repay the creditors, there is a raging debate in Zimbabwe around 
the HIPC route. 
The inclusive government is only a transitional authority 
charged with the responsibility to restore economic stability and a 
road map to free and fair elections. To its credit, the inclusive 
government has managed to stabilize the economy. The economy 
was dollarized; average annual inflation is 3.5 (2011). The 
economy’s GDP has grown by an average of 8% since 2009 and 
government operated a cash budget which in theory, translated into 
a cash budget. However, in real terms, a budget deficit still exists in 
different forms: payment arrears and under budgeting. 
5.8 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the complex link between 
economic and political factors in the analysis of Zimbabwe’s 
economic performance. The fiscal deficit in Zimbabwe started to 
accumulate during the period of economic dirigisme (1980-1988) 
but did not yet upset economic performance because the economy 
was registering impressive growth rates on the back of high foreign 
direct investments and access to foreign resources to finance the 
deficit following the lifting of sanctions. 
As a result, inflation though high, was still in the single digit 
zone for the greater part of the first decade. The impact of the 
deficit on the exchange rate, trade deficit and interest rate was 
neutral due to government’s interventionist policies. At that time, 
the exchange rate was fixed and interest rates were not market 
determined due to financial repression. 
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The current account balance was affected not so much by the 
macroeconomics of the deficit than the rise in the import demand. 
We saw in the period of market based reforms, Zimbabwe 
embracing IMF/World Bank economic reforms but failing to achieve 
the agreed targets as a result of lack of fiscal consolidation. The 
fiscal quarrel prompted the IMF to suspend balance of payments 
support in 1998. This triggered a foreign exchange crisis in 
Zimbabwe. The macro-economics of the deficit started in earnest to 
have a direct and indirect bearing on hyperinflation and the 
exchange rate. 
During the ensuing periods of failed controls and political 
chaos, respectively, we saw the fiscal crisis reaching tipping point 
and we explored the reasons why the Reserve Bank took over all 
the key financial and economic decisions and policies of the state. 
Quasi-fiscal operations compounded the deficit and led to 
macroeconomic problems. Eventually the economic challenges 
became insurmountable and the economy entered the economic 
meltdown phase, which was marked by a hyperinflation of 231 
million percent in July 2008, the highest in the world. Zimbabwe 
joined the list of failed states during the period of chaos. 
We also discussed the point that economic reasons per se 
would not explain the economic meltdown that happened in 
Zimbabwe. Non-economic factors such as the disorderly land 
reform, corruption, the DRC war, the securitization of the state, the 
collapse of the judiciary and the political conflict all combined to 
cause macroeconomic instability and ultimately the economic 
collapse in Zimbabwe as we know it before February 2009.  
We analyzed the macroeconomic impact of the deficit in 
Zimbabwe since 1981, where we saw the consistent failure to 
reduce the deficit ratio. As Jenkins (1997) observed, deficit reached 
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14% of GDP in 1994/95 while total government spending grew from 
31% of GDP immediately before independence to around 40% of 
GDP by end of the 1980s. Capital expenditure accounted for 10% of 
total expenditure or 3.5% of GDP. Revenue, excluding grants also 
grew strongly from 25% to 32% of GDP but was insufficient to 
cover recurrent expenditure which averaged 34% of GDP from 1980 
to 1990 before it accelerated to 800% above GDP in 2008 as the 
economy plunged into the highest hyperinflation ever experienced 
in the world in peace times. In this regard, the public sector deficit 
remained one of the primary causes of economic imbalance in 
Zimbabwe. 
Finally, we conclude that, politics and fiscal deficits created a 
fertile ground for macroeconomic instability in Zimbabwe between 
1980 and 2008. As the UNDP (2008:24) points out, “the lack of 
fiscal discipline throughout the recent post independence period has 
consistently had an adverse impact on growth. Having begun with 
the unbudgeted expenditures of 1997, the situation is now 
characterized by quasi-fiscal expenditures that weigh budgeted 
expenditures”.  
This chapter sought to review the economic history of 
Zimbabwe, track the budget deficit and its occurrence, and examine 
the cumulative effects of the budget deficit on the Zimbabwean 
economy between 1980-2008. The budget deficit alone does not 
sufficiently explain Zimbabwe’s economic collapse. Political economy 
issues equally contributed to the economic meltdown of the country. 
In this regard, we conclude that, apart from the budget deficit, 
there is also a close connection between politics and poor macro-
economic performance in failed states. Zimbabwe perfectly fits into 
this category.  
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Our concern was the impact of the fiscal deficit and politics on 
macroeconomic performance in Zimbabwe. This bias means that, 
we may not have covered the full narrative of Zimbabwe’s economic 
history, for it is was never the intention of this study to open that 
debate. 
As Stiglitzi (2002:xv) said, “ many of the people I criticize will 
say that I have gotten it wrong: they may even produce evidence 
that contradicts my views of what happened. I can only offer my 
interpretation of what I saw.” 
 
                                                 
i My apologies to Rob Davies for misappropriating the above quotation from his 
article, “Memories of Underdevelopment: a personal account of Zimbabwe’s 
economic decline” Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
This study sought to explore the macroeconomic impact of 
fiscal deficits and the catalytic effect of governance in Zimbabwe. 
The study’s hypothesis was that, firstly, depending on their 
composition and financing, fiscal deficits are generally known to 
trigger macroeconomic disequilibria. Secondly, deficits alone, cannot 
fully explain the macroeconomic stability that Zimbabwe 
experienced in the period 1980-2008. The catalytic effect of 
governance was clearly evident. 
The motivation for this study was that fiscal deficits have been at 
the centre of macroeconomic adjustment since the debt crisis of 
1982 and to date, the global financial crisis has made the deficit and 
fiscal policy a big issue in macroeconomic management. And indeed 
Zimbabwe has experienced chronic fiscal deficits since 
independence resulting in negative implications on the economy. 
Therefore, central to this study, was the question: How did the 
cumulative fiscal deficits, caused by political and economic factors, 
affect macroeconomic stability in Zimbabwe since the attainment of 
independence in 1980? 
In Chapter one, we laid out the objectives, hypothesis, 
relevance and the methodology of the study. The main objective of 
the study was to investigate the impact of fiscal deficits on 
macroeconomic performance and in this regard, the role played by 
governance in Zimbabwe. This was seen as very relevant to policy 
making, both for Zimbabwe today and as a lesson to policymakers 
in other countries. It was recognized that public finance 
management is vital for economic development hence the need to 
come up with recommendations which could influence policy making 
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in Zimbabwe, and cause a paradigm shift in fiscal policy in order to 
enhance macroeconomic stability.  
On the methodology of the study, we chose a QUALITATIVE 
AND COMPARATIVE methodology by looking at the experiences of 
other African countries with regard to the political economy of fiscal 
deficits and implications on macroeconomic performance. Our 
justification of this methodology was that econometric modeling 
under hyperinflationary conditions would be futile in view of the 
softness of data and the impact of hyper-inflation. Moreover, we 
wanted to incorporate political economy issues in the discussion in 
view of the fact that econometric analysis per se, does not fully 
explain or capture the intricacies of policy intervention, especially 
the influence of other factors outside the economic domain – like 
governance issues and corruption. The impact of these political 
factors is not so easy to measure. Yet another possible factor that 
econometrics neglect is ideology, which has been important in 
setting the policy agenda in African countries in the 1970s and 
1980s in general and Zimbabwe in particular, after 2000. These 
political economy issues include land and factory invasions, price 
controls, indigenization and economic empowerment in Zimbabwe, 
the nationalization of mines, the transformation of the state from 
civilian to quasi-military and the impunity that this transformation 
bred. Such structural and institutional issues caused serious 
economic decline, especially in Zimbabwe, but cannot be measured 
or quantified. 
As the World Bank (1994: 16) rightly points out, all these 
structural factors play some role in Africa’s poor performance, “but 
we can only speculate about their relevance, because they are 
difficult to quantify and test rigorously”.  
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Chapter two reviewed the theoretical literature on the budget 
deficit and its relationship with selected economic variables. Chapter 
two also shed more light on the various deficit concepts that are 
used in the discourse. These deficit concepts include the 
conventional deficit, primary deficit, cyclical deficit, operational 
deficit, quasi-fiscal deficits and structural deficit. A proper 
specification of the deficit is very important in fiscal policy. It avoids 
the common problem of understating the deficit. We then discussed 
theoretical propositions on the budget deficit, namely the Ricardian 
equivalence, Neo-classical school, and the Keynesian school. 
The Ricardian Equivalence argued that budget deficits were 
neutral because the future taxes implied by government debt, 
cancel any wealth effects of the debt, thereby preventing all the 
effects predicted by the traditional view (Barro, 1974).   
The Keynesians view was that public expenditure crowds-in 
private investment, citing the expansionary effects of the budget 
deficit. Keynesians argue that budget deficits usually result in an 
increase in domestic demand, which makes private investors more 
optimistic about the future course of the economy resulting in them 
investing more. This is known as the “crowding-in effect”. Hence, 
deficits may stimulate aggregate demand, aggregate savings and 
investment despite the fact that they raise interest rates and may 
stimulate inflation.  
Neoclassicals opined that deficits crowded out the private 
sector. The Neoclassical paradigm asserted that the economy was 
always at, or moving rapidly towards, full resource utilization. 
Deficits thus affected growth only through their effects on the rate 
of capital accumulation. Deficits that substitute for tax financing 
increase lifetime incomes if they do not imply certain future tax 
increases. Consumption increases and, in the neoclassical model 
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where all resources are employed, savings decrease. The demand 
for loanable funds exceeds the supply at the current interest rate, 
and in a closed economy where government does not resort to 
money financing of the deficit, interest rates rise, investment falls 
and savings increase, until savings and investment are brought into 
balance. The increased interest rates are thus said to crowd out 
private investment.  
In chapter two, theory concluded that the impact of the deficit 
depends on two things: namely its composition and how it is 
financed. The findings of chapter two can be summarized as follows: 
deficit fuel inflation if they are monetized; interest rates positively 
respond to deficits; there is a connection between the budget deficit 
and trade deficit; the relationship between deficit and exchange rate 
is ambiguous; and lastly, deficits crowd out private investment 
depending on the interest elasticity of investment. 
Chapter three looked at the empirical studies which tested the 
causal link between the deficit and macro-economic variables such 
as inflation, interest rate, exchange rate, growth, and trade deficit. 
Empirical studies suggested that: the relationship between the 
deficit and inflation is statistically significant and positive; there is a 
causal link between the budget deficit and trade deficit (the so-
called twin deficits); the relationship between the deficit and 
exchange rate is ambiguous; and the relationship between the 
deficit and growth is non-linear, implying that budgets do not 
always have to balance – a deficit up to a threshold of about 1.5% 
enhances growth but a larger deficit inhibits growth. 
In chapter four we first did a survey of the general economic 
performance of Sub-Saharan Africa before undertaking a 
comparative study on the economic impact of fiscal deficits in 
Ghana, Botswana, Morocco and Zambia.  In general, we found that 
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fiscal deficits do have an impact on macroeconomic performance. In 
this regard, the experiences of Ghana and Zambia showed that high 
public expenditures were detrimental to their economies while good 
fiscal policy (a low, non-monetized deficit) contributed to 
macroeconomic stability in Botswana and Morocco.  
Finally, in chapter five we then carried out a case study on the 
impact of fiscal deficits and the catalytic effects of governance in 
Zimbabwe during the post independence decade (1980-2008). We 
saw how between 1980 and 1990, the new government pursued 
populist policies that were based on growth with equity principles 
and how these resulted in high fiscal expenditures and high budget 
deficits. Between 1990 and 1995, Zimbabwe embarked on a 
structural adjustment program but abandoned policy reforms in 
1995 after sharp differences with the IMF over the lack of fiscal 
consolidation and the absence of political will in the implementation 
of the program.  After 2000, we saw how government employed 
desperate measures such as quasi-fiscal operations to bridge the 
deficit. Quasi-fiscal operations triggered hyperinflation as they were 
financed by siegniorage. Between 2000 and 2008, the Zimbabwe 
government became technically insolvent. The deficit took its toll on 
the economy and the situation was worsened by poor governance, 
which was characterized by political instability and poor 
macroeconomic policies. We concluded that high fiscal expenditures 
(coupled with lack of fiscal discipline) contributed to economic 
meltdown in Zimbabwe. We also found that deficits were worsened 
by bad governance and corruption. 
This chapter draws down the curtain on the study and 
discusses the major findings, implications, recommendations and 
conclusions. 
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6.2 Findings 
The major findings are that in Zimbabwe fiscal deficits, 
coupled with other political economy factors, had a major impact on 
macroeconomic performance. We also found that the fiscal deficit is 
an important economic indicator affecting macro-economic 
performance, provided it is correctly measured. The study also finds 
that in Zimbabwe political and institutional factors had a bearing on 
fiscal policy, hence fiscal adjustment is more likely to yield positive 
results when it is  underpinned by good governance (in all its 
dimensions), because it is critical for fiscal consolidation. 
The study has revealed that the impact of the budget deficit 
on macroeconomic performance depends first on whether the deficit 
is incurred on recurrent or capital projects. Theory and evidence has 
shown that capital expenditure-based deficits tend to crowd-in 
private investment, whereas recurrent deficits crowd out private 
investment. Secondly, how the budget deficit is financed has a 
bearing on the macroeconomic impact of the deficit. Zimbabwe‘s 
fiscal expenditure was largely recurrent and its financing was 
inflationary. 
The specific findings are captioned in detail below: 
Deficit and Interest rates 
Between 1980 and 1988, the impact of the budget deficit on 
interest rates in Zimbabwe was minimized because the government 
practiced financial repression in a bid to cheaply finance its deficit . 
After 1988, the period of market based reforms, however, deficit-
induced borrowing triggered a huge interest burden and for the first 
time in its history, Zimbabwe was plunged into a debt trap where 
over three quarters of revenue went towards interest payments. 
Therefore, although the primary deficit remained relatively subdued, 
after 1988, the conventional deficit worsened because of interest. 
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During the period of failed controls, the total deficit (including quasi 
fiscal deficits) was financed by printing money. The transmission 
mechanism of deficit to interest rate was blunted by the 
maintenance of a dual interest rate regime alongside a 
concessionary credit policy. Therefore in summary, the evidence 
suggests that deficits had a major bearing on interest rates in 
Zimbabwe mainly during the market based and failed controls 
periods. At the end of the failed controls period, and beyond, a dual 
interest rate policy was adopted to disguise the impact of the 
budget deficit on interest rates in Zimbabwe. In order to manipulate 
interest rates, government rolled over Treasury Bills upon their 
maturity, thereby avoiding interest payments. 
Deficit and Inflation 
Regarding the impact of the budget deficit on inflation, our 
conclusion is that in Zimbabwe, after 1988, deficits were monetized 
and this stoked inflation.  The impact of the deficit on inflation was 
distressing during the period of chaos as a result of quasi-fiscal 
operations run by the Reserve Bank and which were largely 
financed by seigniorage revenues.  Deficits precipitated an 
unprecedented hyperinflation in Zimbabwe which led to the collapse 
of the domestic currency (Zimbabwe dollar in 2008) and its 
replacement by a multiple-currency system in January 2009. 
Deficit and Exchange Rate 
To the extent that deficits stoked inflation, which in turn led to 
the overvaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar against major trading 
currencies, we conclude that the deficit indirectly affected the 
exchange rate. Since the Zimbabwe dollar remained fixed and 
overvalued, a thriving black market emerged, especially after 2000. 
Foreign currency disappeared from the formal market and was now 
available on the black market. This pushed up commodity prices as 
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producers sought to recoup the costs of the black market 
premiums. Therefore, in the absence of official devaluation, the 
deficit indirectly distorted the exchange rate and contributed to 
macroeconomic instability.  
Deficit and Crowding Out 
Did fiscal expenditure cause the crowding out of private 
investment in Zimbabwe?  The results are mixed. On the one hand, 
it would appear that due to financial repression, and a cocktail of 
concessionary finance packages offered to the private sector by the 
central bank, especially after 2000, the impact of interest rates was 
diminished. More so, real interest rates have been negative for 
nearly a decade due to inflation and the deliberate restructuring of 
government debt and the rejection of high bids on treasury bills. 
Since 2000 the Zimbabwean government has been trying to mop up 
excess liquidity on the market by issuing long term borrowing 
instruments. This has led to a significant decline in interest 
payments. All these measures blunted the transmission effects of 
government borrowing on interest rates. However, on the other 
hand Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991) argue that deficits crowd 
out private investment in Zimbabwe as government borrowing 
through money market instruments left the private sector to access 
short term loans at high interest rates whilst competing with 
government. This later view confirms our earlier observation that 
deficits triggered interest rate increases.  
Deficit and Trade balance 
The Zimbabwean case study also looked at the impact of the 
deficit on the current account. The budget deficit affected the trade 
deficit mainly through its impact on domestic absorption and higher 
parallel exchange rate market premiums. However, the relationship 
between the deficit and the current account is still mired in 
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controversy due to other factors that were at play in Zimbabwe, 
such as the suspension of balance of payments support by 
multilateral agencies, suspension of development cooperation 
agreements, and targeted sanctions by the European Union and the 
USA government.  We conclude that the evidence regarding the 
effect of budget deficits on the current account (trade deficit) in 
Zimbabwe remains ambiguous.  
Deficit and Growth 
Zimbabwe’s fiscal experience suggests that deficits were 
partly to blame for the sluggish growth rates registered between 
1980 and 1988. And indeed after 2000, negative growth rates could 
be attributed to high deficit growth.  However, there are other more 
important reasons for Zimbabwe’s consecutive negative growth 
rates other than the deficit. These factors include low capacity 
utilization, input costs, reduced lines of credit, poor export 
performance, the exchange rate and inflation, among others. In this 
regard, the relationship between the deficit and growth in 
Zimbabwe was non-linear. 
The Role of Governance 
Indeed, we also looked at the contribution of other factors 
(other than the budget deficit) to Zimbabwe’s economic problems. 
Our major findings are that bad governance yielded politically 
expedient and self-serving policies such as price controls, the land 
reform program, quasi-fiscal operations and subsidies which caused 
structural distortions. We saw, for example, how the Congo war 
negatively impacted on the Zimbabwean economy and how 
unorthodox the government became as shown by the printing of 
money and other policy aberrations. The issue of political stability 
and how it affected economic confidence is critical in understanding 
the current economic meltdown in Zimbabwe. Even the 
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transformation of the state from a cabinet-based to one where 
decisions were made by the National Security Council had a bearing 
on economic policy formulation and implementation. Under such 
political circumstances, the rule of law was suspended and the 
functioning of public institutions corrupted. Moreover, the 
prevalence of high corruption levels also contributed to the 
economic problems which dogged the country.  Hence, fiscal deficits 
alone may not be sufficient to explain Zimbabwe’s economic 
decline.  
6.3 Implications 
The implication of the above findings is that the performance 
of developing countries is hamstrung by poor revenue 
performances, fiscal indiscipline and bad governance. The problem 
is worsened by the fact that governments, regardless of resource 
constraints, continue to live beyond their means by incurring huge 
deficits as a result of political expediency. This is indeed the tragedy 
in which Zimbabwe found itself after independence. We argue that, 
because of low domestic revenue bases, developing countries would 
have to provide more incentives to attract foreign investment as 
opposed to external borrowing which would increase their public 
debt. Poverty and the population needs of developing countries, 
particularly in health, education, food security and housing, make 
fiscal discipline particularly difficult. 
The recent global financial crisis has put fiscal policy at the 
centre of macroeconomic adjustment. This might mean the 
resurgence of a new thinking on the role of fiscal policy in 
stimulating economic activity.     
6.4 Recommendations 
The objective of the study was to make a contribution to the 
understanding of the macro-economic impact of the budget deficit 
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in Zimbabwe so as to inform policy decision making. In view of our 
findings on the impact of fiscal deficits and bad governance on 
macroeconomic performance in Zimbabwe, we draw the following 
specific policy recommendations.  
Policy Formulation 
Lack of technical capacity in government departments often 
leads to half-baked policy measures. In order for public policies to 
be cost effective and sustainable, there is need for more technical 
support at the Ministry of Finance and other economic ministries. 
Policies must be underpinned by thorough analysis of the various 
economic implications. Moreover, in a developing country like 
Zimbabwe, policy formulation requires civic participation in order to 
get the buy-in of key stakeholders. Moreover, Zimbabwe must 
strengthen its statistical agencies so they can be equipped to 
compile and maintain up to date and reliable statistical data. In 
addition, policies should capture the role played by politics. Good 
governance breeds good economic and structural policies. Political 
stability boosts market confidence.  
In addition, policies must be made with the informal sector in 
mind because that is where most jobs are created. Government 
could also create a fiscal policy think tank to assist the Ministry of 
Finance to develop sound fiscal policies. In one of the federal states 
in the USA, the Fiscal Policy Institute plays a crucial role in policy 
formulation. 
Budget Reforms   
In order to reduce fiscal deficits and improve fiscal space - 
(a) The Zimbabwean government must introduce cash 
budgeting in order to avoid expenditure overruns. 
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(b) The Budget should be formulated with stakeholder 
participation. 
(c) Realistic macroeconomic assumptions should underpin the 
budget. 
(d) Public Audits should be brought up to date and in this 
regard more resources should be allocated to the 
Comptroller and Auditor General.  
(e) Accounting Officers must be sanctioned for all 
unauthorized and irregular expenditures. 
(f) Supplementary budgets must be stopped 
(g) The Parliamentary Portfolio Committees, especially the 
Public Accounts and Budget Committees, must continue to 
be strengthened so they can effectively play their oversight 
roles. 
(h) The Budget must be restructured in a manner which 
sharply increases capital expenditure (capex) in 
comparison to recurrent expenditure. 
(i) All withdrawals from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) 
should be authorized by Parliament and Government 
should stick to the prescribed borrowing limits. 
(j) Health and Education should continue to be well resourced 
within the limit of the budget. Social safety nets should be 
funded in a sustainable manner. 
(k) The Budget must be used as a tool for executing macro-
economic stability and not as a substitute for a 
comprehensive economic development program as has 
happened in Zimbabwe since 1980. 
(l) Relations with the international community must be 
restored to allow the resumption of balance of payments 
support. This will remove pressure on the domestic sources 
of revenue, which are narrow. 
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(m) Public transparency, honesty, integrity and 
accountability are key to stability in public finance. 
(n) A Public Finance Management Act should be enacted in 
order to regulate public spending and promote 
accountability. 
All the above propositions are premised on the assumptions of 
a stable and growing economy. Economic growth is a necessary 
condition for macro-economic stability and improved revenue 
performance. 
Fiscal Adjustment 
(a) Civil service reforms must be undertaken in order to 
reduce the wage and salary bill which drives recurrent 
expenditure.  
(b) Cabinet should be right-sized. (For a small country like 
Zimbabwe, 38 Ministers, including deputies is a large figure 
considering the perks that go with their offices.) 
(c) Revenue Collection reforms must be implemented to 
promote tax efficiency and tax compliance. 
(d) Parastatals should be privatized or commercialized so that 
they do not depend on loans and transfers from central 
government. 
(e) Local Authorities should not be subsidized. They must be 
run autonomously using revenue from licences and 
ratepayers 
(f) Government must work out a public expenditure reduction 
program which is specific, measurable, achievable, realistic 
and time bound (SMART). 
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Governance 
The state must be a catalyst of development. There is a 
strong case for a developmental state where government creates an 
enabling regulatory environment in order to facilitate economic 
development. Corruption in government and the private sector must 
be tackled seriously.  These measures will help boost market 
confidence and stimulate the economy. But most importantly, the 
oversight role of Parliament must be strengthened. This is important 
to ensure that the Executive is always held accountable. 
Macroeconomic Policy and Structural Reforms 
Price distortions lead to the misallocation of resources. It is 
therefore important for all structural bottlenecks in the economy to 
be dealt with, especially in the pricing of public goods and public 
utilities. It is further recommended that policy reversals be avoided 
as they undermine market confidence. 
Government Borrowing 
Zimbabwe has experienced fiscal deficits over a prolonged 
period. Government has developed an insatiable desire to spend 
and live beyond its means. Government borrowing must be confined 
to capital projects only and such borrowing must be long term in 
order to avoid the interest burden.  
Deficit Finance 
Deficit finance must be approved by parliament. This will 
ensure that government becomes accountable to parliament. 
Moreover, this will stop unauthorized expenditure.  
6.5 Limitations of this Study 
This study could, by the very nature of the Zimbabwean 
situation of hyperinflation, not involve an econometric analysis of 
the relationship between the deficit and other macroeconomic 
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magnitudes. The author was thus compelled to undertake a 
qualitative study, also learning from the experience of other African 
countries. It would in principle have been possible to further 
broaden the comparative scope, for example by looking at the 
experiences of more African countries and even Latin American 
countries which suffered from chronic budget deficits and other 
economic ills such as the debt crisis,  high inflation, low growth, 
balance of payments crisis and low investment. This may perhaps 
have provided even more insight on the subject.  
Another limitation is that most data in Zimbabwe are not up 
to date due to funding problems that affected the Central Statistics 
Office. Moreover, statistical data in a hyperinflation economy such 
as that of Zimbabwe tend to be soft and hence should be treated 
with a great degree of caution. The use of nominal aggregate 
figures may not mean anything in a hyperinflationary economy. 
Similarly, deflating the figures using hyperinflationary Consumer 
Price Indices still won’t solve this data quagmire. Be this as it may, 
we hold that these limitations do not materially change the findings 
and conclusions of this study. 
The Zimbabwe case study presented serious challenges 
emanating from political economy and made it impossible to 
attribute our explanation of the economic meltdown exclusively to 
the budget deficit. The budget deficit alone would not sufficiently 
explain Zimbabwe’s economic circumstance – that of a failed state.  
The failed state status complicated the fiscal analysis. 
6.6 Conclusion 
We conclude that fiscal deficits and bad governance 
contributed to the deterioration of macroeconomic performance in 
Zimbabwe since 1980. Political economy factors such as bad 
governance, corruption, and the land reform program in Zimbabwe 
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contributed to deteriorating macroeconomic instability (especially 
during the period of political chaos). During the period of political 
chaos (2004-2008), money financing of deficits triggered 
inflationary pressures which had pervasive effects on other 
economic variables, especially the parallel market exchange rate, 
which became the de facto exchange rate of the country. 
Furthermore, we acknowledge the need for further 
macroeconomic, fiscal adjustment and political reforms to restore 
the economy to its pre-1980 levels.  But most importantly, 
Zimbabwe needs to re-engage the international community with a 
view to getting access to financial and budgetary support whilst 
measures are taken to improve revenue performance and other 
structural impediments related to revenue performance and 
expenditure control. A clear understanding of the effects of 
governance on the economy will equip policy makers with the 
requisite capacity to handle macro-economic policy challenges in 
Zimbabwe today and in future.   
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